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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES ON THE STRATEGY
TO INTRODUCE NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO RETAILING 
Despite the widespread changes that are taking place in
retail technology, it is an area which 'has been subjected
to relatively little research. In particular, there has
been a neglect of the process of introducing new
technology. Based on a comparative study of two
supermarket chains, this thesis examines the way in which
technology is introduced into retail companies and the
problems they encounter. The technology in question
consisted of the computerisation of all head office and
warehouse systems and the introduction of Electronic Point
of Sale (EPOS) and Portable Data Capture Units (PDCs) into
the branches. Research methods included participant
observation, interviews and analysis of documents.
The study found that the introduction of new technology
was not the result of a rational, pre-determined strategy,
but that it evolved from a series of ad hoc decisions.
Organizational processes played an important part in
forming this emerging strategy and also influenced its
successful implementation. In particular, power, politics,
conflict, communication and commitment were identified as
key processes. Further research into these issues showed
that they could be attributed to four major factors: the
decline of the organization; ownership of the company; an
uncertain environment and the organization structure.
The research provided valuable empirical evidence to
support or refute ideas developed in previous works on new
technology. The major contribution of the thesis lies in
the insights it gives into the complex interaction of
strategy formation, organizational processes and the
underlying factors. The thesis demonstrates how the four
major factors, in particular organization structure, gave
rise to the processes which subsequently influenced the
emerging new technology strategy and affected the
companies' ability to sucessfully exploit the benefits.
CATHERINE J CROMBLEHOLME	 JULY 1988 
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1. INTRODUCTION
This introductory chapter sets the scene for the rest of
the thesis. It explains how the research began and the
principles on which it is based. It gives a brief
overview of the key elements of the thesis and its
relationship with existing literature. In addition, it
describes how the thesis is structured and outlines the
content of each chapter.
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH
The research was funded by the Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC) under their Collaborative Award in
the Social Sciences (CASS) scheme. The aim of the CASS
scheme (according to the ESRC Studentship Handbook) is 'to
foster closer links between social scientists and
non-academic organizations'. The researcher is required
to spend a minimum of three months with the collaborating
body.
The collaborating body in this research was Laws Stores
Ltd of Gateshead, a medium-sized, regional, supermarket
chain, operating 45 branches in the North East of England
and Southern Scotland. The company, established in 1907,
was still privately owned and managed by descendants of
the founder.
This type of collaborative research has many benefits, not
least of which is immediate access to a company, something
which many researchers spend months negotiating. It also
provides a valuable opportunity to study the 'real'
problems faced by an organization. A further benefit is
the high level at which access is gained. In their 'Notes
For Potential Applicants and Collaborating Bodies', the
ESRC state 'it will normally be expected to provide a
liaison officer at a reasonably senior level within the
organization'. In this case, the Personnel Director was
the liaison officer. He performed a vital role in
opening doors' for the researcher into all areas and
levels of the company. These factors combined to allow
the researcher a good insight into the workings of an
organization.
There are also drawbacks associated with such close
Co-operation between the researcher and the organization
under investigation. The first is that the two parties
may have differing, and contradictory, expectations of the
research. Fortunately, such a problem did not arise in
this study, largely because the Chairman of Laws had a
strong interest in, and appreciation of, academic
research.	 The second drawback is that, because the
research involves a 'live' situation, many events are
outside the researcher's control. The study is therefore
susceptible to any change in the organization's
circumstances and must be adapted accordingly. Fifteen
months after the research with Laws Stores began, the
company underwent a drastic change (details of which are
given in Chapter 10). From the point of view of the
research, this caused some short-term difficulties, but
these were soon overcome. By adapting the research to the
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change in circumstances, whilst still retaining the
overall aims, it was possible to turn the situation to
advantage.
To explain the context in which the research took place it
is necessary to give a brief overview of the environment
in which Laws operated, ie the retail trades.
THE RETAIL TRADES 
The distributive industry (of which retailing forms a
large part) plays an important role in the UK economy, it
contributed 13.3% to GDP in 1986. Retailing employs over
two million people, 8% of the workforce, and as such is
the country's third largest sector of employment (Annual
Abstract of Statistics, 1988).
The importance of retailing had not been recognised until
recently, when concern began to be expressed about the
decline of manufacturing in the UK and the corresponding
increase in service industries. Furthermore, retailing
has only recently been recognised as a field of academic
study. This is illustrated by a number of recent
developments, for example the establishment of the
Institute for Retail Studies at Stirling in 1983 and the
Oxford Institute of Retail Management in 1985. Chairs in
retailing have also been created, at Stirling University
and at Brighton Polytechnic. The upsurge in academic
interest has also been reflected by the founding of the
International Journal of Retailing in 1986.
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The significance of the retail industry however, lies not
only in its size, but also in its dynamism. This has
been caused by such things as social changes and more
discriminating customers; greater emphasis on design and
merchandising; a large number of acquisitions, resulting
in an increased share of the market for multiples; and
more sophisticated management techniques.
These changes have probably been most marked in the
grocery retailing sector. In the period 1961-1986 the
multiples' share of the market increased from 27% to 72%,
whilst the independents' declined from 53% to 17%. The
size of supermarkets has also increased dramatically, with
an associated trend away from the high street to
out-of-town sites.
The most dramatic change, and one with far reaching
implications, is the introduction of new technology. Many
of the major supermarket chains introduced data processing
facilities into their head offices in the 1960s. By the
early 1980s, with the advent of microelectronics and
improved data communications, they were introducing (or at
least contemplating) laser scanning and were reviewing
ways of using the massive amounts of management
information generated. Whilst these changes took most
companies over 20 years, Laws Stores attempted to make the
transition in less than two. A head office computer was
installed in 1982 and in 1984 laser scanning was installed
into two branches on a trial basis. Understandably, such
rapid developments were not achieved without difficulties
and thus provided a fertile area for research and an
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opportunity to make a contribution in the previously
under-researched area of retail technology.
NEW TECHNOLOGY
New technology has been a key element in the changes in
retailing. Much has been written, both in the popular and
academic press, about technology, often referred to under
a confusing variety of terms, such as 'new technology',
'information technology' and 'microelectronics'. It is
necessary, therefore, to clarify what is meant by
technology in this context. The technology used by Laws .
Stores consisted of two main elements, head office systems
and in-store systems.
Shortly before the research began, an IBM mini-computer
was installed in Laws Stores' head office and work began
on transfering all administrative, financial and
management information systems onto this. The IBM System
38 that was purchased was a 'state of the art' machine
requiring little technical support but, as the systems
were on-line, considerable involvement was required from
the user departments. This technology (ie the hardware
and the software) was not fundamentally different from
that which could be used by any company's head office,
although some systems, such as warehousing and purchasing,
were specifically tailored to retailing.
The other element of the technology, the in-store systems,
were specific to retailing. These consisted of Portable
Data Capture (PDC) units, which were introduced into all
5
branches of Laws during the period of the research, and
Electronic Point Of Sale (EPOS) systems, which were
introduced into two branches. PDCs are hand-held battery
powered units, similar to large calculators, which are
used to capture the store's order and transmit it, via the
telephone lines, to head office. EPOS systems consist of
sophisticated electronic cash registers with the ability
to capture data on the merchandise sold and store it for
processing by a computer. In supermarkets, data is
captured by means of a barcode on each item which is read
at the checkout by a laser scanner, hence they are often
referred to as laser scanning systems.
THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
The study did not conform to a 'traditional' model of the
research process. This is often illustrated as a series
of logical, sequential, discrete steps leading from
selection of the research topic, through literature
searching, collection and analysis of the data to
presentation of the findings (Howard and Sharp 1983).
Given the unusual opportunity of immediate access to a
company, advantage was taken of this situation to enable
the researcher to study 'real world' problems. Therefore,
the first stage of the research involved investigation
into the company to discover just what those problems
were. Information was sought on company operations, how
new technology fitted into the organization, how this
technology was introduced and any problems resulting from
its introduction. The methods used included observation,
analysis of documents and unstructured interviews. As
6
problems and issues were identified in the organization,
continual reference was made to the existing body of
literature on the relevant subjects. This shed light on
some areas of the research and also revealed gaps in
previous works. In this way, by undertaking empirical
research and literature searching simultaneously, it was
possible to identify a topic which was both a 'real'
problem for Laws Stores as well as an area which had not
been adequately covered in previous work.
The major problems and issues at Laws were found to
involve the organizational processes by which the strategy
to introduce new technology was formulated and
implemented. These processes included communication,
conflict, internal politics and commitment to the changes.
A review of literature on new technology found there to be
very little work on the strategy and implementation of new
technology and the processual viewpoint was also lacking.
Therefore, this area was chosen for further research in
Laws Stores. The aim was to investigate the nature of
these organizational processes, the factors which gave
rise to them and their subsequent effect on the strategy
to introduce new technology.
Once again, several methods were used to collect data,
although these were now focused on the specific processes
outlined above, in particular more structured interviews
were used to facilitate greater probing of the relevant
issues. This was followed by a comparative study in
another supermarket chain, Wm Low & Co plc. Although
similar to Laws in many respects, Wm Low was significantly
7
different in others, especially its approach to new
technology. In total, 90 days were spent with Laws Stores
between October 1983 and May 1985, this was followed by
four one-week periods with Wm Low & Company plc.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the literature on technology and automation from
the 1960s and early 1970s tended to concentrate on
manufacturing industry, for example Woodward (1965), Pugh
et al (1968). Little attention was paid to the service
industries and retailing in particular. One notable
exception to this is the work of Pettigrew (1973) who
studied the decision to introduce a computer into a retail
organization, however he did not emphasize the retailing
aspect of the study. The more recent works dealing with
the advent of microelectronics have also tended to
concentrate on manufacturing, for example Bessant and
Dickson (1982) note that, 'our main concern in this book
is with the application of microelectronics to
manufacturing processes'. This is despite the fact that
microelectronics has had a major impact on the service
sector.
With the increased trend towards the automated office some
recent publications have dealt with service industries and
occasionally retailing. However, many of these have taken
a macro view, looking at the spread of microelectronics
through a particular industry or worldwide (Dawson 1983).
They have generally looked at the impact of new
technology, in particular the effect on industrial
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relations issues such as control in the work place (Sawers
1984).
Recently, there has been an increase in publications on
retail technology and EPOS in particular. The outstanding
feature of these works is that they all largely cover the
same ground and rarely come up with anything new. They
fall broadly into three camps. (There are, of course, a
few exceptions to these generalisations which will be
discussed later).
First, is the 'technical' literature (RMDP 1982, Brown
1986, Euromonitor 1985), outlining possible equipment
suppliers, their systems and capabilities. These works
provide a vital source of information, but cover only one
side of the coin - the 'hard' aspects of retail
technology, rather than the 'soft' organizational and
inter-personal issues associated with its introduction.
Second, are the works which tend to be largely
prescriptive (Distributive Trades EDC 1982, OFT 1982).
These are mostly optimistic reports highlighting the
potential benefits of EPOS and urging the retailer to
invest in the new technology. They are rarely based on
any original empirical research and are generally lacking
in any systematic analysis or objective content.
On the other hand there are the pessimistic reports,
investigating the impact of retail technology on employees
(EFILWC 1983). Many of these appear to be written from an
ideological standpoint, 'proving' that technology can
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bring 'serious risks to the workers involved' (FIET 1985).
The empirical basis is often superficial, demonstrating
little knowledge of retailing or the technology, with
results chosen to support the author's a priori
assumptions.
Through the researcher's own investigations in Laws Stores
and through attendance and discussion at seminars and
conferences, it would seem that the new technology is not
quite so deterministic. It does not automatically lead to
benefits for the retail organization, nor the alienation
of the checkout operator. Whilst there are potential 
benefits of EPOS, problems arise during the implementation
process. This often prevents the retailer from fully
realising all the cost advantages which would give a
satisfactory return on such a large investment.
The above literature failed to explain what was taking
place at Laws Stores. The actual introduction and
implementation of new technology into a retailing
organization, the problems which arise and the way in
which full benefit can be achieved was not adequately
covered by previous research. With good access to a
company which was introducing new technology, the
researcher was in an ideal position to undertake a
detailed study of this process.
PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS 
In keeping with the 'real world' model of the research,
the results are not presented as a series of hypothesis,
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which are then measured and tested in the field. In this
thesis a picture of the relevant data is gradually built
up, as it was in the actual research. The specific issues
identified during the introduction of new technology are
related to the more generalised context of the
organization, its structure and environment. The final
product is an explanatory network of the influences and
relevant factors affecting the retail company's strategy
to introduce new technology and the successful
implementation of that strategy.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I presents the
background to the research and Part II deals with the case
studies, analysis of the findings and conclusions.
The thesis begins, as the research did, with the
collaborative organization, Laws Stores. Following this
introduction, the second chapter reviews the environment
of grocery retailing in which the company operated. The
third chapter investigates the characteristic features of
supermarket chains and the principles on which they base
their organizations. The fourth chapter presents
background information on Laws Stores and illustrates the
extent to which it conformed to such principles, it
provides details of the technology which was used in
addition to the structure and ownership of the
organization. The fifth chapter deals with the research
methodology, it explains the principles on which the
research is based and the practical problems which had to
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be overcome. The sixth chapter presents and analyses the
relevant literature on new technology and organizational
behaviour.
In part II, Chapter 7 describes the introduction of new
technology into Laws Stores. It covers the three year
period from the initial computer proposal, through
installation of the various systems, to the operation of
laser scanning. Chapter 8 analyses the strategy to
introduce new technology, the organizational processes
which gave rise to that strategy and the problems which
were encountered. Chapter 9 then relates these issues to
the wider context, including ownership of the company, its
structure and the environment in which it operated.
Chapter 10 discusses the history, ownership and structure
of Wm Low, focusing on the strategy to introduce new
technology and proposals for future developments. Chapter
11 draws together the various threads of the thesis by
comparing the findings in Wm Low with those in Laws
Stores. It contrasts the different strategies for
introducing new technology and the factors affecting those
strategies.
The thesis concludes with a summary explanation of events
in Laws Stores and the applicability of the findings to
other organizations. In addition, it discusses the
contribution to existing theory and some implications for
further research.
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2. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDY
This chapter discusses the role of the environment in
shaping the decisions of a company. It addresses such
questions as: to what extent does the environment
determine the actions of a company? How can the company
itself affect the environment? The purpose of this
chapter is to explore the retail grocery sector and
facilitate a greater understanding of the changes that
were taking place and the context in which decisions at
Laws Stores were made. Particular attention is paid to
recent trends in retailing, such as the size and location
of stores, trade structure, merchandising techniques, and
the technological changes that were taking place.
The organization can be seen as an open system (Katz and
Kahn 1978) involved in a process of continual interaction
with its surroundings. Some writers (Miles and Snow 1978,
Burns and Stalker 1961, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967)
emphasize the importance of this relationship and stress
that the organization and the environment must fit well
together in order for the company to be successful, an
approach which will be outlined in Chapter 6. Other
writers take the view that rather than adjusting to fit
it, the company can 'enact' its own environment (Weick
1969, Child 1972). They argue that this relationship is
determined by the particular choices made by the
organizational decision-makers and by the constraints
which more dominant counterparts impose upon them.
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It is this latter aspect which is crucial, it is possible
for leading supermarket operators, J - Sainsbury, Tesco and
Asda, to shape the grocery retailing environment by
utilising their considerable resources; financial and
otherwise, and through their power over suppliers,
competitors, planning authorities and even to a certain
extent consumers. However, as Table 2.1 illustrates, Laws
Stores was small in comparison to the leading supermarket
chains with only a fraction of their sales, profit and
market share. It was, therefore, unable to exercise much
power over suppliers, competitors and planning
authorities. Owing to its lack of resources, both
financial and otherwise, Laws was rarely able to shape the
market in which it operated, particularly in the short and
medium term. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis,
the environment in which Laws operated is considered to be
predetermined and any decisions which the company took
were seen as a reaction to that environment and an attempt
to prosper within it.
THE GROCERY RETAILING INDUSTRY
The importance of the distribution industry, and retailing
in particular, was noted in Chapter 1. Within this, food
retailing is the largest employer, accounting for 29% of
all employees in the retail sector in 1986. The
significance of food is also illustrated by its large
share of total retail turnover (38%) and consumer
expenditure (18%) (Annual Abstract of Statistics 1988).
The whole of the retail industry has undergone a number
of changes in recent years. These include variations in
14
Comparative Size of Supermarket Chains (1983) 	 Table 2.1 
SUPERMARKET
CHAIN
FINANCIAL
YEAR
SALES
EM
PROFIT
EM
NUMBER
OF
NUMBER OF
EMPLOYEES
MARKET
SHARE
ENDING STORES (000'S) (%)
TESCO FEB 1983 2277 53.5 489 40.4 12.9
J. SAINSBURY FEB 1983 2201 106.9 263 33.3 12.3
ASDA APR 1983 1318 77.4 82 30.0 6.9
FINE FARE MAR 1982 820 25.8 594 N/A 4.9
INTERNATIONAL
STORES DEC 1983 692 6.7 410 N/A 3.5
SAFEWAY SEP 1983 597 24.1 98 11.8 3.1
KWIK SAVE AUG 1983 556 27.4 345 4.8 3.0
PRESTO MAR 1983 510 TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 2.9
ARGYLL ARGYLL ARGYLL
21.3 1111 28.7
LIPTONS MAR 1983 400
WAITROSE JAN 1984 488 12.5 76 10.6 2.5
WM MORRISON JAN 1984 270 10.0 30 5.2 1.4
HILLARDS APR 1983 193 5.8 42 N/A 1.1
GRANDWAYS APR 1983 136 1.1 90 N/A 0.9
WM LOW	 ' SEP 1983 133 3.9 61 4.3 0.7
AMOS HINTON MAR 1983 113 2.0 54 N/A 0.7
CARREFOUR FEB 1982 123 TOTAL 6 TOTAL 0.6
DEE DEE
17.8 '1.6
DEE DISCOUNT MAY 1982 95 70 0.6
BUDGENS DEC 1983 100 N/A 105 N/A 0.5
BISHOPS
STORES FEB 1984 89 N/A 63 N/A 0.5
LAWS STORES APR 1983 51 (0.5) 53 1.9 0.3
Source : ICC (1984), Food Retailing (1987), Newcastle
Journal 9 January 1985, Company Reports.
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trade structure, marketing trends, centralised control and
the use of new technology. Such changes will be
illustrated below with reference to the food retailing
industry in which Laws operated.
TRADE STRUCTURE
Grocery retailers can be divided into three major groups:
the independent companies with less than ten outlets, some
of which belong to symbol groups such as Mace Wavy Line,
Spar or VG; the co-operatives, which in 1986 consisted of
approximately one hundred different societies of varying
sizes and the multiple sector, comprising chains with ten
or more outlets. The latter may be further sub-divided
into the major multiples, for example Argyll, Dee,
Sainsbury, Tesco, and the smaller, mainly regional
multiples, such as Wm Jackson, Morrisons, and Wm Low.
The most pronounced trend in the retail grocery trade in
recent years has been the increase in the market share of
the multiples, at the expense of the co-operatives and the
independents. Figure 2.1 shows that the multiples' share
of trade has increased from 60.9% in 1980 to 71.8% in
1986, whilst the co-operatives' share has declined from
14.2% to 11.1% and the independents' from 24.9% to 17.1%.
Coupled with this shift in market share has been a 36%
decrease in the number of retail grocery outlets between
1977 and 1986 (Figure 2.2). Although many of the changes
have effected the whole of the grocery retailing industry,
some are more applicable to the different sectors and will
16
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therefore be addressed under the headings of multiples,
co-operatives and independents.
Multiples. Most multiple grocery chains have undertaken an
extensive rationalisation programme since the early
1970's, closing many small high street stores and opening
fewer, but much larger and therefore more cost effective
stores on the outskirts of towns. Figure 2.3 shows that
the number of stores below 4,000 sq ft has decreased
significantly, whilst those over 10,000 sq ft are steadily
increasing in number. As a result of these trends, the
average sales area of multiple stores was 10,875 sq ft in
1986, compared to 5,284 sq ft in 1977 (Figure 2.4). Table
2.2 shows that the location of new stores has also
changed, with local and neighbourhood centres decreasing
in favour of edge of town and free standing locations.
Tesco has probably undertaken one of the most drastic
rationalisation programmes. The average store size
increased from 6,000 sq ft in 1975 to 18,000 sq ft in
1985, whilst over the same period the number of outlets
dropped from 771 to 369 (marketing Week June 1985).
Co-operatives. The co-operative societies were later than
the multiples to realise the need to carry out changes.
At the co-operative conference in 1982 a vote was passed
to reduce the number of societies to twenty-five within
two years. Whilst it did not achieve this, the number was
reduced, through a series of mergers, from 206 in 1980 to
about a hundred in 1986. The movement undertook a
comprehensive programme of store rationalisation, closing
19
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Type of Site - New Multiple Superstores	 Table 2.2 
1980-1986 
Site Type 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Purpose Built
Shopping Centre 25 48 14 32 33 24 27
Traditional High
Street 16 7 29 5 4 21 18
Local/Neighbourhood
Centre 16 4 14 5 8 0 6
Edge of Town/
Free Standing 25 41 43 59 55 52 46
Other 18 0 0 0 0 3 3
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IGD Food Retailing 1987
Size Profile of Co-op Stores, 1980-87 	 Table 2.3 
SALES AREA
(SQ FT)
STORE PROFILE AS AT 1 JANUARY (COL.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
%)
1987
<	 2,000 62.9 60.8 58.5 57.0 54.7 51.9 49.1 46.7
2-	 3,999 23.9 24.5 25.7 25.5 26.0 26.8 27.8 28.6
4-	 9,999 10.4 11.4 11.7 13.0 13.7 14.5 15.9 17.1
10-14,999 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.7 2.6 2.8
15-19,999 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7
20-24,999 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9
25,000 + 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.2
T OTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IGD Food Retailing 1987
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over 1,000 food stores in two years. At the same time it
increased its superstore presence at twice the national
average to become the third largest superstore operator in
the U.K. in 1986. Table 2.3 shows that the larger
co-operative stores increased in percentage terms between
1980 and 1987, however, those under 2,000 sq ft remained
the dominant sector.
Independents. Whilst the co-operative societies have a
considerable resource base from which to be able to build
their larger stores, this is not usually the case for the
independents and the small multiples. They lack economies
of scale because of their limited buying power and smaller
stores, and therefore have to look for alternative means
of survival in this highly competitive industry. Many of
the independents are affiliated to one of the symbol
groups such as Mace Wavy Line, VG or Spar. This provides
them with increased buying power and a pool of expertise
on which to draw for advice on financial matters,
merchandising and technology. For the regional chains and
independents there is the option of joining NISA (National
Independent Supermarket Association) which, with a
membership of 352 companies, 1,782 branches and a turnover
of approximately E2 billion in 1987, has considerably more
buying power than each company would have individually.
An alternative strategy for the independent or small
multiple is to exploit a particular niche within the
market which is not in direct competition with the larger
supermarket chains. One such policy is the convenience
store approach, ideal for smaller outlets in high street
23
and suburban estate locations. These stores, which the IGD
estimated a total of 2,500 in 1987, have extended opening
hours, including weekends, carry a broad range and are
able to charge a premium price. Many of' the convenience
stores which have been established in the 1980s are under
the umbrella of the symbol groups, for example Spar's
Eight-till-Late, or have grown 'from the roots of a
floundering grocery chain' such as Cullens (RDM Nov/Dec
1985). However, these are also coming under pressure from
the larger chains such as 7-Eleven, an American owned
organization with stores worldwide including 7,000 in the
US and 2,000 in Japan.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
One 'final' option for grocery retailers who see no
long-term future for themselves in this highly competitive
industry is to merge with, or be acquired by, a larger
competitor. Mergers and acquisitions have played a very
significant part in changing the structure of the trade in
recent years by adding considerably to the degree of
concentration that has occurred. Many of the trading
names were retained during the early 1980s, although they
were grouped under common ownership. However, by 1987
most of these had been rationalised with companies
operating under one or two major fascias. Table 2.4 shows
major acquisitions by food retailers between 1980 and
1987. This relates mainly to takeovers of food retailers
and some major non-food retailers in the U.K. As it does
not cover unsuccessful bids, takeovers outside retailing
or those outside the U.K., it tends to understate total
24
Major Acquisitions by Food Retailers 1980-1987 	 Table 2.4 
COMPANY
CURRENT MAJOR
TRADING	 NAMES
ACQUISITIONS
(since
	 1980)
PREVIOUS TRADING NAMES
Argyll
Group
Safeway
Presto
Lo-Cost
Cordon Bleu
Freezer Fare	 (1980)
Price-rite	 (1980)
Allied	 Suppliers
	 (1982)
Amalgamated
Distillers
Products	 (1983)
Amos	 Hinton	 (1984)
Safeway	 (1987)
Freezer Fare
Price-rite
Liptons,	 Templeton
Hintons,	 Winterschladen
Asda
Group
Asda
MFI	 (1985)
Wades
	 (sold	 1985)
MFI	 (sold	 1987)
Associated
British
Foods
----
Crazy Prices
	 (1982)
Fine Fare/
Shoppers
Paradise	 (sold
	 1986)
Crazy Prices
Barker &
Dobson
Budgen Budgen
	 (1986)
BAT
Stores
----
Price-rite	 (sold	 1980)
Mainstop	 (sold	 1982)
John Quality	 (sold	 1984)
Country
Market	 (sold	 1983)
International(sold
	 1984)
Booker Booker
(Wholesale)
Bishops	 (1984)
John Quality	 (1984)
Budgen	 (sold	 1986)
Rusts
	 (sold	 1982)
Bishops
Zipin:/
John Quality(sold
	 1986)
Dee
Corporation
Gateway
Key Markets
	 (1982)
Frank Dee	 (1983)
Lennons	 (1984)
International	 (1985)
Fine Fare
	 (1986)
Woolco
	 (1986)
Carrefour
Key Markets
Frank Dee
Supermarkets
Lennons
International
Fine Fare
Woolco
Tesco Tesco
Bugden	 (1985)
Hillards	 (1987)
Tesco Stores
Ireland	 (sold
	 1986)
Victor	 Value	 (sold	 1986)
Bugden
Hillards
Source: Derived from IGD Food Retailing 1987.
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activity within the industry. Argyll and Dee are the two
most prominent supermarket companies whose expansion has
resulted from a series of acquisitions, compared to such
companies as Sainsbury and Tesco who prefer more organic
growth based on extending older stores and building new
ones.
Argyll has a history of mergers and acquisitions going
back to the 1960s when Allied Suppliers was formed out of
such companies as Meadow, Maypole, Liptons, Templeton and
Galbraith. Argyll acquired Allied Suppliers in 1982 and
two years later purchased Hintons. In 1985 it began to
rationalise its trading names to Presto and Lo-cost. In
1987 Argyll acquired Safeway from its American parent
company and began to convert the larger Presto stores to
this format.
The other major acquisitor, Dee, described by one report
as a 'corporate boa constrictor' (Marketing Week, August 2
1985) because of its ability to 'digest' companies larger
than itself, successfully resisted a takeover bid by
Argyll in 1981. In 1984, following acquisitions of Key
Markets, Frank Dee Stores and Lennons, Dee doubled its
supermarket presence by purchasing 380 International
Stores from British American Tabacco (Financial Times
January 22 1985). Its bid for Booker McConnell failed,
but in 1986 it purchased Fine Fare from Associated British
Foods and in 1987 announced the conversion of all its
stores to the Gateway fascia. Early in 1988 it again
successfully resisted a takeover bid, this time from
Barker and Dobson.
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Competition in the retail grocery trade is particularly
strong in the North East of England, with the North East
Co-operative Society, Tesco, Dee Corporation, and Argyll
as the main competitors in the early 1980s, and more
recent entries being made into the area by Asda and
Morrisons. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
local supermarket chains felt the pressure, with Hintons
selling out to Argyll in 1984.
MARKETING TRENDS 
The major multiples have tried various marketing methods
in order to improve turnover and profit margins. In the
late 1970s the competitive emphasis was on price. When
Tesco launched 'Operation Checkout' in 1977, store traffic
increased by a million customers a week and market share
rose from eight to twelve per cent by the end of the year.
Sainsbury responded the following year with 'Discount '78'
and soon all the major multiples had some sort of price
cutting campaign. Ten years later however, apart from the
limited line discount chains such as Kwik Save, price is
no longer the major selling point, the emphasis is on less
tangible values such as quality, service, range of
merchandise and store ambience. Tesco and Sainsbury both
frequently advertise in the Sunday newspaper supplements
with glossy photographs emphasising the above points but
with no mention of price. Supermarkets now stock a much
broader range of fresh foods, such as delicatessen, dairy
products and fruit and vegetables, and the larger
superstores offer services such as opticians, dry
cleaners, and key-cutting.
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The net profit margin is the industry's main measure of
success (Figure 2.5). In 1984 most of the major multiples
were aiming for a five per cent margin, however, for those
with over twenty-two billion pounds turnover, a three per
cent margin still created sufficient capital to reinvest
in new stores. Those companies with margins below two per
cent and turnovers below £200 million faced obvious
difficulties regarding long-term viability. The increased
trend towards fresh foods provides a higher profit margin
as does a greater emphasis on own label goods, which in
1987 accounted for approximately 32% of packaged grocery
sales in major multiples. In Sainsbury, the market leader
in this area, own label goods account for 56% of the total
sales value, compared to Tesco's 35%, even Asda, who had
previously not stocked own labels, preferring instead to
offer the brand leader at a competitive price, announced
their decision to develop a full own label range in 1985.
CENTRALISED CONTROL
Another way of improving margins is to become more
efficient by improving distribution methods, greater
productivity and tighter control through computerised
management information systems. Increased centralisation
is seen by many companies as a way of improving
efficiency. Distribution is more centralised with a
higher percentage of goods going through the companies'
own warehouses rather than direct to stores, figures for
1987 showed that some multiples controlled over eighty per
cent of branch deliveries (IGD Food Retailing). Buying is
also becoming more centralised with few sales
28
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representatives now calling on individual stores to take
orders, leading to greater central control of the lines
stocked by the stores and improved buying terms. Above
all, decision-making on most aspects of store operations
is now centralised with store managers having very few
discretionary powers.
Tesco is illustrative of this trend towards greater
centralisation. The company operated on a decentralised
basis until the early 1980's. Store managers were given
extensive powers to be virtually their own entrepreneurs
in the market place. Each local store manager had the
autonomy to go out and negotiate his own deals with local
suppliers and, within certain guidelines, sell at his own
price. However, in an attempt to gain greater control
over the business, Tesco reversed its previous policy and
began to centralise its operations. Buying is now
controlled from a central buying office and store managers
can no longer negotiate their own deals. In addition, the
company reviewed the range of goods that stores stocked
and reduced this from a maximum of 15,000 lines to 7,500.
By instituting greater control, Tesco was able to
significantly improve store productivity performance
through better stock control, shelf allocation and
distribution systems.
The increased use of new technology has enabled the
companies to pursue this policy of greater centralisation
more effectively. It is not suggested that the
introduction of new technology in any way compelled the
companies to become centralised, which could be
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interpreted as a form of 'technological determinism'. In
general the senior management in these companies
implemented a policy of centralisation that would give
them increased control and ensure the branches throughout
the country presented a consistent image in terms of
range, merchandising and pricing. In view of this policy
decision and the technical developments that were taking
place, the management were able to utilise technology that
would enable them to further pursue their chosen strategy.
They could equally have opted for technology which would
have enabled them to pursue a policy of decentralisation,
either by processing the information in-store, where the
stores are large enough, or by processing the information
centrally and then transmitting it back to the store for
decisions to be taken locally.
RETAIL TECHNOLOGY
The chapter has so far outlined the many changes that have
taken place in the retail grocery trade over the last ten
years. One change which has affected virtually all
industries is the introduction of new technology and
retailing has been no exception to this trend. Retailers
have been using computers since the 1950s and indeed were
among the first companies in this country to use large
mainframes for central administrative functions like
accounts, sales analysis and payroll. Pettigrew's (1973)
work with a retail organization dates their first computer
purchase back to 1956.
31
It is not necessary here to discuss the history or
technicalities of computerisation as these have been well
documented elsewhere. This section will refer to
technology which has been specifically designed or adapted
for use within the retail industry, this includes portable
data capture units and electronic point of sale equipment.
Despite retailers early use of computing for head office
functions, they lagged behind other industries during the
1970s and were unwilling to invest in computerising their
stores until the mid 1980s. Nevertheless, it is this area
which has received most attention in recent years and
which will continue to do so.
PORTABLE DATA CAPTURE UNITS 
Portable Data Capture Units (PDCs), also referred to as
Data Entry Terminals, are defined as 'hand-held battery
powered devices which are capable of recording data at its
point of origin and of transmitting it, via private or
public telecommunications links to a central point' (RMDP
1982). They were first used in Britain by Sainsburys in
1970, and whilst on this basis they could hardly be
described as 'new' they have been modified significantly
since this time and only became popular with the majority
of supermarket chains about 10 years later. One change is
that of size, when first introduced the PDC was as large
as a supermarket trolley and had to wheeled around the
store to collect data. They were then reduced to a size
which could be carried by a shoulder strap and eventually
to a hand-held terminal, similar to a large calculator.
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Physical properties aside, PDCs have become increasingly
more powerful and flexible over the past few years, with
the advent of microprocessors, cheaper large capacity
storage chips and improvements " in two-way
telcommunications facilities. Consequently, the range of
applications of these terminals has expanded considerably,
not only in retailing but also in other areas, such as
forestry control, meter reading and salesman's order
taking. Originally, data was recorded on ordinary
cassette tapes, but this can now be done using
micro-chips, customised to the individual organization's
requirements.
Within retailing, and particularly grocery retailing, PDCs
are widely used for re-ordering based on the measurement
of stock holding and sales, frequently used in conjunction
with the SLIM (Stock Labour Inventory Management) system.
The operator takes the PDC around the store each day
noting which lines need to be replenished, she then keys
into the machine the appropriate product number and the
number of cases required. The PDC is linked up to the
telephone line and the data is automatically dialled-up by
head office, transmission takes approximately three
minutes. Goods are assembled in the central warehouse and
delivered to the store the following day.
The advantages of PDCs are numerous. First, re-ordering
can be done by assistants, quickly and accurately, with
the minimum of training. Second, the twenty-four hour
lead time reduces the number of out of stock lines.
Third, goods are put immediately onto the shelves, thus
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reducing handling costs and the amount of space required
for stock-holding purposes. Fourth, since this
information would be required in a computerised form for
analysis by buyers, merchandisers and accountants, the
data entry at branch level reduces the work-load at head
office.
DATA CAPTURE AND PRODUCT MARKING
Before going on further, it is essential to discuss
product marking, on which the systems often depend.
Whilst it is possible to enter data manually into both the
PDCs outlined above and the EPOS systems which will be
discussed next, this method tends to be slow, prone to
errors, and severely limits the amount of data that can be
collected without slowing down the whole process.
Therefore, in order to quickly capture data which is both
accurate and complete it is necessary to devise a form of
product numbering which uniquely identifies each product,
and then to convert this into a form suitable for machine
reading. There are four major product marking systems
used by retailers throughout the world: kimball tags;
optical character recognition; magnetic stripe and
barcoding. Owing to its low cost and the relative ease of
incorporating it into packaging, the barcoding method was
chosen for the high volume grocery retailing business.
Barcodes were developed specifically for the retail trade,
although their use has now extended to other areas such as
libraries, building societies, manufacturing and
warehousing. A barcode is simply the article (product)
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number converted into a machine readable symbol. The
symbol itself consists of a series of bars and spaces of
varying width to a pre-determined standard and structure.
It is read by a light pen or low intensity laser scanner
linked to a computer which transfers it back to the
original format.
Barcodes are now found on most grocery products and form
part of the label design. In principle, the labelling of
products with the barcodes and the subsequent reading by
the laser scanner should be a fairly straightforward
operation provided that the various technical parameters
are adhered to. However, in reality, this caused a number
of difficulties in the early days and was a continual
source of irritation for supermarket chains, including the
one in the case study. Some of the problems were
technical, for example insufficient blank area around the
barcode to distinguish it from the rest of the label,
insufficient colour contrast between the bars and the
spaces. However, most of the problems were logistical,
for example placing the barcode near the edge of the
packaging so that it wrapped around the corner or was
covered by the seal, assigning the wrong code to a product
or the same code to two products and changing the code
without first notifying the retailers to enable them to
update their files. Fortunately, as more supermarket
chains are now using laser scanning, greater pressure has
been exerted on manufacturers and many of the problems
associated with barcodes have been overcome.
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The international standards and the allocation of article
numbers are controlled by the European Article Numbering
(EAN) system, which, in January 1988, included 32
countries both within and outside Europe. The US,
however, uses the Universal Product Code (UPC). The EAN
system involves the allocation of a unique number
consisting of thirteen digits. The first two digits
identify the nationality of the issuing authority, in this
country the number 50 is used to identify the UK Article
Numbering Association (ANA). The following five digits
identify the manufacturer/supplier and the next five
identify the product. The final digit is a check digit to
ensure that the code is correctly composed.
ELECTRONIC POINT OF SALE
Electronic point of sale (EPOS) basically involves the
capture of information at the point of sale using
sophisticated electronic cash registers, this information
can then be processed locally or transmitted to a central
location for processing and analysis. The use of EPOS,
which escalated in the 1980s was brought about by the
development of the micro-chip. This enabled cash
registers to have extensive capabilities without the
disadvantage of large size which would be unacceptable at
the point of sale. As noted by the Distributive Trades
EDC (1982),
'The main cause of change is the development of
the microprocessor. It has meant that computers
are not only smaller, cheaper, easier to use and
capable of operating in shop and warehouse
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environments, but are now available at economic
cost for use in all types and size of business'.
Another development has been improved communications. This
facilitates the transmission of data to a central location
for processing and analysis, thus gaining economies of
scale, and also the passing of information such as prices,
in the opposite direction from head office to store. The
Distributive Trades EDC (1982) noted that the
availability, reliability and cost of communication
facilities would be an important factor in determining
whether retailers took full advantage of the opportunities
in computer technology.
Each sector of the retail industry, for example department
stores,	 variety
	
stores,	 specialist	 stores	 and
supermarkets, as well as restaurants, pubs and petrol
stations have differing requirements concerning hardware
configurations,	 and	 software.	 Many	 equipment
manufacturers and software houses have developed systems
to suit these varying needs. Even within each sector the
requirements of each company vary depending on the size of
the organization and individual stores, the money
available for investment, the data processing policy and
company strategy as a whole. Above all, the system chosen
depends on the preferred choice of the organization's
decision-makers, working within a number of constraints
such as time, cost and size.
There are now a large number of companies in the market
for EPOS systems coming from both traditional cash
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register companies, for example NCR, Sweda, and computer
manufacturers, for example ICL, IBM, DTS, each of which
has a number of different models on offer. Table 2.5
lists 23 major suppliers with over 50 different systems
suitable for a variety of applications. Additionally, the
larger retail organizations, and increasingly the smaller
ones too, are able to specify their requirements to the
manufacturers and have equipment and software tailor-made
or modified to their needs. Within the specific context
of this research the systems which are of interest are
those tailored for the supermarket trade.
LASER SCANNING SYSTEMS 
Since the majority of grocery items are now barcoded,
laser scanning is the most obvious choice of system for
supermarkets. It has been suggested for some time that a
minimum of eighty per cent of grocery sales by volume (as
opposed to number of lines) would need to be barcoded at
source in order for laser scanning to become a viable
proposition. Once this level was passed in 1983, a number
of companies began introducing laser scanning systems,
these range from the large superstore with thirty checkout
lanes to the small independent with three checkouts.
Figure 2.6 shows that the number of grocers with laser
scanning in the U.K. increased from 6 in 1981 to 473 in
1987.
From the customer's or checkout assistant's point of view
the laser scanning operation is simple: the item with the
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Table 2.5 
EPOS Systems: Suitability to Types of Retail Outlet 
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barcode is passed over the low-powered laser scanner which
automatically looks up the price of the article in the
system's memory file and transmits it back to the checkout
display. The whole operation takes only a fraction of a
second. In addition, details of the transaction, such as
the product description, method of payment, time and
checkout assistant, are recorded on file.
There is a large number of laser scanning systems
currently available which vary widely in terms of: design
philosophy and available configurations; performance and
systems capabilities; types of memory; price look up
capabilities and data communications facilities. Scanning
systems can be divided into three broad groups: big store
controller-driven systems; micro-computer controlled
systems and terminal-based systems.
Store Controller-Driven Systems. Store controller-driven
systems provide facilities not only for scanning but also
for extensive local and central management information.
The basic configuration involves EPOS terminals and
scanners linked to twin mini-computers (one for back-up)
in the store's office. Attached to this may be a series
of peripherals, such as VDUs, management terminals,
printers and shelf-edge label printers. Owing to the cost
of the twin mini-computers such systems carry large
overheads and are therefore expensive per lane, except in
very large installations. They are not viable below about
eight lanes and ideally should support sixteen to twenty
lanes. The powerful mini-computers provide facilities for
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quite comprehensive local data processing, but the company
may also choose to link the store to some central point
for further analysis of data, particularly if the systems
are extended to an increasing number of branches.
Micro-Computer Controlled Systems. In principle,
micro-computer controlled systems are the same as store
controller-driven driven systems. The difference is that
a less powerful, and therefore cheaper, micro-computer is
used to provide data processing at the centre of the
system. Consequently, systems are relatively cheaper on a
cost per lane basis in smaller installations. As local
data processing facilities are limited, it may be
necessary, where the store forms part of a chain, to
transfer data to head office for processing. This may be
done via telecommunications lines or by physically
transferring data on cassette or diskette to head office
via post or courier.
Terminal-Based Systems. The simplest configuration is the
terminal-based system which consists of a small number of
basic laser scanning terminals called 'slaves' linked to a
'master' terminal which contains the operating files,
price-look-up files and transaction data files. Such
systems have limited data processing facilities. Local
reporting is achieved by printing reports on the receipt
printer of the master terminal, the width of which limits
the scale and scope of the reports available. However, the
system can be enhanced by linking the terminals, via the
master, to a micro-processor in the store's' office.
Additionally, data may be transmitted to head office for
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processing as with the micro-computer controlled systems
above.
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LASER SCANNING
Having discussed the various options available to grocery
retailers, what are the costs of the laser scanning
systems and what benefits can be expected to offset these
costs? The cost of laser scanning varies enormously
depending on the type of system required, its capabilities
and the number of lanes installed. As can be seen from
Figure 2.7, the simplest terminal-based system could be
obtained for less than £5500 per lane for three lanes in
1982, with the price per lane decreasing as the number of
checkouts increases. The more sophisticated systems with
in-house data processing facilities began at about £7500
per lane for 8 lanes, decreasing to £6500 per lane for 24
lanes (Figure 2.8).
There are numerous potential benefits claimed by equipment
manufacturers and industry observers. However, as yet
most of these have not been supported by quantifiable,
detailed and accurate data, either from a company who has
experienced laser scanning in the UK, or from extensive
independent research on the topic. This lack of empirical
data helps to explain retailers reluctance to invest
heavily in the computerisation of their stores.
Potential benefits are divided by most writers into 'hard'
and 'soft'. The hard benefits are those "which can be
measured and assessed quantitatively, whereas the soft are
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rather less tangible and are deduced as much by guesswork
as by judgement (Jones 1984). A major hard benefit is
improved checkout productivity achieved through faster
item transactions. It is claimed that the'number of items
passing through the checkout will increase from
approximately twenty-two to over thirty and possibly forty
items per minute. Thus giving cost savings through a
reduction in the number of checkouts and checkout
personnel, plus space savings at the front end.
This claim, however, is disputed by some observers. The
results of an international study showed 'no overall
speeding up of checkout operation' (Infratest 1984). In
one extreme case cited traditional cash registration
resulted in up to 20% greater efficiency than scanning
checkouts. Factors which affect the realisation of
potential benefits in checkout flow include the slope of
the operator's learning curve and the problems with
barcodes noted previously, both of which were found to be
significant in Laws Stores.
Another hard benefit arises from item price removal. As
prices are held on file it is no longer necessary to price
each item individually, thus saving time in pricing
(estimated by Laws Stores to be 48 seconds per case) and
also the cost of pricing guns and tickets. Further hard
benefits accrue, at least in principle, through more
accurate pricing. As the correct price is held on file it
eliminates the opportunity for the operator to guess a
price where the ticket is missing or to ring up the wrong
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price (accidentally or otherwise). In this way it also
reduces 'shrinkage' which occurs through theft and
under-ringing. Hard savings are also made through quicker
and more accurate cash reconciliation and easier cashier
training.
Potential soft benefits come mainly from utilising the
sales data which is generated. This can lead to improved
labour scheduling both at the front-end (checkouts) and in
other departments, more effective shelf-space allocation
and a reduction in the number of out-of-stocks. If goods
are also scanned on receipt at the back door it can
eventually lead to automatic re-ordering requiring only
limited intervention by management.
In addition, further 'very soft' benefits can be
identified which are even more difficult quantify. In
particular, the detailed sales data enables an improved
sales mix, tracking of items and additional promotional
techniques. Less tangible benefits include improved store
image and more detailed customer receipts. Despite being
more difficult to quantify and possitLy Less easiLu
attainable, the soft benefits may ultimately give greater
returns. Equipment suppliers, NCR, claim that a typical
store of 15,000 to 20,000 sq ft with twelve traditional
checkouts and a turnover of £4 million a year, would gain
total hard savings equal to 1.05% of turnover compared to
assessable soft benefits amounting to 1.49%.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has shown the retail grocery trades to be
undergoing significant changes, including increased
competition and concentration in the hands of a few large
supermarket chains. As a result of these changes, the
smaller regional multiples, such as Laws Stores, are under
considerable pressure. One of the major changes that has
taken place is in the field of new technology, in
particular EPOS, with a wide range of both suppliers and
systems for retailers to choose from.
The environment in which Laws operated was complex and
uncertain. The role of the company within this context
was a relatively insignificant one. In view of its small
size and lack of resources, Laws was unable to
substantially alter this environment. Nevertheless, it
was able to exercise choice over the direction taken and
the technology which it used. The way in which Laws
responded to the environment and the choices it made
concerning technology will be discussed later in the
thesis. In order to put this into context, the next
chapter explores, at a more general level, the
characteristic features of supermarket chains and the ways
in which they have evolved.
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3. ORGANIZATION OF A SUPERMARKET CHAIN
The second chapter illustrated the environment of grocery
retailing and detailed recent changes. Before moving on
to the specifics of how Laws Stores operated in that
environment, this chapter investigates at a more general
level the characteristic features of supermarket chains.
It aims to show the principles on which such companies
base their organization and the way in which they operate.
It also includes a discussion of the information required
to run the operation and the sources of such information.
THE EVOLUTION OF GROCERY CHAINS 
In order to understand how supermarket chains are
currently organized and operated it is necessary to look
at their historical development and evolution. Most of
the chains that are now well known in Britain began as
single grocery stores in the late eighteenth or early
nineteenth century (Table 3.1). There are, of course,
notable exceptions such as the co-upeiative societies and
Asda. However, the majority were family businesses,
managed and operated by the owner and his family who often
lived above the shop.
These businesses expanded by opening additional branches
close by which were managed, wherever possible, by a
member of the family. As the number of branches grew, this
became increasingly difficult and professional managers
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The Origins of Supermarket Chains 	 Table 3.1 
Current Name Founder Place Date
Galbraith William Galbraith Paisley 1894
Gateway J. H. Mills Bristol 1880
Grandways William Jackson Hull 1851
Laws Stores Arthur McClelland Newcastle 1907
Wm Low James Low Dundee 1868
Morrisons William Morrison Bradford 1899
Presto Thomas Lipton Glasgow 1871
J. Sainsbury J. Sainsbury London 1869
Tesco J. Cohen London 1919
Source : Company Documents
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were recruited. The supermarket chains soon recognised
that advantages could be gained by buying their goods from
a central point. First, there were economies of scale as
lower rates could be negotiated by ordering in larger
quantites. Second, specialists could be employed for the
sole purpose of buying goods and negotiating contracts.
Unlike single store owner-managers, who had to manage the
store and staff as well as negotiate contracts, these
experts could devote all their time and energy to the
buying function. Third, the best sources of supply for
particular lines could be identified and control exercised
over the grade and quality of goods supplied. Fourth,
centralised buying reduced administration overheads,
paperwork was reduced by replacing the several small
orders and numerous invoices with one large order and
invoice. Fifth, by centralising this malor fuuctLca
greater control could be excerised by family members.
The grocery chains continued with this organic growth and
expanded rapidly. For example: J Sainsbury was founded in
1869 and by 1914 had 115 stores; Lipton's of Glasgow
opened 100 shops in twenty years following their first
store in 1871; Home and Colonial, beginning with their
first store in 1885, had opened 400 by 1900 (Garbing-King
1972). With such rapid expansion, the necessary expertise
could not be found within the owning family and therefore,
in addition to the buyers, other specialists had to be
recruited to cover such areas as accounts, personnel and
advertising. The branches were too small for each one to
support such expertise independently so these specialists
were located at head office with the buyers. Although
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operating a large number of branches, strict control was
retained by the owning family through standardising
procedures across the whole company and by centralising
decision-making powers at head office.
This brief overview of the evolution of grocery chains has
highlighted several features which many of them still
retain as modern supermarket companies. In particular
this	 includes:	 family	 ownership	 and	 control;
specialisation	 of	 functions	 and	 centralised
decision-making 	 linked with a high degree
	 of
standardisation and formalisation. It is not suggested
that these features exist merely as historical accidents,
although that may be true in some cases. Rather, it is
argued that they developed in response to the nature of
the business as the most efficient means of organizing the
chains. Whilst there have been changes in the nature of
grocery retailing, many of which were highlighted in the
previous chapter, the basic principles on which the
businesses operate remain the same. As the features
specified above, family ownership, centralisation and
specialisation, recur throughout the thesis, each will now
be covered in more detail.
FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The importance of family firms in retailing has been noted
by Channon (1978). In a study of the largest 100 service
companies he found that many of them were still led by a
founding entrepreneur and a substantial number were
managed at senior levels by descendents of the founder.
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This was particularly true of retailing as described in
Channon's chapter entitled 'Families and Formulas for
Retail Distribution', and can be seen in grocery chains by
the number of family members still on the board, very
often still acting as executive directors. Sainsbury's is
probably one of the most notable with grandsons of the
founder as Chairman and Finance Director; Tesco also had a
family Chairman until 1985. Many of the regional
multiples are still owned and managed by descendents of
the founder. The two case study companies, Laws Stores
and Wm Low were examples of this, others include
Morrisons, Jacksons and, before they were taken over by
Argyll, Hintons.
There are a number of implications for firms which are
both owned and managed by family members. One of the
major drawbacks are the limits on capital. Loans from
financial institutions are costly and may not be
available, whilst recourse to other methods of financing
may mean relinquishing shareholding to outside the family
group. These limits on funds are particularly crucial
when a company may wish to invest heavily in new
technology. However, where funds are available, family
firms may be able and willing to take greater risks than
would normally be acceptable to shareholders and
consequently the pay-off may also be higher.
Levinson (1971) noted one of the problems of family firms
as being rivalry between family members. Perhaps two
sons, cousins or grandsons fighting to gain control of the
company when their predecessor leaves. Conversely, there
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may be difficulties if there are not enough family members
to fill all the positions of responsibility in the firm.
For example, data processing is a highly specialised
function and it is unlikely that such expertise will be
found within the family. Thus, the owning family find
themselves in the unwelcome position of being dependent on
an outside specialist for what has become a vital part of
their operations.
In addition, a family firm may find it difficult to
recruit and retain highly qualified senior executives.
Sofer (1961) notes, 'the problem of recruiting inadequate
middle management was inseperable from the practice of
reserving senior appointments and directorships for family
members'. Promotion to director level and a high salary
may not be sufficient reward if an ambitious man really
wants to exercise power. He is unlikely to be able to do
this in a family firm and so becomes frustrated and moves
on after a short while.
A further problem of family firms relates to the
decision-making processes. Barry (1976) notes that these
'will frequently result in decisions which will not always
appear wholly rational when seen from the perspective of
the business organization alone'. Such irrationality
arises largely from the role ambiguity felt by
owner-managers who occupy three roles simultaneously: as
family members they are responsible for the family's
investment; as directors they are concerned with the
future of the business and as managers they have
departmental interests.
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Such irrationality in decision-making could have
disastrous results for the firm where large investments in
new technology are concerned. As Donnelly (1964) points
out: it 'may lead to management unwillingness to take
necessary corrective action when company accounting
procedures indicate that its pet projects are out of
line'. The question arises as to whether a family member
should support the introduction of new technology which
requires a large injection of capital and would not be in
the long-term interest of the company, but would further
his own departmental interests.
Miller and Rice (1967) describe the problems faced by the
individuals and the organization in family firms as being
attributable to the natural coincidence of task and
sentient boundaries. The task group is that which
comprises the individuals employed in the activity system
and the sentient group is the one to which individuals are
prepared to commit themselves for support. For a family
member working in a family firm these two groups naturally
coincide and whilst this may be effective in conditions of
stable equilibrium, at times of expansion or change, for
example when introducing new technology, it can lead to
distorted judgement and the disruption of relationships
within the firm.
One of the strengths of a family firm is having a
'dedicated and loyal internal organisation' (Donnelly
1964). Thus whilst the company may have difficulty in
recruiting and retaining management, those that do stay
often demonstrate considerable loyalty. Such commitment
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can be of cruicial benefit to an organization undergoing
drastic and often painful changes brought about by the
introduction of new technology.
CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION
As Child (1977) notes, centralisation and decentralisation
are not simple dichotomies, there is a considerable choice
of possibilities in between. Varying types of decisions
may be passed down to varying levels in the hierarchy.
Both centralisation and decentralisation have advantages
for supermarket chains and the debate surrounding this
issue has gone on for many years. The principle arguments
in favour of both are summarised below.
Centralisation
(a) Centralisation can economise on managerial overheads
as it avoids the duplication of activities or resources
that would occur if similar activities are carried out
independently by each branch or region. The degree to
which certain activities are decentralised depends to a
large extent on the size of the branch and the need for
that particular specialism at branch level. For example J
Sainsbury have a Personnel Officer in each branch, either
on a full or part-time basis depending on the size of
store. This is thought to be necessary by the company
because wages form a major part of their costs and staff
are therefore considered an important resource. In
addition, it removes some of the administrative burden
associated with personnel policies from the branch
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manager. It would not be necessary for other specialists,
such as accountants, to be employed in each branch as
there would be insufficient work to justify this.
(b) A further benefit is that centralisation of
management enables the company to employ a wider range of
specialist functions than would otherwise be feasible.
This includes such things as corporate planning, market
research and merchandising. Furthermore, it enables the
companies to recruit better qualified and more able staff
by paying higher wages and offering better prospects than
would be possible in smaller units. The cost of
providing such staff at the individual store level could
in itself be prohibitive.
(c) It is argued (Child 1977) that top managers have
generally proven their ability by the time they reach
senior positions and normally have more experience than
other employees. Therefore, their capabilities are fully
utilised in a centralised organization as they possess the
authority to make decisions which are subsequently
implemented throughout the organization.
(d) By focusing power and authority in a small number of
executives, centralised control enables them to respond
quickly to changing market conditions, for example
consumer demand for healthier foods and price cutting
strategies of competitors.
(e) Probably the most potent argument for centralisation
in grocery chains is the economies of scale that can be
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gained by bulk buying. As Davies et al (1985) note, 'the
size of the large retail chains has enabled them to obtain
highly competitive terms from food manufacturers and other
suppliers'. Such terms are not available to independent
operators and it is unlikely the suppliers would be so
generous with the multiples if each branch manager ordered
whatever stock he chose and negotiated his own deals.
This issue of 'discriminatory discounts' is one which has
aroused considerable concern in the UK. First, it was felt
that manufacturers granted discounts to large retailers
greater than was justified by the cost saving. Second,
there there was concern that this benefit was not being
passed on to the consumer. On the first point the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1982) found the
evidence to be confused, as it is difficult to calculate
cost on the basis of individual orders. On the second
point it concluded that the general practice of
'discriminatory discounts' had not been harmful to the
public, in fact they had been provided with lower prices
than they would have in its absence.
(f) Advantages can also be gained from centralising
warehousing facilities. Rather than having several
suppliers' vehicles calling directly on individual stores,
many companies now distribute a high percentage of their
goods from a small number of regional warehouses, which
they either operate themselves or contract out.
Consequently, each branch receives only one or two large
deliveries each day (or each week, depending on the size
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of store), thus reducing the long queue of vehicles
waiting to be unloaded and improving efficiency.
In addition there are further benefits with this system as
it is possible to reduce the amount of stock held in
stores leading to subsequent savings of cost and space.
This is particularly important in high street stores where
rent and rates are high, the space that is saved can be
put to more productive use as selling space. Centralised
warehousing facilities enables the stock to be held in low
cost locations such as industrial estates.
(g) Centralised decision-making enables management to
impose standards across the whole company. Thus, all
branches present a consistent image in terms of the range
of goods stocked, advertising and promotions and store
layout. Through standardising and formalising operating
procedures, for example ordering, merchandising and staff
recruitment, the company is able to maintain strict
control and identify those branches which may not be
performing satisfactorily. From their position in the
organization, senior managers have a broad company-wide
perspective of what is going on and how far this conforms
to policies which have been agreed and established. They
are, therefore, in a better position to make decisions
which will accord with those policies and be consistent
with the interests of the entire organization.
Whilst the above factors would seem to put forward a good
case for centralisation, there are also several advantages
in decentralisation.
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Decentralisation
(a) Decentralised decision making prevents senior
managers becoming over-burdened with routine operational
decisions. Instead, they devote more of their time to
long-term policy matters.
(b) There are motivational considerations in favour of
decentralisation. It is argued that most people are
willing to give more to their jobs when they have a high
degree of individual freedom, discretion and control over
their work. Motivational problems can be particularly
acute in retailing because individual units are at a
distance from one another and from head office, therefore
it may be difficult for management and staff to identify
with any 'common goals'. To overcome these problems
branch managers may be allowed to operate their stores as
autonomous units, almost as independent traders, with full
responsibility and accountability for their own actions.
(c) Following on from the above point, decentralisation
can often result in more effective controls and
performance measures. This is because each branch can
easily be identified as a separate sphere of
responsibility and costs and revenues allocated
accordingly. Control systems can be applied to these
units in order to provide more feedback to higher
management and better appraisal of management's
performance.
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(d) Whilst it was argued that centralisation can lead to
a quicker response to market conditions, decentralisation
can lead to greater flexibility in relation to local
conditions. The manager at the local leve). is much more
likely to be aware of such things as regional food
preferences or the opening of a new supermarket in his
area. In addition, if he has greater decision-making
powers he is able to respond more quickly to such changes
than if the problem has to be passed up the hierarchy for
a decision.
APPLICATIONS OF CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION
Varying degrees of centralisation and decentralisation
have been used by supermarket chains over the years.
Dalrymple and Thompson (1969) noted that Safeway in the
United States operated with a relatively decentralised
structure, but as can be seen from Figure 3.1 there is
relatively little major decision-making below divisional
level. If the company were truly decentralised, the store
managers would have more authority and there would be no
need for district managers.
The French hypermarket group, Carrefour, adopted a policy
of decentralisation in the 1960s (Knee and Walters 1985).
Branch managers were able to compose their own range of
merchandise and sell them as they wished, operating within
broad company guidelines concerning image, price appeal
and working conditions. During the period of fastest
expansion Carrefour's central administration numbered only
nine people. In return for allowing managers to use
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initiative and local buying policies, the company bore the
consequence of losing substantial discounts on bulk
buying, estimated at one per cent of sales. In addition,
extra expense Was incurred in training and paying
high-calibre local executives. As noted in the previous
chapter, Tesco also had a decentralised operation until
the early 1980's when it reversed its previous policy and
instituted greater central control.
Norkett (1985) argues in favour of strong centralised
control and presents the financial results of the UK's 20
largest supermarket chains to support his view. In
particular he notes that supermarket chains have developed
sophisticated control systems for margins, stock levels,
cash flow and good lines of communication, which he
regards as the 'the keys to financial success'.
Norkett proposes that strict control is necessary over two
areas: gross margins and store performance. In the case
of the former it is necessary to achieve a balance between
an adequate mark-up and a price in line with competitors
whilst still achieving a fast stock turnover. To ensure
that gross margins are sufficient to provide an
appropriate return, monitoring systems are required on the
relative efficiency of buyers.
In the case of store performance, Norkett advocates a
management information system based on the principles of
exception reporting. He suggests that such a system
should highlight stores which are not reaching the
required level of performance in five areas: lower sales
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than the previous year; a fall in store gross profit;
above normal stock losses; a high wages-to-sales ratio and
below average sales per employee/hour.
Most, if not all, supermarket chains in the UK now appear
to favour centralisation. This is because many of the
advantages of decentralisation are not as pertinent in the
UK as they are in other countries, such as the US and
France. For example, the UK is a relatively small
country, therefore the problems of distance from head
office are less acute than elsewhere. Similarly,
although there are variations in food preferences from one
region to another, these are not so great as in other
countries.
SPECIALISATION
Having ascertained that supermarket chains operate with
centralised control this next section aims to investigate
how the different central functions relate to one another
and to the branches. In order to do this we need to study
the main functions of a supermarket chain. Expressed
simply: the independent trader buys in goods from the
wholesaler, breaks these down into appropriate units for
the consumer and sells them at a price which is both
acceptable to the customer and provides the trader with an
adequate return on his capital and labour. Thus, the
operation can be immediately divided into two areas:
buying and selling.
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The teparation of buying and selling into two separate
functions, each with its own manager responsible for
expenses and profits, was the basis of the 'Mazur Plan'
(Figure 3.2). Developed by Paul Mazur in 1932, the 'Mazur
Plan' became popular with U.S. department stores in the
1930's. However, opponents argued that separating buying
from selling caused arguments regarding which one of those
two functions was the dominant cause for a success in
merchandising or, conversely, which was the dominant cause
for a particular failure (Gist 1968). As Wingate and
Freidlander (1978) observed
'separating buying and selling provides an ideal
mileu for "buck-passing". If separate executives
are charged with the responsibilities one for
buying and one for selling, each is likely to
blame the other for failures in the functioning
of the integrated whole'.
Whilst such arguments were orignially based on evidence
from department stores, many parallels can be drawn with
supermarket chains. In this case buying is the
responsibility of a specialist based at head office,
whilst selling is the responsibility of branch managers in
dispersed locations, collectively known as 'Operations'.
This situation frequently leads to 'buck-passing' and
counter accusations as noted above. For example, branch
managers may accuse buyers of being too distant from
consumers and unaware of their needs, listing products
that are unsuitable and not catering to local tastes. In
response, buyers may accuse managers of having a narrow
viewpoint and not seeing the business from a company-wide
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perspective. They claim that low sales figures are due to
inefficient ordering systems and poor merchandising.
As supermarket chains have grown they have added further
functional departments in addition to buying and
operations. Finance and accounting departments are
required to manage budgets, cash flow and forecast sales,
as well as process invoices and pay creditors. A
personnel department is also needed to service the high
number of employees in a retail organization. As the
chain becomes larger and more sophisticated it is often
necessary to establish a marketing department, to cover
such areas as pricing strategy, advertising and promotion,
store layouts and merchandising policies. Additional
functional departments may cover such areas as management
services, property and development. One of the more
recent departments to be added to retail chains and
possibly one of the fastest growing functions is data
processing or computer services. The responsibilities of
such a department include maintaining and developing all
the computer facilities in the company, for example head
office administrative systems, warehouse stock control
and, more recently, in-store systems.
This type of functional organization offers a number of
advantages, in particular simplicity, efficiency and
economy. It is economic in managerial manpower because
co-ordination is achieved through top management, rather
than several divisional managers or integrating personnel
such as product managers. Individuals have clearly
defined roles and responsibilities within their functional
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domain and the reporting structure is also clearly defined
with all information flowing vertically through the
hierarchy. These factors combine to make a functional
structure particularly suited to stable conditions where
its well-established roles and reporting procedures enable
it to operate most efficiently.
By grouping together specialists such as research and
development and computer services, further benefits can be
gained through the sharing of equipment and facilities,
for example laboratories and computers. This also ensures
that the specialists are fully utilised across the whole
organization rather than a particular specialist, for
example a systems analyst assigned to one department being
under-worked whilst in another department one may be
over-worked. Grouping of specialists enables them to
co-ordinate their work, exchange ideas and benefit from
one another's expertise. Furthermore, such staff often
gain additional satisfaction from working with others in
their field. A functional structure also provides clearly
marked career paths for specialists and so makes it easier
to hire and retain their services.
There are disadvantages associated with a functional
structure. A major problem is that top executives may
become overloaded with co-ordinating activities and day to
day operations. As a result there is little attention to
strategic issues, such as major changes in the market and
consumer trends. This 'executive overload' may partly
explain the neglect of strategic issues within retailing
companies particularly grocery chains, which has been
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noted by several writers (Knee and Walters 1985, Davies,
Gilligan and Sutton 1985). The issue of strategy and
structure is central to this thesis and will be discussed
in later chapters.
Highly functional structures tend to lead to problems of
poor lateral relations. As co-ordination occurs through
the hierarchy there are no mechanisms, as indeed there is
no need for, horizontal communication between departments.
Operating with its own group of specialists performing a
specific task, each department is highly differentiated
from the rest of the organization. In their definition of
differentiation, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) include not
only differences in the tasks performed but also
differences in the 'cognitive and emotional orientation
among managers in different functional departments'. Such
differences were found to be significant during the
introduction of new technology into the case study
companies and will be investigated later in the thesis.
In this section the reasons why such differences occur
will be discussed on a more general level.
One reason for differentiation is that individuals are
recruited for departments according to their ability to
perform the function required. These people will probably
have developed an identification with the norms and
criteria of their occupational group. As they pursue a
career in that specialism by moving between several
organizations their loyalty may lie more towards their
profession rather than the company. This was a feature
noted by Pettigrew (1973) relating to the pioneering work
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of computer analysts and programmers in a retail
organization of the 1960s.
A further reason for differences to occur is that each
department within an organization has different ways of
working, different critical issues, time horizons,
performance measures and contacts outside the organization
(Table 3.2). For example, the property development
department may be discussing planning permission with a
local authority for a store to be opened in three years
time; the buyers are negotiating margins with suppliers
for goods to be delivered in three months time and the
store manager is concerned with immediate problems of
staff shortages and overtime payments.
McClelland (1963) noted that the specialisation of tasks
within supermarket chains leads to differing attitudes and
behaviour patterns. Accordingly, he reports that the
store manager cannot be authoritarian as this will result
in low morale amongst staff and poor customer relations;
he relies on intuition rather than logic and his 'mental
processes run counter to those of the accountant or
administrator'. In contrast, the buyer is 'incorruptible',
'cool and decisive'; he has knowledge of commodities,
needs to have flair and be numerate (McClelland 1963).
Although the roles and responsibilities of buyers and
store managers (and to some extent their attributes) may
have changed since 1963, functional structures still exist
and therefore the principle of differentiation still
applies within supermarket chains. From their stud y of
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ten American companies, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)
observed that the more the outlook and behaviour of
managers in various departments differed, the more
difficult it was for them to achieve an integrated effort.
A condition for good performance was found to lie in the
achievement of an adequate level of integration, ie 'unity
of effort among the various sub-systems in the
accomplishment of the organization's task'.
As already noted, functional organizations tend towards a
low level of horizontal interaction, as a result of which
departmental stereotypes form. When the occasional need
does arise for communication it often results in
misunderstanding and conflict. This is further
exacerbated by the fact that only those at the top of the
hierarchy see the total picture. Departments only aim to
optimise their own sub-goals, they fail to recognise the
objectives of the whole organisation and the need for
co-ordinated action between the various functions.
Functional structures are efficient in stable conditions
and when a company's operations are based on a single
range of products or services, for example supermarkets.
However, problems arise when a company wishes to
diversify, for example into freezer centres, DIY and
garden centres or into manufacturing. When a single
department, such as marketing or personnel, has to deal
with all the differing needs of a diversified
organization, for example different types of consumers,
operating procedures and time horizons, the major benefits
of a functional structure, that is simplicity and economy
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are lost. In such circumstances companies may choose to
adopt a divisional or product structure, with a functional
structure operating within each division. Alternatively,
they may choose to operate each division- as a separate
company. The fact that choices exist in the structuring
of organizations is particularly important and will be
reiterated in Chapter 6.
The communication channels in a functionally organized
company are predominatly vertical and therefore it is
difficult to co-ordinate activities across different
departments. Consequently, the organization is slow to
respond to the actions of competitors and changes in
consumer needs. Thus, whilst efficient in stable
conditions, problems occur with functional structures when
the environment in which they operate becomes unstable.
As noted in Chapter 1, the retail grocery trade has become
relatively unstable in the late 1970s and early 1980s
following changes in consumer attitudes, such as the trend
towards healthier eating, the move to larger out-of-town
superstores, and a large number of takeovers. Thus,
whilst still operating with a functional structure, this
has been modified by a number of supermarket chains to
improve lateral relations and co-ordination between
departments. Knee and Walters (1985) note the importance
of Sainsbury's policy of delegating responsibility for
implementing strategy and co-ordinating activities to a
series of committees. This leaves the main board to
formulate strategy and give broad guidance. Knee and
Walters also note that 'the committees' structure is more
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important than individual functions. In other words the
committees have been developed to operate across functions
rather than around functions'. Such a structure overcomes
three of the problems associated with functional
organizations noted above: lack of co-ordination between
departments; over-burdening of senior management and lack
of attention to strategic issues. The committee structure
comprises: Branch Operations; Finance and Audit;
Director's Trading Committee; Distribution Committee;
Directors Administrative Committee.
FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 
AND DATA PROCESSING
This chapter has so far discussed the structuring of
retail organizations and the differences between the
various departments. This last section will deal with the
key decisions made by those departments, their information
requirements and the source of the data necessary for
those decisions. Table 3.2 shows the time horizons of the
various departments in relation to the key decisions which
have to be made. For example, store operations are
concerned with, immediate decisions, such as which lines
to reorder and when, which lines should be reduced in
price and how many staff are needed for next week's
trading. In comparison, the accounting function is more
concerned with longer term decisions of sales and profit
forecasts and budgets.
Table 3.2 shows there is a variety of information required
to assist the departments in their decision-making. Some
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of this data is external, coming from suppliers, research
agencies and observations of competitors, and some of it
is internal, for example overheads and wage costs. The
predominant type of information required across all
departments is sales data or trends. Thus, as can be seen
from Figure 3.3, data captured at the point of sale is the
major source of management information for decisions made
in all departments. Jones (1977) argues that the point of
sale function is at the very centre of the retail
management information cycle. All retail businesses are
centred around the selling function and other areas within
the organization are dependent upon this. In effect, the
other areas within a retail organization can be regarded
as a service to the selling function.
The source data captured at the point of sale can assist
those in the 'service' functions in their decision-making,
which in turn will have implications for the selling
functions. Jones (1977) views the data captured at the
point of sale on two levels, consistent with the time
horizons previously referred to. First, the operational
level which provides information to make day to day
decisions concerning the business, for example staff
performance, over and under-stock situations. Second, the
data gathered at the point of sale can be built up into
longer term sales history data, which can be used for
budgeting, forecasting and purchasing.
The significance of data captured at the point of sale is
two-fold. First, as already mentioned, this information
is required by a number of different departments. It can
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therefore be collated and processed on a single database
and different programmes run for a variety of functional
requirements. Second, point of sale data has advantages
over the only data previously available which was based on
inputs into stores. Input data does not take into account
shrinkage or stock losses, nor does it reflect the exact
date or time at which a product was sold. Furthermore,
input data takes longer to process than point of sale data
which is captured electronically. (These advantages are
in addition to the economic benefits detailed in Chapter
1).
Thus, the electronic capture of data at the point of sale
is designed to provide accurate, reliable and timely data
which can be used by all functional departments in their
decision-making processes. However, because this data is
so fundamental to the business, it is of crucial
importance that the systems are totally dependable and
'foolproof'. The difficulties faced by two supermarket
chains in establishing these systems, utilising the data
and the problems of interaction between the various
departments, will be addressed later in this thesis.
SUMMARY
This chapter began by describing the historic evolution of
grocery chains and identified three important features:
family ownership and control; specialisation of functions
and centralisation. Each of these was discussed in turn,
showing the advantages, disadvantages and relationships
between them. From this it can be summarised that many
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supermarket chains are still owned and controlled by
descendents of the founder. These chains have grown
rapidly by retaining control at the centre and operating
efficiently with functional structures. ilowever, these
have been modified by the addition of various committees,
facilitating better co-ordination in response to an
uncertain environment. The latter part of the chapter
dealt with the information requirements of the various
departments, stressing the significance of data captured
at the point of sale and the importance of reliable
systems. The next chapter will illustrate how far Laws
Stores conformed to the evolutionary pattern previously
described whilst later chapters explain in detail the
problems faced by the company when introducing new
technology.
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4. LAWS STORES LTD
The aim of this chapter is to show how Laws Stores
operated within the constraints of the environment
discussed in the previous chapter. It begins by outlining
the development of the company, with emphasis on the
family ownership and the organization structure. It goes
on to cover recent changes that have taken place within
the company and in particular the technological
developments.
HISTORY
Originally called City Stores, this family owned
supermarket chain was established by Arthur McClelland who
opened his first shop on Tyneside in 1907. He expanded
steadily by opening four more stores over the next five
years until the first world war prevented further growth.
Following the war, in 1921 Arthur McClelland purchased
nine stores from W M Laws and combined both the stores and
the name to form Laws Stores. The chain expanded steadily
by establishing additional branches and became a prominent
name in the North East of England.
Following the second world war a new generation of
executives took control of the company. Arthur McClelland
remained as Chairman and his son, W G (Grigor) McClelland,
took over as Managing Director. The company instituted
several changes, the first of which, in 1949, was the
conversion of all its stores to self-service, followed by
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the opening of the company's first supermarket, also the
first in the North East, in 1959. During this ten year
period the number of stores operated by the company
fluctuated as it sold its smaller inefficient branches,
purchased or built larger new ones and extended existing
branches. By 1960 there were fifty-one branches, the
largest having a sales area of 7,750 square feet. In
1962 Grigor McClelland left the company to pursue an
academic career, he remained as Chairman but handed over
the daily running of the company to a Managing Director.
In 1967 the head office was transferred to new premises in
Saltmeadows Road, Gateshead, alongside which was built a
packing station for the processing and packaging of
sausages, bacon and other provisions. In 1972 the company
expanded to Scotland by purchasing seventeen stores, in
and around Edinburgh. The head office functions were
amalgamated with those at Gateshead, retaining only a
divisional office and warehouse in Edinburgh. In 1978
Grigor, now referred to as Professor, McClelland returned
to a full-time position within the company as Chairman and
Managing Director. His son, Andrew McClelland, joined the
company shortly afterwards, initially as General Manager
for Scotland and later as Operations Director and Deputy
Managing Director, thus strengthening the family presence
within the firm.
In January 1985 Laws Stores was operating forty-five
branches with an average of approximately 4,000 square
feet of selling space. The largest branch Haddington,
Scotland, with a sales area of 10,000 square feet was
80
opened in 1982. The company employed 1900 staff, the
majority of whom were part-timers working in the branches
as checkout operators or merchandisers replenishing
grocery lines. Other store staff were involved in the
reception of goods at the back-door or worked on the
departments such as meat, fruit and vegetables, or
provisions, under the supervision of departmental heads.
The branch managers were responsible for ordering goods
from the warehouse and from visiting suppliers represent-
atives, although as buying was becoming increasingly
centralised these visits declined. Decisions about what
lines to stock, prices charged, promotions, contracts of
employment and the setting of budgets were taken
centrally. Within these parameters the branch manager was
expected to achieve a specific sales target for his
branch, the targets were set annually by head office in
consultation with area managers.
Distribution of grocery lines took place mainly from the
company's own warehouse which operated with twenty seven
staff, plus four office staff and a Warehouse Manager.
Branches received one to five deliveries a week depending
on requirements. The amount of goods being delivered
direct from suppliers to the shops was declining. All
frozen and chilled goods were also being delivered from a
central warehouse.
The head office employed approximately 110 staff and was
divided functionally into departments headed by directors.
In September 1983 the board of directors consisted of the
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Chairman and Managing Director, Professor W G McClelland;
his son, the Deputy Managing Director and Operations
Director, Andrew McClelland; the Personnel Director; the
Buying	 Director;	 the	 Finance	 Director;	 the
Administration Manager and a non-executive Director
(Figure	 4.1).	 Following	 the	 Finance	 Director's
resignation in July
amended (Figure 4.2)
the Administration
directorship.	 Most
1984, board responsibilities were
. The financial aspects came under
Manager who was promoted to a
significantly the Data Processing
Department became the responsibility of the Operations
Director, thus underlining the owning family's dominance
in key areas of the firm. The more recent organization
chart (Figure 4.2) shows the vital position held by the
Operations Director, who had reporting to him the General
Manager for Scotland, the Warehouse Manager, three English
Area Managers and the Data Processing Manager.
RECENT CHANGES 
On his return to the company in 1978, the Chairman
instituted a number of changes which paralleled those
taking place in the grocery retail trade as a whole.
However, owing to Laws limited resources in terms of
finance and expertise, the changes were often on a smaller
scale and lagged behind those of its competitors.
Nevertheless, they enabled the company to begin to close
the large gap which had developed between itself and the
industry leaders. One such move was a policy of store
rationalisation. In 1982 Laws closed four branches each
with a sales area of less than 1,000 sq ft, extended two
82
AREA
MANAGERS
ENGLISH
BRANCH '
MANAGERS
ENGLISH
BRANCH
STAFF
--OPERATIONS
DIRECTOR
WAREHOUSE
STAFF
SCOTTISH
BRANCH
MANAGERS
SCOTTISH
BRANCH
STAFF
BUYERS
GROCERY
PROVISIONS
NON-FOODS
WINES & SPIRITS
FRUIT & VFGETABLES
ADMINISTRATICN
MANAGER
ASSISTANT
PROPERTY 	
SERVICES
MANAGER
Figure 4.1
Laws Stores Ltd Organisation Chart (September 1983) 
SPECIALIST SUPERVISORS
MEAT
PROVISIONS
FRUIT AND VEGETABLES
DIRECTOR AND
GENERAL MANAGER
SCOTLAND
WAREHOUSE/TRANSPORT MANAGER
— AREA MANAGER
1 
SPECIALIST
-- 
SUPERVISORS
MEAT - FRUIT AND VEG
BUYING DIRECTOR
SENIOR SYSTEMS
CONTROLLER
D.P.
SPECIALISTS
D.P. OPERATIONS D .P.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS DATA MANAGER OPERATORS
—PROCESSING-.
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGER DIRECT
MERCHANDISE ACCOUNTING!MANAGING DIRECTOR GOODS
FINANCIAL MANAGER DEPT.
DIRECTORDEPUTY MANAGING
DIRECTOR
—MANAGEMENT
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ACCOUNTANT
{
ACCOUNTS
STAFF
PERSONNEL
FINANCE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT
WAGES
DEPT.
BUYING
SCOTLAND
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTANT
CCMPANv SECRET:Z.
NON-EXECUTIVE
SECURITY STAFFDIRECTOR -- COMPANY SECURITY
OFFICER
-- INTERNAL AUDIT	
MANAGER
PROPERTY SERVICES
MANAGER
INTERNAL
AUDIT STAFF
PROPERTY
SERVICES STAFF
SECRETARIAL
& OFFICE
SERVICES
--- TRAINING OFFICER (ENGLAND)
--- PERSONNEL DIRECTOR
83
— TRAINING OFFICER (SCOTLAND)
— EMPLOYMENT OFFICER
- PERSONNEL OFFICER
WAREHOUSE
STAFF
OPERATIONS -
DIRECTO
SPECIALIST SUPERVISORS
MEAT
PROVISIONS
FRUIT & VEGETABLES
AREA
MANAGERS
ENGLISH
BRANCH
MANAGERS
ENGLISH
BRANCH
STAFF
TRAINING OFFICER (ENGLAND)
DATA PRCCESSING
MANAGER
BUYERS
GROCERY
PROVISIONS
NON-FOODS
WINES & SPIRITS
FRUIT AND VWETABLES
D.P.	 D.P.
OPERATICNS--1 OPERATORS
MANAGER
	 I BUYING_ 
OFFICE SfAFF
-----4ANALYST/PRGGRAMMERS
MANAGF21.ENT ACCOUNTANT
- FINANCIAL ACCOUNTANT
SECURITY
STAFF 
INTERNAL
AUDIT STAFF
FINANCE &	 PROPERTY SERVICES
--ADMINISTRATICN
	 MANAGER 
	
DIRECTOR
ASSISTANT PROPERTY
:,ERVICES MANAGER PROPERTY
L SERVICES STAFF
Law Stores Ltd Organisation Chart (August 1984)
	 Figure 4.2
AREA MANAGER SCOTTISH
DIRECTOR AND BRANCH SCOTTISH
GENERAL MANAGER MANAGERS BRANCH
SCOTLAND STAFF
—1
 SPECIALIST
SUPERVISORS
MEAT - FRUIT & VEG
WAREHOUSE/'I'RANSPORT
MANAGER
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
CHAIRMAN AND
MANAGING DIRECTOR
DEPUTY MANAGING
DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
PERSONNEL
BUYING
SCOTLAND
FINANCE &
ADMINISTRATION
NON-EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR
BUYING &
MARKETING
DIRECTOR
ENPLOYMENT OFFICER
PERSONNEL OFFICER
CHIEF ACCCMNTANT
CONOANY SECURITY
OFFICER
— INTERNAL AUDIT
MANAGER
-PERSONNEL TRAINING OFFICER
OFFICE
--OFFICE
MANAGER STAFF
DIRECTOR (SCOTLAND)
84
existing stores and opened one new one with a sales area
of 10,000 sq ft. In the early 1980s the company's total
sales area increased by ten per cent and the average size
of branch grew by a third.	 '
The company also centralised its warehousing and
distribution facilities closing its Edinburgh and
Gateshead warehouses and, in 1981, opening a large purpose
built warehouse in Felling, approximately a mile from the
head office, from which distribution took place to all
branches both in Scotland and England. In an attempt to
reduce overheads further, the distribution facilities were
contracted out to BRS who provided drivers and maintained
the transport. Additionally, all chilled and frozen
goods were handled and delivered by central warehouses
which were also contracted out.
Changes were also instituted in the areas of buying and
marketing. The corporate identity was changed to give the
company a more fashionable and up-market image, a new
advertising campaign was also launched. This was intended
to stress the convenience, personal warmth and price
competitiveness of Laws Stores, as an answer to the
larger, out of town stores being opened up by such chains
as Presto and the North East Co-operative Society. In
response to the purchasing power of these chains, Laws
joined the buying group NISA in order to gain more
favourable terms from suppliers, it also introduced NISA
generic products into its stores and stocked more own
label lines on which there is a greater margin. Inside
the stores, changes took place on the fresh food sections
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with all the fruit and vegetable and meat departments
being changed to self selection and in-store bakeries
being introduced into five branches.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
One of the most recent and most pronounced changes which
took place within Laws Stores was the introduction of new
technology into virtually all areas of the business.
Unlike many of the larger supermarket companies who have
had in-house computer facilities for many years, all Laws
data processing requirements were undertaken by a bureau
based in Hull. The introduction of new technology into
Laws Stores began in 1982 with the appointment of a new
Finance Director. He considered the accounting machines
to be antiquated and some of the manual techniques being
used unacceptable. Following agreement by the rest of the
board of directors, he undertook a feasibility study on
the computerisation of the accounts.
Further investigations into other areas of the business,
such as the branches and the warehouse, where most of the
data was being generated, revealed that they would also
benefit from being computerised. The Financial Director
also concluded that the bureau was becoming relatively
more expensive as the cost of computers declined and, in
addition, was hampering the development of up-to-date
systems for the company. On these grounds the Finance
Director proposed the introduction of an in-house computer
and the development of data processing for all company
functions.
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This proposal was accepted by the board and an IBM system
38 was installed in August 1982. The actual choice
criteria and decision process will be explained in greater
depth in Chapter 7. Briefly, IBM were 'chosen on the
grounds that such a large and prominent company would be
reliable and provide the necessary support. Furthermore,
the System 38 most closely fitted Law's specifications
regarding size, capabilities and cost.
The Data Processing Department which was subsequently
established consisted of seven staff, including a Data
Processing Manager, four Analyst Programmers and two
Computer Operators. This small size was intended as a
measure to keep costs to a minimum but also meant that the
systems would have to be 'user-driven'. Not only would
the individuals in the user departments, for example
clerks, supervisors, managers, buyers and accountants, be
responsible for in-putting the data, they would also be
required to identify the requirements and prObiems
associated with the systems.
The computerised systems were first used for the company
payroll, followed by other areas in the accounts
department, buying and personnel. By the end of two
years, computerised systems had been introduced into all
head office departments and the warehouse. Despite the
small size of the Data Processing Department, these
systems were introduced in a short time by buying all the
software as packages and then altering it to suit the
company's requirements. The alternative, to have all
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systems	 tailor-made	 in-house,	 would
	 have	 taken
considerably longer.
Technological developments also took place within the
stores themselves. Portable data capture (PDC) units were
introduced into all the stores over a nine month period
from October 1983 to June 1984. The equipment was
supplied by MSI who claim to be the world's largest
supplier of hand-held terminals. The stores placed their
orders for grocery lines using these devices either daily
or two or three times a week, depending on requirements.
The order was transmitted to the System 38 at head office
via the public telephone lines and from there it was
transmitted to the warehouse for picking. The PDCs were
later upgraded to include the ordering of frozen foods and
Chilled goods.
The most advanced development to be introduced into Laws
was laser scanning. This was installed into the Whickam
branch in March 1984 and Morpeth in June 1984. The two
systems, which were intended as trials, were purchased
from different equipment suppliers, ADS and NCR, in order
to avoid dependency on one supplier. The two systems were
slightly different but both were at the simplest and least
expensive end of the EPOS range outlined in Chapter 2,
falling into the category of micro-driven and terminal
based systems.
The Whickam branch was equipped with five ADS 45 terminals
linked to a microprocessor in the manager's office,
attached to this was a VDU and printer. The Morpeth
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branch was equipped with NCR 2126 equipment consisting of
two master terminals and three slaves, consistent with the
terminal-based systems previously outlined, the limited
number of reports that were available from this system
were printed on the receipt printer.
Several other branches were equipped with ADS and NCR
checkout equipment which could be up-graded to scanning
when necessary, but which were currently operating a
simple price look up (PLU) system. This system, often
thought of as a forerunner to laser scanning, involves
assigning a velocity code to the fastest selling lines. (A
velocity code is a three digit number which uniquely
identifies the product). The checkout operator keys in the
code which initiates an automatic price look up in the
machine's memory and transmits the item price and
description back to the checkout, details of the
transaction are also stored in the system's memory.
With the use of the PLU system, 'hard' benefits accrue as
a result of not price marking these lines individually.
Instead, the system depends on the checkout operator
remembering the item codes. It is claimed that the
operator can remember up to two hundred codes, but at Laws
the number was limited to eighty. According to IBM, 2.4%
of the lines carried by a supermarket account for 85% of
sales by volume. Thus velocity coding can give
considerable cost savings as a result of not pricing these
lines. 'Soft' benefits accrue from an increased amount of
accurate sales data on the most popular lines and the
itemised customer receipt.	 In addition to the
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developments outlined above, proposals were also submitted
for linking the laser scanning stores to the IBM System 38
at head office to enable the two way exchange of data.
'
By comparison to most other supermarket chains Laws Stores
were relatively advanced in this field of new technology.
Although laser scanning was first used in this country by
Key Markets in 1979, when Laws introduced their first
system in March 1984, most of the major multiples were
still operating their equipment on a trial basis and many
of the regional multiples, such as Hintons and Wm Low, did
not have any systems in operation at all. This is
illustrative of the rapid technological development that
had taken place in Laws since the appointment of the
Finance Director.
SUMMARY
This chapter has shown Laws Stores as a traditional
family-owned supermarket chain operating with a functional
organization structure. The company prospered during the
early part of the twentieth century and continued to do
well until the 1960s. However, from the late 1960s
onwards it failed to respond effectively to the changes
that were taking place in the retail grocery trades. It
attempted to follow the trends, such as the development of
larger stores, increased emphasis on fresh foods and
in-store bakeries, but in most cases these developments
were too late and, because of lack of resources, on a
scale too small to make any impact.
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One of the major changes which Laws Stores undertook was
in the field of new technology. In 1982 it introduced its
own in-house data processing facilities, something which
most other supermarket chains had done in the 1960s. This
was quickly followed by laser scanning in 1984. Thus,
although late investing in computerisation, once it had
begun the company progressed rapidly from having no
in-house data processing facilities at all, and being well
behind mainstream activities, to the forefront of
technological developments in a period of less than three
years. However, this process was not achieved without
some difficulties which will be analysed in Part II of the
thesis.
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Previous chapters analysed the background to the case
study and the environment in which the company operated.
This chapter looks at the research methods that were used,
the problems encountered, how they were overcome and the
role of the researcher in the organization. Before
moving on to describe the research process in more detail
it is important to explain two aspects of the
methodological approach. First, that the research took
place in the 'real world' (Boehm 1982), and second the
concept of triangulation (Denzin 1970).
RESEARCH IN THE 'REAL WORLD' 
A traditional model of research begins by selecting an
area of investigation, then reviewing previous research,
formulating hypotheses, designing the study, selecting the
sample and, finally, conducting the study and analysing
the results. However, as Boehm (1982) argues, research in
the 'real world' does not fit this 'by the book' model.
The nature of the research award and the close
collaboration with Laws Stores outlined in Chapter 1
enabled the researcher to gain relatively easy access to
the company. A participant observer role was adopted in
order to extract most information from this potentially
rich source of data. The researcher entered the company
without any a priori assumptions or previously formulated
hypotheses as is suggested by the traditional model.
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Investigations within the company showed that many of the
problems associated with the new technology stemmed from
the nature of the organizational processes such as
politics, conflict and communication: A review of
previous research on new technology (to be discussed in
Chapter 6) was being undertaken simultaneously with the
investigation and showed the processual viewpoint to be
lacking in the theoretical works on technological change.
This was therefore chosen as the area to be pursued
through further research.
Thus, in a reversal of the traditional research model, the
methodological approach taken, combined with the problems
of the organization and deficiencies in the literature,
led to the definition of the area to be studied. The
approach was similar to that described as 'The Discovery
of Grounded Theory' by Glaser and Strauss (1968) who argue
strongly against developing theory from a priori
assumptions, and propose that theory is generated from
data systematically obtained from the research.
TRIANGULATION
Although the research was based primarily on participant
observation, a number of other methods were used including
interviews, both structured and unstructured, and the
analysis of documents. This procedure was referred to as
'methodological triangulation' by Denzin (1970) or a
'triad' by Faulkener (1982),
'each leg represents a unique mode of data
collection: one from interviews with both informants
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and respondents; the second from observation of
people at work; and the third from documents, records
and archives of the organization or industry in
question'.
This multi-method approach has many advantages. Converging
data from many different classes such as observation,
interviews and documentary evidence, overcomes the problem
that every data-gathering class is potentially biased, by
employing a number of different classes the flaws of one
method may be the strengths of another.
Not only were multiple methods used but also multiple
sources of data, which made it possible to view the
introduction of new technology from as many different
angles as possible. Individuals were interviewed from all
departments and levels within the organization and also,
on occasions, from outside the company (See Appendix A).
Documentary evidence also came from a variety of sources:
memoranda (Appendix B); minutes of meetings (Appendix C);
and miscellaneous company documentation such as
consultants' reports, procedure manuals, historical
documents and the company newspaper (Appendix D).
Triangulation by data source was useful both in providing
differing viewpoints and also, as one source acted as a
check on another, in improving the validity and
reliability of the information that was collected.
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
According to Denzin (1970),
'Participant observation is a commitment to adopt the
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perspective of those studied, by sharing their day to
day experiences ....defined as a field strategy that
simultaneously combines document analysis, respondent
and informant interviewing, direct'participation and
observation, and introspection'.
Four types of participant observer role are identified by
Denzin, these begin with the 'complete participant' who is
totally concealed and who does not reveal his scientific
intent. Next is the 'participant as observer' who
discloses his role and establishes relationships with his
subjects who serve both as respondents and informants.
The third type, 'observer as participant', typically
includes only one visit or interview with the respondent
and the nature of the contact is brief and highly
formalised. The fourth type, the 'complete observer'
role, removes the field worker entirely from interaction.
On the basis of these four types the role adopted by the
researcher within Laws falls into the second category of
'participant as observer'. The researcher's academic
interests were made explicit, a number of subjects served
as informants and frequent, unstructured interviews took
place with informants and respondents. Time was also
spent observing the people at work and in meetings.
Occasionally, small tasks associated with the technology
were undertaken by the researcher, for example assisting
the Work Study Officer in checking products with barcodes
that would not scan and timing throughput at the checkout.
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The role of the researcher underwent continual
redefinition during the time spent with Laws, gradually
moving from observation to participation as her presence
became more acceptable. Janes (1961Y identifies five
phases in this redefinition: newcomer; provisional member;
categorical member; personalised member and imminent
migrant. Each phase is dependent upon the degree of
rapport that is established and yields data specific to
that phase. Janes' categorization will be referred to
throughout the chapter as an indication of the
relationships that existed between the researcher and the
subjects.
The 'newcomer' phase began with visits to all head office
departments and the central warehouse in order to
understand the operations of every area of the company.
Interviews took place firstly with the functional
director, then the departmental supervisors and finally a
number of clerks in each department. On average, a day
was spent in each department, the purpose was mainly
context setting, to gather 'general orienting information'
(Janes 1961), for example the function performed by each
department and by key individuals, as well as the formal,
and as far as possible, the informal relationships between
departments. Information was also gathered on the new
technology which, at this stage, had been introduced into
all head office departments, although many operational
difficulties were still being ironed out.
Owing to the Chairman's academic interests and contacts,
employees were familiar with answering questions about
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their work, albeit previously at a fairly superficial
level. Consequently, they were open, friendly and well
able to describe the tasks they performed and their
relationships with other departments. New technology was
the main topic of conversation as it had only recently
been introduced and respondents readily offered their
opinions on it.
In addition to providing background information and a
greater understanding of the company, these initial
contacts proved useful in other ways. The head office was
relatively small, employing approximately 120 staff, so
after only a short while the researcher had spoken to the
Chairman, all directors, senior management and many of the
more junior staff. Thus it was possible to gain broad
acceptance throughout the company. Once these contacts
had been established it was possible to pick up
information during informal chats over lunch or
tea-breaks. These introductions also proved useful at
later stages in the research as initial contacts could be
built upon when specific issues arose, without having to
begin from cold as an ousider and gain the respondent's
confidence.
During the 'newcomer' phase some time was also spent in
the branches. First, visits were made to several stores
to gain an impression of the varying types operated by the
company, such as their size, location and age. Store
operations were then studied in greater depth, with four
days being spent in one store examining such areas as
checkout	 operations,	 cash	 reconciliation	 and
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administration. The researcher's previous experience as
an assistant manager with a major supermarket multiple was
an advantage in gaining credibility with members of the
organization, particularly store managers. This was
capitalised on throughout the research and whereever
possible was stressed in preference to the academic
aspects of the researcher's work.
After the initial visits to stores and different head
office departments it was necessary to find a means to
justify the researcher's continued presence within the
company for two or three days each week. It was requested
that the researcher be allocated a desk at which to work
between conducting interviews. A desk was found in a
small, quiet office only occasionally used by area
managers. As this was not the ideal place in which to
observe what was happening in the company every
opportunity was grasped to move into various departments.
For example time was spend observing the buyers as they
placed their orders on the computer, observing the
operators in the computer room, or visiting stores to
discuss problems with the portable data capture units
(PDCs), or future plans for the introduction of laser
scanning.
At this time, October/November 1983, PDCs were being
introduced into the stores and the Training Officer was
involved in training store managers. The researcher spent
some time with her during these visits and after a while
it became acceptable for the researcher to occupy a spare
desk in the personnel office, which was used by the
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Training Officer, Personnel Officer and Work Study
Officer. This marked the 'provisional member' phase in
which respondents began enquiring about the research and
requested comparisons between Laws and' the supermarket
chain for which the researcher previously worked. Owing to
the Training Officer's long experience with the company
(almost 25 years), much of which was spent as a store
manager, her informal role was that of a 'mother-figure'.
Consequently, the personnel office was often the focus of
activity. Employees came seeking advice or store managers
telephoned to discuss their problems or just for a chat.
Therefore, this was a useful location from which to
observe the organization.
Under the terms of the CASS award a senior member of the
company is assigned to liaise between the organization and
the academic institution. This role was undertaken by the
Personnel Director at Laws who, during the course of the
research, came to act more as an 'informant' than a
respondent' (Denzin 1970). This function was also
performed by other members of the organization and
signalled the beginning of the 'categorical member' phase
of the research. The respondent is someone who functions
primarily as the person filling out or giving answers to a
questionnaire or social survey, they do not perform any
special tasks other than those required of them by the
researcher. By comparison, the informants should
'ideally trust the investigator;	 freely give
information about their problems and fears and
frankly attempt to explain their own motivations;
demonstrate that they will not jeopardize the study;
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accept information given to them by the investigator;
provide information and aid that could jeopardize
their careers' (Denzin 1970).
The informants within Laws did not fulfill all these
requirements, which Denzin notes are ideal character-
istics, but they nevertheless performed a number of vital
functions. They provided reports on events that the
researcher was still 'outside' of, and opened doors to
other areas and individuals that would otherwise have
remained closed. They also served as a 'sounding board'
for the researcher's insights and propositions. This
approach was, however, used with some caution as the
Personnel Director and Training Officer were principle
actors in the study. Therefore, it was important not to
give too clear an indication of the precise line of
investigation being taken as this would unduly bias their
behaviour and responses.
As informants were drawn mainly from the personnel
function there was a risk of seeing the organization
solely from their perspective, or being over-identified
with the personnel role. Van Maanen (1982) notes that the
researcher does not always have complete freedom of choice
regarding informants,
'Members of the studied organization are hardly
equivalent in the knowledge they posses. Field-
workers do not wish to become close to just anyone,
but rather want to count among their informants the
more open, knowledgeable and articulate members of
the organization.	 It is the case however that
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informants probably select the researcher as much as
the researcher selects them'.
Wherever possible 'facts' given by informants were
cross-checked with other sources and 'opinions' followed
up in interviews with other respondents. The problem of
over-identification with the personnel department was
countered by stressing the researcher's previous work
experience in the operations side of the supermarket
business and by constantly emphasising the independent
nature of the research to members of other departments.
A major source of information was gained through acting as
a 'fly on the wall' at meetings. It had been hoped (and
confirmed by the Chairman) that attendance at board
meetings would be possible. However, this was not agreed
by the rest of the board who felt unwilling to 'wash our
dirty linen in public' and considered that the
researcher's presence at such meetings would make them
reluctant to argue and 'let their hair down'. Denzin
(1970) notes a problem with triangulation 'involves the
inaccessibility of critical data areas, types or levels'
and advises that where such situations occur a hierarchy
of desired empirical areas can be constructed, if one area
is closed, observers simply move to the next most
desirable source. Thus, when observation of board
meetings was not possible, information was obtained
through interviews with directors who were present,
further supported by minutes of the meetings.
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Whilst access to board meetings was never gained, it was
possible to attend other meetings. These were both
pre-arranged, formal meetings, (for example with the
representatives of equipment suppliers or store staff to
discuss the introduction of laser scanning) and informal
spontaneous meetings (for example between an Analyst
Programmer and Training Officer to discuss PDCs, or a
general discussion amongst directors over coffee).
Although notes were not taken during these meetings, the
topics discussed were recorded by the researcher as soon
as possible afterwards. In addition to noting subject
matter, records were also made of individuals' behaviour
and attitudes during these meetings, which were then
pursued and checked during interviews with those present.
These observations could be divided into three categories.
First, the mannerisms and behaviour of individuals. Denzin
(1970) defines this as 'expressive movement... .concern is
directed to the various features of the body that are
manipulated, often in unconcious ways, to convey
definitions of self and interpretations of situation'. In
this way the feelings of one manager to a director were
obvious in the way he continually chewed his nails while
the latter was speaking.
Second, were the observations of language, such things as
tone of voice, degree of deference and the use of titles
were noted. For example 'friendly banter' between the
data processing and personnel departments was in fact
quite acrimonious when the tone of voice and expression
were noted. Third, the general atmosphere of the meeting,
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was observed. This included such things as: who took the
more dominant role; who was more submissive or argument-
ative; the quality and rationality of argument that took
place and the level of emotion. These three subtle
elements of meetings: mannerisms; tone of voice and
atmosphere are important in determining the state of
relationships between individuals and cannot be identified
by other means such as interviews or documentary evidence,
therefore observation provided a crucial aspect in the
triangulation of research methods.
PROBLEMS OF PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
One of the problems of particpant observation is contam-
ination. The presence of the researcher is likely to have
reactive effects because the process of interaction
between the researcher and the respondent creates
attitudes and behaviours that did not exist before
interaction. These reactive effects had to be taken into
account during the first few months with Laws Stores when
the researcher's presence was most obvious. However, most
of the information gained in these early stages was
factual and therefore less likely to be subject to
reactive effects. As the researcher's continued presence
within the company became less obtrusive, so it was
possible to penetrate individuals and issues to a greater
depth. Many informal meetings took place spontaneously in
the office without the researcher attracting any attention
and observations were possible without too much
interference from the reactive effects of her presence.
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Another major problem with the participant observer role
is that of objectivity. As the researcher enters the
phase of the 'personalised member' (Janes 1961) and
becomes more involved and achieves 'rapport with the
subjects, it is possible that the problems will no longer
be interpreted impartially. However, Denzin (1970) argues
that the researcher should 'escape the fallacy of
objectivism' and become fully integrated with those he is
studying to the extent that he loses all his
preconceptions, takes the perspective of his subjects and
adopts their language, values and culture. Previous
experience in the supermarket industry enabled the
researcher to re-adopt this language and perspective, and
so become integrated into Laws Stores.
The counter-point to this is that it was necessary to
avoid the problem of over-rapport. In these circumstances
the researcher may cease to think as an academic and begin
to adopt, uncritically, the perspective of those being
studied. This 'going native' can inhibit the development
of hypotheses, for the researcher finds himself defending
those he is studying rather than actually studying them
(Denzin 1970). Van Maanen (1982) illustrates the two
perspectives available to the researcher, that of the
'outsider' and the 'insider', and the problems faced by
each. He notes that in reality the pure insider or pure
outsider is a 'fanciful figment of an overworked academic
imagination. Qualitative researchers typically bend
toward one figment or the other.... The trick lies in
recognizing the limitations of the path one embarks upon'.
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Whilst attempting to become an 'insider' the researcher
with Laws maintained a balanced academic approach by
producing weekly reports, writing working papers, and
discussing issues with supervisors and colleagues. These
issues were expressed in general theoretical terms rather
than the specific practical problems facing the
organization concerned. Furthermore, the comparison with
Wm Low and Company gave a different perspective and an
interval of a year between completing research with Laws
Stores and the writing up of the thesis enabled a more
objective approach to be taken.
DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS 
Throughout the period spent with Laws Stores, October 1983
- December 1984, documentary evidence was collected from a
variety of sources. Most historical documents came from
the files of the Personnel Director which contained memos
and minutes going back to January 1982, the date of the
initial computer proposal. The Personnel Director did not
act as a 'technical gatekeeper' (Pettigrew 1973) in the
sense that he controlled or handled all information
relating to new technology. Nevertheless, as a member of
the board it is likely that he had access to most of the
formal communications about such a major issue as
technology. The researcher was able to retain the file
containing new technology minutes and memos, thus
providing a useful permanent record which could be
referred to in later stages of the research.
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The documentary sources of data used, both current and
historic, fall into three categories: memoranda; minutes
and miscellaneous. The most useful were memoranda.
Appendix B shows that these related mainly to new
technolgy issues and were written by the Data Processing
(DP) Manager or Finance Director and in some cases the
Chairman or Personnel Director. Some memos on wider
company issues also came to the researchers attention.
Although an attempt was made to get onto the circulation
list for all new technology memos, this was never achieved
and therefore informal contacts had to be relied upon.
Copies of current memos were usually obtained from either
the sender or the recipient, mainly the Data Processing
Manager or Personnel Director. It is recognised that this
was necessarily selective and therefore introduces an
element of bias, however this was counter-balanced by
using other sources of documentary evidence and other
research methods.
Memoranda were useful as they enabled the researcher to
follow contempory issues, and indicated lines of interest
to be pursued in interviews. They also provided insights
through the manner in which they were written and gave an
indication as to the type of person and his feelings on
the subject addressed by the memo. The following memo
from the Operations Director to other directors and the
Data Processing Manager leaves no doubt as to his
managerial style, his strength of feelings and his sense
of urgency,
'We appear to have been making agonisingly slow
progress in the job of prioritising our list of DP
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projects. Accordingly I am setting myself up as
Chairman of an ad hoc User Committee. Please attend
a meeting in the Board Room....to crack this problem
...be well prepared for high speed decisions. I
consider this meeting to be important so please
adjust other appointments if necessary'.
Such memos give an indication of relationships within the
organization, the sender of the above memo is clearly of
higher status than those he is writing to. The propensity
with which individuals sent memos and the types of
response they elicited were also noted as an indication of
the state of relationships. 'The style of address, the
mode of presentation, the topics covered and the frequency
of writing - all are revealing in terms of one's
perception of another' (Pettigrew 1973).
The second source of documentary evidence was minutes of
meetings. As can be seen from Appendix C these covered
mainly Executive Meetings (a regular meeting of the
Chairman and Executive Directors) as well as those
concerning data processing developments. This information
was used largely to support evidence gained at interviews
and, from a historical point of view, to trace events or
decisions, and to act as a check on respondents' memories.
Minutes have only limited use because they give little
insight into what actually took place at the meeting and
are a selective record as interpreted by the person who
wrote them. Denzin (1970) notes that as they are
'prepared by a person in a given organizational
position they represent a peculiar stance towards the
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issues contained in the report under study and
observers must be sensitive to the selective bias
introduced by the person preparing such reports'.
The third documentary source used was miscellaneous
company documents. Appendix D shows that these consisted
of Weekly Notes distributed to stores, the company
newspaper - Laws Gazette, a procedure manual and
information for advertising agencies. In addition,
published sources of material were available on the
company, for example Studies in Retailing (1963) by Prof
McClelland which contains a case study of Laws Stores,
newspaper reports and journal articles. These sources
provided useful background information and a starting
point for further investigation.
Owing to the limitations of documentary evidence, such as
bias, lack of depth, and the need to understand the
associated circumstances, it was always employed in
conjunction with other methods. 'For case studies, the
most important use of documents is to corroborate and
augment evidence from other sources' (Yin 1984). The
memorandum given above indicates how the Operations
Director feels about the subject in question but not why,
nor the circumstances which led to him sending the memo -
issues which were pursued through interviews with various
individuals.
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INTERVIEWS 
Two types of interviews were undertaken in Laws Stores:
completely unstructured and a more structured,
standardised approach. The type used depended on the
stage in the research process, the circumstances and the
degree of rapport with the respondent. After initial
familiarisation with the company, respondents were
identified in key positions in each department: the
Personnel Director; the Data Processing Manager; a Buyer;
an Area Manager and two Store Managers, all of whom were
involved in current new technology projects. These were
interviewed on a weekly basis, whilst others, the
Chairman, Operations Director and Analyst Programmers,
were approached when necessary.
Unstructured Interviews. The weekly interviews were
unstructured and open-ended. The respondents were allowed
to tell in their own words what developments had taken
place with their projects that week and what their
reaction to these were. Appendix E gives an example of an
unstructured interview with a Branch Manager following the
introduction of laser scanning. Where there was little to
report, the opportunity was taken to pursue more general
issues, such as, the company's general policy on
technology and the degree of consultation. By using this
approach the researcher was gradually able to probe more
sensitive and emotive issues such as an individual's role
in introducing new technolgy, 	 his motives	 and
relationships with other individuals and departments.
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Tape recorders were not used at any point during the
investigations for two reasons: one psycological, as it
was felt the use of recording equipment may have inhibited
the respondents; and the second practical, as the
locations in which interviews took place were, literally,
on the shop floor, in the warehouse or in a car while
visiting branches. This latter location was a particularly
rich source of data. Questions could be framed in a
conversational manner, so that respondents did not realise
they were being interviewed, no notes were made, there
were no interuptions and no chance of being overheard. On
one occasion the respondent insisted on returning to head
office before beginning the formal weekly progress meeting
without realising that considerable information had
already been collected during the thirty mile car journey
and a break for lunch in the pub. In most cases, brief
notes were taken during interviews which were then written
out in full as soon as possible afterwards.
It was apparent that some respondents expected the
exchange of information to be reciprocal, not only were
they sources of data for the researcher but the researcher
was expected to supply them with information too.
Therefore, extreme care had to be taken to maintain
confidentiality. In some instances it was only the
researcher's opinions that were sought. In such cases it
was possible to maintain independence by being ambiguous
and stating both sides of the argument. At other times
respondents obviously sought information that others may
have divulged and the researcher had to deny knowledge of
these details.
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In contrast to Pettigrew's (1973) impression of a
'non-naive' observer it was often felt necessary to feign
ignorance in order to pursue a particular issue. This
avoided disclosing a source to another respondent, enabled
the issue to be seen from and entirely different point of
view, and acted as a check on facts. For example, in an
interview with the Data Processing Manager he indicated
that the responsibility for controlling barcodes lay with
the buyers. In a later interview with a buyer the
conversation came to laser scanning and the researcher
questioned his involvement in barcoding. Contrary to the
view given earlier the response was, 'that's the Data
Processing Manager's job, let him earn his corn'.
These regular, unstructured interviews continued to follow
technological developments, in particular laser scanning,
until February 1985, and were augmented by more focused
interviews with specific individuals, where necessary.
Following this, some structured questions were required to
test the researcher's perception of the organization and
to enable more direct comparisons to be drawn between
individual's responses. A more standardised, semi-
structured interview schedule was designed which included
both open and closed questions.
Structured Interviews. The topics addressed in this last
phase of the research with Laws included: the stability of
the environment in which the company operated; the
organizational structure; communication; decision-making;
attitudes towards technology; the way in which it was
introduced and its effect on the organization. An example
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of a semi-structured interview conducted with a senior
member of Laws Stores Management is given in Appendix F.
The sample selected for interview included the Chairman,
all directors and a number of senior managers representing
various departments within the company. However, due to
circumstances which will be explained later, it was not
possible to interview all these individuals. The final
sample of sixteen (given in Appendix A), was nevertheless
representative of all departments and levels of managment
from the Chairman to junior executive.
Each interview was intended to last an hour but in many
cases were much longer. Some respondents felt they should
'set the record straight' or give the researcher 'a fair
hearing'. This marked the final phase noted by Janes
(1961), that of the 'imminent migrant'. During this time
respondents and informants take on a sense of urgency
concerning how they are going to be described by the
investigator in his written reports, and may try to exert
pressure regarding the total investigation. Denzin (1970)
terms this 'a process of role-disengagement. Field
relationships will be terminated, and though friendhips
established will linger, continuous interactions with
those observed will cease'.
WM LOW & COMPANY
Undertaking a second study with Wm Low enabled the
researcher to draw comparisons between two companies
operating under similar conditions, but varying in certain
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significant aspects, particularly their approach to new
technology. Mouzelis (1967) argues for the use of the
comparative approach to combine methodological rigour with
deep insight, 'by strategically choosing a few cases (say
two to five), it is possible to combine intensity of study
with comparative variations of significant variables'.
The most obvious similarities between the two companies
were that they were supermarket chains operating in
depressed areas of the country, as such they were
confronted with the same economic pressures and threats
from the larger supermarket operators. Most importantly,
both operated within the same rapidly developing
technological environment which included laser scanning,
electronic funds transfer, the increased use of micro-
computers and improved telecommunications. Furthermore,
both companies had similar historical backgrounds being
established around the turn of the century and originally
family-owned firms. However, Wm Low was now a public
company with both a non-family Chairman and Managing
Director. Significantly, the history of technological
developments was very different from Laws, as was its
approach to current developments - points which will be
expanded in Chapter 11.
The research with Wm Low took the more formalised approach
of the 'observer as participant' type (Denzin 1970). This
was due to the larger size of the company, the short time
available and the distant location. In addition,
interviews could be more focused because of the
researcher's greater knowledge of the supermarket industry
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and the technological and organizational issues that were
being explored. The initial visits to the company were
spent conducting focused interviews with as many managers
as possible, both in the stores and head office.
Information was collected on the company's operating
methods, style of management and approach to new
technology. In between interviews, time was spent in the
personnel office, this was not the focus of activity to
the same extent as at Laws but nevertheless provided some
information. Discussions over lunch and coffee also
proved useful and two informants provided data.
During later visits more structured, standardised
interviews were conducted in order to draw comparisons
across the company and with Laws Stores (see Appendix G).
The interview schedule was similar to that used at Laws,
but was modified slightly in accordance with the
circumstances and technology in use at Wm Low. (The
interview schedule is given in Appendix H). The
interviews were undertaken with 13 key respondents who had
been identified in the previous phase of the research.
Unfortunately the company accounts were being compiled
during this time and members of the accounts department
were not available for interview, however the sample was
representative of all other departments and all levels of
management. The material drawn from Wm Low was not as
detailed as that from Laws Stores. Nevertheless, it
clarified some points from earlier data and enabled some
comparative analysis to be undertaken.
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SUMMARY
The participant observer role adopted by the researcher
enabled the 'real world' problems involved in the intro-
duction of new technology to be identified, and defined as
the area for further investigation. In accordance with
the concept of 'methodological triangulation', participant
observation was combined with interviews and documentary
analysis, thus overcoming the difficulties and inherent
bias associated with the use of a single research method.
The investigation in Wm Low facilitated a comparative
analysis of two similar organizations which differed in
significant aspects, in particular their approach to new
technology. By employing these research methods a rich
source of empirical evidence was established on which to
further develop the thesis.
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6. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Previous chapters have established the-background to the
study in terms of the retail industry, the company in
which the research was undertaken and the methods used.
The aims of this chapter are three-fold: to highlight the
gaps in the literature on new technology and show where
this thesis fits in; to provide a synopsis of previous
works on organizational behaviour which were found to be
most relevant; to clarify the concepts and terminology
which are used in the latter half of the thesis.
NEW TECHNOLOGY LITERATURE
Many authors (Bessant and Dickson 1982, Winch 1983, Wright
and Rhodes 1985) trace the literature on technology,
originally referred to as the 'automation debate' (Benson
and Lloyd 1983), back to the 1950's following the
invention of the transistor in 1948. The studies are
variously described as being 'optimistic' or 'pessimistic'
and the development of the technology itself as being
'revolutionary'
	 (Wright	 and	 Rhodes	 1985)	 and
evolutionary' (Bessant and Dickson 1982). As the tech-
nology advanced, became cheaper, more widespread, and the
implications more fully realised, so the literature
proliferated. The latest advancement in technology, and
associated wave of literature, stems from the late 1970's
and the debate on the impact of microprocessors and
silicon chips following the 1978 BBC documentary 'Now the
Chips are Down' (Huws 1982).
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Despite this extensive literature on technology it is
deficient in a number of respects and much of it is not
entirely relevant to the research reported here. One of
the deficiences in the literature is that much of it has
been technical, either describing the hardware choices
available (RMDP 1982, Mussannif 1983, Jones 1977) or
taking a systems or operational research type of approach
(Tricker 1982, Pendlebury 1981).	 This literature is
undoubtedly necessary and useful but, apart from a short
section on the retail technology in use in the case study
company, outside the scope of this research.
For many years the technical literature predominated,
whilst studies of the effect of new technology on the
behaviour of individuals and organizations was lacking.
Recently however, there has been more attention paid to
these behavioural aspects. Nevertheless, much of this has
again been outside the scope of this research as it has
focused on issues and taken approaches quite distinct from
that of the research reported here. This is not to say
that some of the literature has not been appropriate and
this will be referred to later. To understand where the
present work fits into the existing literature on
behavioural aspects of new technology, it is necessary to
look at the issues and approaches taken by previous
research.
First, there is the question of the level of the research.
On the one hand are the studies at the macro level (Benson
and Lloyd 1983), which focus on issues such as the
diffusion of technical change, social, economic and
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political issues. Whilst on the other hand are the studies
concerned with the role of, and effects on, the individual
(Sawers 1985, Cross 1983, Buchanan and Bessant 1985).
These address such questions as: how will the new
technology affect the content of jobs; will it lead to
more or less skills; how will it affect the physical
working environment and how will the worker be compensated
for the changes.
Additionally, there are studies of individual enterprises.
Previous research at this level has tended to focus on the
structural implications of new technology, questions of
centralisation versus decentralisation, and technological
determinism versus strategic choice (Buchanan and Boddy
1983, Mansfield 1984, Robey 1977). As the research
reported here took place with two case studiy companies,
Laws Stores and Wm Low, it is this literature focusing on
individual enterprises which is most relevant. However,
contrary to the approaches outlined above, the emphasis in
this thesis is towards a more processual viewpoint. It
investigates at the process by which decisions are reached
and implemented, including the effect of the present power
balance, mechanisms of integration, and the state of
lateral relations. The implications of this type of
approach highlight another deficiency in the literature:
it's tendency to focus on the impact of technological
change rather than the process by which it is achieved
(for example, EFILWC 1983). This was noted by Mcloughlin
et al (1985);
'most attention has been focused on either the
"impacts" of new technology or the social choices and
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decisions that underlie management strategies for its
introduction... At present little detailed data
exists on the approaches taken within organizations
to the problems of managing the 	 of
technological change.'
Technological change should be seen as a dynamic process
in which issues, events and relationships are changing
daily, it is not simply a static phenomenon which can be
exemplified by comparison of the situation 'before' and
'after', as is implied by many of those who undertake
research into the impact of new technology. It is a
process which can last for many years, indeed many compan-
ies who endeavour to keep abreast of technological
developments find themselves in a continual cycle of:
review of current operations; decision to introduce new
technology; implementation; operation; further review;
up-grading of technology and so on.
Clark (1984) identifies five phases in the process of
introducing technological change: (1) the decision to
computerise; (2) choice of equipment; (3) implementation;
(4) initial operation and (5) routine operation. The
implementation process alone can take many years, for
example first the new systems are introduced into the
production or operations side of the business, then the
finance department, followed by the personnel office, the
marketing function and so on; by the time new systems have
been introduced into all areas of the business, those in
the production department are obsolete.
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Implementation may be prolonged because those who are to
use the technology are geographically dispersed. In the
introduction of a new computerised system into British
Rail freight operations (Mcloughlin lat al 1985) the
implementation period took four years. The process
involved 'task force' teams travelling the country to 150
locations to train the staff and bring each point on-line
with the central computer. This problem of geographical
dispersion is particularly acute in retailing. Many
organizations pride themselves on the speed at which they
can introduce new technology into their branches. Solway
(1985) reports that 'In the space of fifteen months we
have installed scanning into 150 Shopper's Paradise
branches, averaging two installations per week.'
Whilst some studies investigate the impact of technology,
others focus on specific phases within the cycle outlined
above, for example the decision-making process (Pettigrew
1973), the introduction strategy (Child 1984), or the
implementation process (Mcloughlin et al 1985, Mehra and
Reid 1982). In contrast to these specific, and generally
static, approaches this researcher followed developments
in Laws Stores over a three year period and was able to
study the whole process from the pressures to computerise
through to routine operation of the technology.
Another criticism is that many studies are concerned only
with industrial relations issues. These can be either at
the macro level, such as the effect on the overall level
of employment and the structure of the workforce (MSC
1985); at the enterprise level, for example conflicts
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between management and unions, problems of overcoming
resistance to change (Wilkinson, 1983); or at the
individual level, such as changes in job content,
retraining, ergonomics and remuneration (Huws 1982). By
comparison, there is less literature available on
management aspects of technological change, such as the
relationship between computer specialists and line staff,
individual manager's resistance to change, the reasons for
it and how it can be overcome. This particular study is
concerned with new technology as it affects management and
directors, including all levels from store managers or
junior head office executives up to the Chairman of the
company.
A criticism of other publications is that they tend to be
prescriptive or normative, with the aim of instructing
managers in how things should be done.
'There is very little information about what is
actually taking place' (Bessant and Dickson 1982).
This is particularly true about studies of new
technology in retailing. Sawers (1984) notes,
'While there is an extensive literature on new
information technology applications in retail opera-
tions; it is largely didactic and, with a few notable
exceptions, it is generally lacking in systematic
empirical investigation, and offers little in the way
of solutions to the challenges posed by such
developments.'
In contrast to the normative literature currently avail-
able, the approach taken here is a descriptive one,
121
relating what actually took place in two organizations
introducing new technology, the process by which this was
achieved and the roles of individuals involved. The
analysis is based on a discussion- of the relevant
organizational behavioural issues such as power, politics,
conflict, co-ordination and integration.
A further criticism is that many of- the books on new
technology consist of a series of papers, frequently the
proceedings of a symposium, which are often disparate
(Piercy 1984, Bjorn-Anderson 1980, Winch 1983, Marstrand
1984). They tend to range over a variety of different
issues where frequently the only common thread is some
vague and often tenuous link with technology. In other
instances the literature is based on a series of individ-
ual and entirely separate case studies (Buchanan and
Boddy, 1983) which are later combined to form the basis of
a publication. Whilst such literature gives a number of
different viewpoints and an impression of the broad range
of problems and issues involved in the introduction of new
technology, it fails to develop a coherent and consistent
argument or provide a suitable theoretical framework for
the analysis of such problems.
Elements of the above works will be discussed in the
thesis. For a greater understanding of the issues and
principles underlying the research it is necessary to look
at the literature on organizational behaviour. In order
to understand the relationship between technology, organ-
ization structure and environment in Laws Stores the work
of the contingency theorists was referred to. 	 They
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maintained that the structure of an organization was
largely determined by a variety of situational factors,
such as environment, technology or size.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENT
A major piece of research on the relationhip between
organization structure and environment was undertaken by
Burns and Stalker. They saw their research as, 'a
contribution to the study of problems related to the
exploitation of scientific discovery by industry in
peacetime conditions' (Burns and Stalker 1961). Although
undertaken in the late 1950's the aims of the research by
Burns and Stalker are nevertheless still relevant.
Companies continue to face problems in trying to keep
abreast of technological advances and, on the whole, the
solutions to those problems remain elusive.
Based on their own observations and on interviews with
managers in twenty firms, predominantly in the electrical
industry, Burns and Stalker found that the type of
organization structure differed depending on whether the
environment was rapidly changing or relatively stable.
Mechanistic structures, appropriate to stable conditions,
are characterised by differentiation of tasks into
specialist functions and a high degree of formalisation.
Each individual's job is precisely defined, his tasks are
clearly specified and performed according to predetermined
rules and procedures. There is a hierarchical structure
of control, authority and communication. Virtually all
interaction tends to be vertical, ie between superior and
123
subordinate. The whole organization is controlled by
'somebody at the top' who, because of the hierarchical
nature of the system, is the only one who knows what is
going on in all areas of the business and therefore is
able to co-ordinate the various activities.
The organic type of organization is adapted to an unstable
and rapidly changing environment. According to Burns and
Stalker (1961) it is
'appropriate to changing conditions which give rise
constantly to fresh problems and unforeseen
requirements for action which cannot be broken down
or distributed automatically arising from the
functional roles defined within a hierarchic
structure.
'Accordingly, the characteristics of this type of
organization include ill-defined roles and task
specifications. Each individual performs a different role
and task according to changing circumstances. Control,
authority and communication exist as a network, flowing
up, down or horizontally as determined by the task.
Knowledge may be located anywhere in the network,
depending on who has the expertise for the current task.
This location becomes the centre of authority for a short
period only, authority will move elsewhere in the
organization as the environment changes and similarly the
organization changes its focus to another task.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) placed organizations on a
stable-dynamic continuum similar to that of Burns and
Stalker. They concluded that, in a general way, their
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results 'strongly support these conclusions of Burns and
Stalker'. They carried out their research in the
plastics, food, and container industries, as these were
thought to represent three totally, diverse industry
environments. The plastics industry is highly
competitive, product life-cycles are short and the firms
are characterised by continual new developments. The
container industry, at the other extreme operated in a
relatively stable and certain environment. There were no
significant new products and sales increased steadily, but
slowly, in line with population growth. The food industry
was seen as lying midway between the two. There was heavy
investment in innovation but new product generation and
sales growth were less than plastics but greater than
containers.
With regard to the organization's internal structure
Lawrence	 and Lorsch looked at two dimensions:
differentiation and integration. Differentiation for
Lawrence and Lorsch means not only the division of labour
into various functional departments but also differences
in approach to work. 'By differentiation we mean these
differences in attitude and behaviour, not just the simple
fact of segmentation' (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).
Therefore, as well as looking at variations in formality
of structure, the researchers investigated the divergence
among functional managers in their orientation towards
particular goals. This included differences in time
orientation and differences in interpersonal orientation.
The term integration is defined by Lawrence and Lorsch as
'the quality of the state of collaboration that exists
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among departments that are required to achieve unity of
effort by the demands of the environment.' It is taken to
mean not only the state of inter-departmental relations
but also the process and devices by which they are
achieved.
Lawrence and Lorsch perceive both the environment and the
internal organization to be composed of sub-sets. Thus,
parts or departments of the organization could deal with
parts, or aspects, of the environment. Furthermore, they
postulated that the more diverse the environment, for
example the plastics industry, the more highly
differentiated the organization would need to be and more
complex integrative mechanisms would be required.
Conversely, the simpler the the environment, for example
the container industry, the less differentiated the
organization and the fewer the integrative mechanisms
would be required. The research proved their hypothesis
to be true. When firms within each industry studied were
divided into high, moderate and low performers, it was
found that high performers had structures which best fit
their environmental demands.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY
The relationship between technology and organization
structure has been researched and debated since the
1960's. For example, Joan Woodward (1965) undertook a
survey of 100 manufacturing firms in South East Essex.
Each firm was placed on an eleven point scale of
production systems ranging from the manufacture of single
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units tailored to individual customer requirements,
through mass production of standardized goods, to the most
technically complex task of continuous flow production.
,
Analysis of data relating organizational variables to this
scale of technological complexity showed three trends.
First, it established a linear relationship between a
firm's technical complexity and aspects of its
organization chart and personnel ratios. Second, it
revealed a 'U-shaped' curvilinear relationship between a
firm's technical complexity and its type of social
structure according to the scale developed by Burns and
Stalker (1961) ranging from 'organic' to 'mechanistic'.
Third, it was found that firms were more successful
financially when they conformed to the median
organizational form for their 'technology group' than when
they diverged from it. The classical principles of
management, with emphasis on clear, formal definitions of
responsibility, seemed to be appropriate for the success
of large batch and mass production firms but detrimental
to the success of both unit and process production.
Following her research Woodward concluded that,
'The case studies confirmed that variations in
organizational requirements between firms are nearly
always linked with variations in their techniques of
production... The background survey showed that the
successful firms approximated to the medians of the
group in which they had been placed. This indicates
that the medians for each group represent a pattern
of organization appropriate to that group'.
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Woodward's work, whilst having a number of supporters
(Harvey 1968; Zwerman 1970), was also subject to criticism
based largely on the failure of subsequent studies to
replicate the original findings (Donaldson 1976).
Following Woodward, a number of researchers attempted to
investigate the link between technology and structure.
Perrow (1970) disagreed with Woodward's second thesis that
there was a curvilinear relationship between technology
and structure. He proposed folding the scale in the
middle thus producing a technological continuum from
routine to non-routine. Therefore the relationship between
technology and structure is seen as linear rather than
curvilinear. Whilst Perrow himself did not test the
theory empirically others have done so (Rage and Aiken
1969, Van de yen and Delbecq 1974) and found that their
research largely supported the predictions made by Perrow.
Contrary to these findings the work of Pugh et al (1968),
which came to be known as the Aston Studies, reported no
statistically significant relationships in thirty-one
manufacturing firms between a measure of technology,
largely the degree of automation of the work, and various
measures of structure. In addition, Hickson et al (1969)
also used Woodward's original scale as a measure of
technology. Although a few of the relationships with
structural variables were statistically significant,
analysis indicated that they were spurious, and were in
fact attributable to the effect of organizational size.
'The irrelevance of technology is emphasized when the
effects of size are removed' (Hickson et al 1969). More
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important, since this was the original unfolded version of
the technology scale, no curvilinear relationships were
found that were both statistically significant and
substantively important.
A re-examiniation of the Aston Group findings by Aldrich
(1972) suggested that the data could be interpreted to
support a relationship between technology and structure.
Mohr (1971), on the other hand, in a further attempt to
replicate Woodward's findings failed to find evidence to
support her hypothesis that 'the effectiveness of an
organization is determined by the consonance between its
technology and its social structure' (Mohr 1971).
What are the reasons for such contradictory evidence on
the relationship between technology and structure? The
differences stem from the fact that both technology and
structure are multi-dimensional variables and problems
arise because researchers have interpreted and measured
the variables in differing ways. According to Mohr,
'A first source of discrepancy in the above findings
lies in the lack of agreement in the conceptual
definition of technology. Clearly technology is not
in itself a variable but rather only a very broad
concept that must become more specific to be useful
in research and theory.'
Critics of Woodward suggest that her measure of
technology, based on the complexity and predictabilit y of
the production system, is crude and unreliable.
Furthermore, her methodology, relying primarily on
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subjective observations and interviews is open to
interpretational bias (Robbins 1983). In addition, the
concept of performance is also brought into question,
Woodward claims that a consonance between structure and
technology will enhance the organization's effectiveness.
However, others argue that different organizational
members and groups, pursue a variety of goals and
interests and therefore raise the question more
effective for whom? (Dawson and Wedderburn 1980).
Another cause of confusion in the studies is the level of
*analysis undertaken by the researchers (Gerwin 1979). The
Aston studies were similar to those of Woodward in that
they considered the predictability of the whole system,
whereas others (Perrow 1967, Hage and Aiken 1969)
concentrated on the predictability of the work done by
individuals.
Hickson et al (1969) offer their own explanation for the
discrepancy between their findings and those of Woodward.
'Structural variables will be associated with
operations technology only where they are centred on
the workflow. The smaller the organization the more
its structure will be pervaded by such technological
effects: the larger the organization the more these
effects will be confined to variables such as job
counts of employees on activities linked with the
workflow itself and will not be detectable in
variables of the more remote administrative and
hierarchical structure.'
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Fry (1982) reviewed the technology-structure literature
from 1965-1980 and found three main reasons why it 'seems
to have generated more controversy than agreement'. First,
there are the differing conceptualisaions of technology
and structure; second, the different levels of analysis
and third the different types of measures. When these
influences were taken into account Fry concluded that
'with some exceptions, strong support was found for the
existence of technology-structure relationships.'
Apart from the failure of further research to replicate
the findings of Woodward a further major criticism was
based on the deterministic stance which she is purported
to have taken. Eilon (1977) rejects the thesis that
organization structures may be causally determined by
their technology,
'Such a conclusion simply offends the the intuitive
belief of many of us in the existence of choice in
organization design and the validity of the notion
that firms can be restructured as a result of
conscious managerial decisions.'
This criticism of Woodward is not entirely valid as closer
scrutiny of her work shows that she did not advocate the
wholly deterministic view which is attributed to her.
Indeed, her reason for studying technology was one of
operational simplicity and she qualifies the relationship
between technology and structure by saying, 'technology
did not so much determine organization as define the
limits within which it could be determined' (Woodward,
1965). Therefore, the label of 'technological determinism'
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for Woodward was not fully warranted. Nevertheless she,
and her fellow contingency theorists, largely overlook the
important role played by management in influencing the
structure of their own organizations. Furthermore, the
contingency theorists do not recognise the existence of
the plurality of interests within organizations nor the
existence of powerful individuals or sub-groups who have
the capability of influencing both the technology and the
structure adopted by the organization. These issues of
managerial choice, sub-group interests and conceptions of
power and politics within organizations, will be discussed
throughout the thesis. The key elements in the literature
relating to these subjects are presented in the rest of
this chapter.
STRATEGIC CHOICE
The concept of 'strategic choice' was introduced in 1972
by John Child as an alternative to the views of the
contingency theorists. Child drew attention to the fact
that researchers omitted to take into account one very
important factor - the ability of the organizational
decision-makers to exercise choice in structuring their
organizations.
With reference to the notion of organizational performance
which is contained in the work of the contingency
theorists Child accepts that 'it is likely that in most
cases organizational decision-makers do believe that
structural design has some consequences for performance',
but stresses an important proviso: if performance exceeds
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a satisfactory level, decision-makers may choose to
trade-off some potential gain in performance for a
'congenially' structured mode of operation. In other
words, they may be able and willing to exercise some
choice over performance standards. Child further argues
that in addition to being able to exercise choice over
organizational structure and performance standards, the
decision-makers may also have some power to 'enact' their
organization's environment.
Using several case studies of technical change, Buchanan
and Boddy (1983) sought to investigate the notion of
'technological determinism' versus 'strategic choice'.
They found that whilst the organization structure was
affected by the technology in every company studied, it
was not the technology which determined the organization'
structure but how technology is used. Buchanan and Boddy
concluded that there were choices available in the way
work was organized and structured around the technology,
'The cases demonstrate that: The changes to structure
that accompany technological change reflect strongly
and directly the expectations and objectives of
management,	 and weakly
	
and	 indirectly	 the
characteristics of the technology' (Buchanan and
Boddy 1983).
Some writers question the idea that technological change
can be seen as one well-formulated, coherent and
consistent strategy based on the expectations and ideology
of management. The work of the New Technology Research
Group at the University of Southampton (Clark 1984,
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Mcloughlin et al 1984) rejects the argument that
management is able to develop a single unitary strategy
towards the introduction of new technology. Instead, it
favours a view of managerial actions as a series of
,
flexible and changing sub-strategies associated with
different stages in the process of change. Each
sub-strategy develops as a reaction to current pressures,
opportunities and constraints, rather than as
clear-sighted proactive decisions and choices. Thus, the
emphasis shifts from a concept of strategic choice based
on management ideologies and expectations, to one which
results from a reaction to problems and pressures which
prevail at the time each sub-strategy is evolved. Such
problems and pressures include a whole range of economic,
technical, social and political factors.
It is the internal social and political factors and
processes, such as lateral relations, power, conflict,
communication and integration which were of particular
interest in the case study reported in this thesis.
Therefore, the literature guiding the researcher's work in
this particular field of organizational behaviour will be
discussed later. Having reviewed the literature on
technology, organizational structure and strategic choice,
the next section studies the relationship between strategy
and structure.
STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE
One of the most influential proponents of a link between
strategy and structure has been Chandler (1962). Taking
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an historical perspective he studied the development of
seventy large American firms over the period 1901 to 1959
and identified four phases in the growth of the large
American corporation:
'the initial expansion and accumulation of resources;
the rationalisation of the use of resources; the
expansion into new markets and lines to help assure
the continuing full use of resources; and finally the
devlopment of new structure to make possible
effective mobilisation of resources to meet both
short-term market demands and long-term market
trends' (Chandler 1962).
From his research, Chandler concludes that structure
follows strategy, the thesis for which he is now
well-known. In addition he goes on to say,
one important corollary to this proposition is that
growth without structural adjustment can lead only to
economic inefficiency. Unless new structures are
developed to meet new administrative needs which
result from an expansion of a firm's activities into
new areas, functions or product lines, the
technological, financial and personnel economies of
growth and size cannot be realised'.
Whilst Chandler's thesis that structure follows strategy
is an important one in its particular context, it must be
put into perspective (Robbins, 1983). The underlying
research was not concerned with a cross-section of firms
but studied only large, successful, growth-oriented firms
in the U.S. over a particular time period. Therefore, it
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is not known whether the results are appropriate to static
or declining, small or medium-sized firms in the U.K. at
the present time.
Other researchers (March and Simon 1958, Cyert and March
1963, Miles and Snow 1978) argue that in fact structure
constrains strategy, 'once an organization has developed a
particular strategy-structure arrangement, it may have
difficulty pursuing operations outside its normal scope of
operations.' (Miles and Snow 1978). Cyert and March
argue that organizational structures and processes evolve
to prevent the organization becoming overwhelmed by
uncertainty. Large and complex problems are broken down
to enable them to become more manageable and are dealt
with by organizational sub-units. However, the rules and
procedures associated with such structures restrict the
senior management's search activities to within their own
familiar domain and so restrain their choice of
alternative strategies. From this viewpoint it would
therefore be logical to conclude that strategy follows
structure.
The complex interaction between strategy and structure is
recognised by Miles and Snow (1978), who, in an attempt to
clarify the situation, conducted research in which they
'looked not only for consistencies in the alignment of
strategy, structure and process, but also for the
structural constraints on strategy.' Miles and Snow
studied a large number of firms in the textbook
publishing, electronics and food processing industries and
in hospitals. They first developed a model to explain the
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process by which organizations adapt to their environment,
referred to as the 'adaptive cycle', and secondly
developed a typology to illustrate the alternative forms
of adaptive behaviours referred to as 'strategic types'.
The adaptive cycle is broken down, for the purposes of
analysis,	 into	 three major problem
	 areas:	 the
entrepreneurial problem is the definition of the
organizational domain; the engineering problem involves
creating a system to produce and distribute the chosen
products or services and the administrative problem is
seen primarily as that of reducing uncertainty for the
organization. Miles and Snow point out that whilst
adaptation frequently occurs by moving sequentially
through the entrepreneurial, engineering and
administrative phases, the cycle can be triggered at any
one of these points. In addition they state that,
'adaptive decisions made today tend to harden and become
aspects of tomorrow's structure' (Miles and Snow 1978).
Thus stressing the point that patterns of adjustment that
evolve as a solution to a particular problem will
constrain the strategy in the next cycle of adaptation.
Miles and Snow identified four adjustment patterns, which
they call strategic types. Each type 'has its own strategy
for responding to the environment and each has a
particular configuration of technology, structure and
process that is consistent with its strategy' (Miles and
Snow 1978). The first of these types, the defenders, are
organizations which have narrow market domains and seldom
look elsewhere for new opportunities. They rarely make any
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changes to their technology, structure or procedures but
devote attention to improving the efficiency of the
existing operations. As a result of this narrow focus,
defenders are difficult to dislodge from their particular
niche, but may be threatened by any major shift in the
market. The second type, the prospectors, are continually
searching for new market opportunities. They are often
the creators of change to which their competitors must
respond, but as a result fail to become totally efficient.
The third type, the analysers, are companies which tend to
operate in two types of market. In the stable environment
they operate routinely and efficiently, whilst in the
other, changing market, they rapidly adopt those new ideas
which appear to be most promising. If it does not
maintain a balance between these two markets such a
company may face difficulties. The final type, the
reactors,	 exhibit characteristics which are both
internally inconsistent and inappropriate for the
environment in which they operate. The top managers may
perceive changes occurring in the market but are unable to
respond effectively and are unlikely to make adjustments
of any sort until forced to do so by environmental
pressures.
POLITICS, POWER AND INFLUENCE
Whilst internal politics is recognised as an important
factor in the life of an organization, most writers and
researchers pay little attention to it. Child (1977)
refers to political behaviour twice, but then only
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briefly. In the first reference he raises the important
point that,
'structure itself often becomes victim to politics,
and indeed it will not be allowed to operate
effectively if it does not reflect political forces
within the organization... Political ambitions are
frequently a driving force behind structural
changes.'
The second reference relates political activity with its
involvement in the decision-making process.
'Any decision within organizations is reached and
implemented through a political process. Politics is
about the use of power, and decisions are a
formalization of that use, which will have to be
reached through negotiation and compromise when power
is spread among several parties.'
Thus, whilst recognising the existence of politics within
organizations, Child deems the topic sufficiently
important to warrant only two short paragraphs.
In addition to being important in decision-making
processes, as noted by Child, politics is also an
important force during times of change. This was commented
on by Machiavelli as early as the fourteenth century in
his treatise on the principles governing politics,
statecraft and power.
'And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing
more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to
conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to
take the lead in the introduction of a new order of
things. Because the innovator has for enemies all
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those who have done well under the old conditions,
and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under
the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of
the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and
partly from the incredulity of men, who do not
believe in new things until they have had long
experience of them.' (Machiavelli 1958).
This is particularly true of technological change, as was
observed by Buchanan and Boddy (1983) in their review of
several case studies they found that 'technological change
is a political process as the expectations of those
concerned conflict'. However, despite this recognition,
the subject is not given a great deal of attention.
The neglect of power in organization theory literature was
recognised by Pfeffer (1981) who suggested a number of
reasons for this. The first of which concerns the
conceptualisation of power and the pervasiveness of it.
Due to its imprecise nature, power can be used to explain
almost everything and in particular those things which
cannot be accounted for by other ideas. In addition, the
assessment and measurement of power and politics are by
their very nature 'difficult nettles to grasp' (Pettigrew,
1973).
The study of politics provides problems of a practical
nature for the researcher (Mouzelis 1967); researchers
rely on the co-operation and financial support of those
who control the organization and therefore are not going
to support studies which appear to be harmful or
disparaging. It is likely that many groups would hinder
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the researcher's attempts to probe the power structure and
political struggles taking place. Moreover, the
researcher faces difficulties of an ethical nature,
whether or not to disclose his intentions to his subjects
and in doing so jeopardise the whole purpose of the
research.
Pfeffer proposes that a further reason for the neglect of
power and politics is the availability of competing
perspectives for understanding organizations. These are
generally more acceptable as they conform to the values of
rationality and effectiveness that is expected of managers
and organizations. The third and final point made by
Pfeffer is that the concept of power is troublesome to
managers because of its implications and connotations. As
Burns (1961) points out no-one regards himself as a
politician or as acting politically because the term is so
often used in a pejorative sense.
Despite these problems, and the general lack of attention
to the subject, there have been a number of works focusing
specifically on power and politics in organizations (Burns
1961, Emerson 1962, Hickson et al 1971, Bacharach and
Lawler 1980). Probably one of the most notable of these
works (and from this researcher's point of view one of the
most relevant) has been that of Pettigrew (1972, 1973,
1975, 1985). Pettigrew's early work, reported in his
book, 'The Politics of Organizational Decision Making'
(1973), was based on a longitudinal study of the
decision-making process involved in the purchase of a
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computer for a retail company. Hence the significance for
this particular research project.
The focus of the study was the process of mobilising power
and support for the various hardware alternatives favoured
by the members of the computer department and their
attempts to influence the board of directors. The period
covered, 1957-1968, involved four computer purchase
decisions, the last of which was covered in great detail
as the author acted as participant observer during this
period. Such a role allowed him access to information not
normally available to researchers and put him in a
position to be able to study political activity. 'If the
researcher is interested in covert activity, in political
behaviour, it is essential to be close to the ground of
the action' (Pettigrew 1973).
There are a number of important threads running through
the book, many of which will be referred to again
throughout this thesis. The main conclusion however is
that,
'This research has tried to put forward a conception
of decision-making as a political process...
Innovative decisions were seen to be a special source
of political behaviour in the sense that the dynamics
of their process and their outcomes had an impact on
the distribution of resources' (Pettigrew 1973).
In taking a processual viewpoint, Pettigrew attempted to
link the strategies of the various interested parties to a
particular decisional outcome by tracing the generation of
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demands and the mobilisation of power in the decision
process. He argues that a more complex and differentiated
political structure would lead to more disparate demands.
These disparities were said to be the result of
organizational position, professional training, and
adherence to sub-group values and reference groups.
Critical factors discussed included the history of social
relationships, likes, dislikes, and organizational
attachments of those involved in the demand-generating
process, and the level of uncertainty surrounding the
decision. This uncertainty was a product of a complex
political structure, a technically complex set of
problems, the dynamic nature of the technical environment
in which the decision was being made, and the selective
intervention of external forces. Many of these factors
were found to be important in the case study reported here
and will be raised again later in the thesis.
Organizational politics is necessarily tied up with a
notion of power. Pettigrew, in his case study, refers to
the necessity of mobilising sufficient power in support of
a demand and that 'such a process of mobilisation is
founded not only on the possession and control of system
relevant resources but also on skillful use of them.'
(Pettigrew 1973). In particular, he stresses the
importance of information as a power resource and the role
of the technical gatekeeper. The technical gatekeeper is
located in such a position in the organizational structure
as to be able to open and close the communication channels
and to collect and manipulate information before it is
passed on. An important factor in the mobilisation of
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support for a demand is an individual's perception of the
organizational power structure. However, Pettigrew goes
on to point out that neither control of information nor
accurate perception will be much use unless the
individual has political access; so that through their
structural position and inter-personal relationships they
are able to approach potential supporters who are able to
influence the effective decision-makers.
In his discussion of power, Pettigrew focuses mainly on
information control as a power, resource as this was of
particular interest in his case study. Bacharach and
Lawler (1980) develop a much more complex typology of
sources, bases and types of power. They begin by offering
an explanation and solution to the confusion over the
terms power, influence and authority. In contrast to
other approaches (which either equate the three concepts,
or equate power with influence and assert that authority
is a special case of power) Bacharach and Lawler take the
view that authority and influence are distinctly different
dimensions of power, each with its own special properties.
The unique aspect of authority is that subordinates
acquiesce without question and the term implies
involuntary submission, whilst when submitted to influence
the subject does not suspend his critical facilities or
willingness to act on the basis of his own inclinations.
After clarifying the concepts of authority and influence,
Bacharach and Lawler (1980) go on to make a distinction
between the bases and sources of power. Bases of power
refer to what the parties control in order to be able to
144
have power over others and sources of power refer to how
the parties come to control the bases of power. They
identify three primary bases of power: coercive, resting
on the threat of physical sanctions; remunerative, based
on the control of material rewards and normative, based on
the control of symbolic rewards. In addition to these,
Bacharach and Lawler include a knowledge or information
power base similar to that held by the technical
gatekeeper in Pettigrew's work.
Finally, Bacharach and Lawler identify four sources of
power. First, the structural position may give an
individual access to various bases of power, such as
access to information or the ability to withdraw material
rewards. A second source of power is personal
characteristics, for example verbal skill allowing the
individual to argue effectively for additional resources.
Third, expertise is seen as being a source of power, such
as education. It is not classed as a basis for power as
it must be developed and applied to the organizational
context before it can be of any use. Fourth, opportunity
is classed as a source of power embedded in the informal
structure of the organization, for example a Chairman's
secretary has no official position of power but has the
opportunity to regulate who has access to the Chairman and
thereby influence the decision process. Bacharach and
Lawler conclude that 'the distinction between authority
and influence heightens our awareness of power in
organizational settings and provides the starting point
for a political analysis of organizations' (Bacharach and
Lawler 1980).
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This researcher was given considerable access to
information and individuals within the case study company,
making it possible to observe political activity similar
to that noted by Pettigrew (1973); However, whereas
Pettigrew observed only the decision process from the
narrow viewpoint of the computer department, this
researcher traced the whole process of introducing new
technology and took into consideration the various
viewpoints of the many different departments concerned.
The existence of power and politics within the
organization will be illustrated later in the thesis and
analysed in terms of the typology devised by Bacharach and
Lawler.
SUMMARY
The review of literature on new technology at the
beginning of the chapter highlighted a number of
deficiencies concerning content and presentation. With
regard to content, whilst the bias towards technical
literature has largely been overcome, much of the work now
tends to focus heavily on industrial relations issues and
the impact of introducing new technology rather than the
process by which it is achieved. The presentation of the
work is rather normative and fails to represent and
analyse what actually takes place in organizations. In
addition, many of the publications result from the
proceedings of a conference and therefore fail to develop
a consistent argument and a sound theoretical base on
which to build.
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In contrast to these approaches, this thesis describes
what actually happened two case study companies and the
introduction of new technology is seen as a dynamic
process. The focus of the study is on interactions between
individuals and departments at managerial level and the
implications these had for the strategy to introduce new
technology. Within the case study companies issues such
as environment, organizational structure, internal power
and politics were found to influence the introduction of
new technology. Therefore, in order to achieve a greater
understanding of these concepts, the researcher referred
to the literature on organizational behaviour. The most
relevant works, which provided the initial theoretical
base for the research, are outlined in this chapter to
provide an introduction to the concepts and terminology
which is used throughout the thesis.
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PART II 
Part I provided the background to the study in terms of
,
the retail grocery trades, the main case study company,
the methodology and the relevant literature. Part II will
explain and anlayse the introduction of new technology
into Laws Stores over a three year period, January 1982 -
December 1984, and draw comparisons with the second case
study company, Wm Low.
Part II consists of five chapters, plus the conclusions.
Chapter 7 examines in detail the events that took place
during the introduction of the head office computer and
in-store sytems into Laws Stores. Chapter 8 analyses
these events in terms of the strategy to introduce new
technology and the processes involved in forming and
implementing that strategy. Chapter 9 investigates the
underlying factors which gave rise to those processes.
Chapter 10 presents the background to the comparative
oraganization, Wm Low, focusing on its data processing
devlopments. Chapter 11 draws comparisons between Wm Low
and Laws Stores in terms of history, structure and, in
particular, their differing attitudes to new technology.
Finally, the conclusions summarise the findings of the
thesis, analyse its contribution to the existing body of
knowledge on new technology and discuss the implications
for future research in the area.
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7. THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO LAWS STORES 
The introduction of new technology into an organization is
not a single discrete event but is composed of several
different stages. Wroe (1986) identified 3 stages: the
selection stage; the implementation stage and the live
operation stage. Wilkinson (1983) also noted three
stages: design; choice; implementation and debugging.
McLoughlin et al (1985) noted five stages: the decision to
introduce; the choice and design of technology;
implementation; initial operation and routine operation.
In contrast to the approaches above, the rapid
developments which took place at Laws Stores were more
complex. Therefore, the events are divided initially into
two phases: first, the introduction of head office systems
and second, the introduction of in-store systems. Each
phase is then further sub-divided into different stages
using McLoulghlin's categorisation (Figure 7.1). This
categorisation was found to be most appropriate because of
its more detailed stages and their greater applicability.
The first phase (see Appendix I) extends from January 1982
to September 1983. It began with the initial proposal and
decision to computerise, the choice of equipment and
establishment of the Data Processing Department. This is
followed by the subsequent implementation and initial
operation of head office and warehouse systems. During
this period, investigations were also taking place into
in-store systems such as laser scanning and Portable Data
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Capture (PDC) units, but the major emphasis was on head
office systems. The research into this period was
retrospective, based on documentary evidence and
interviews with those who were involved.
,
The second phase, (See Appendix J) beginning in October
1983, marks the shift in emphasis from head office to shop
systems. Most of the former were now into the routine
operation stage, although they were still being enhanced.
But the most significant developments were taking place in
the stores. During this phase, PDCs were gradually being
introduced into all branches and laser scanning was
installed in two branches on a trial basis. This period
ended in December 1984.
It is important to emphasise that these divisions into
stages and phases are for analytical purposes only. The
detailed chronological tables in Appendices I and J shows
that, in reality, the introduction of new technology did
not consist of such logical sequential steps. As will be
shown, the process was an iterative one (Johnson and
Scholes 1984). The introduction of new technology into
Laws Stores demonstrates that as the strategy evolved, it
was sometimes necessary to return to a previous stage to
reformulate a decision or choice.
Similarly, the introduction of new technology did not
consist of one single component, 'the technology', such as
a piece of hardware or software. It consisted of a
multitude of components: hardware such as central process-
ing units, disk drives, terminals and printers; and
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software such as operating programmes and a variety of
application programmes, for example personnel, payroll,
purchasing, financial accounting, and text processing.
Each of these components or systems was progressively
introduced over a period of time. For example, after the
basic hardware has been installed the financial systems
were implemented and undergoing initial operation and
testing whilst other systems, such as personnel or text
processing were designed and developed. These were then
implemented at a later stage whilst the in-store systems
were being investigated. Thus it is difficult, when
analysing extensive technological change, to divide the
multifarious process up into clearly identifiable,
discrete phases and stages because of the overlap of the
different components.
Although writers argue over the precise nature of the
impact of technological change, most agree that its effect
on an organization can be dramatic, stressful and even
revolutionary (Pettigrew 1973, Bessant and Dickson 1982,
Long 1984, Rowe 1986). The experience of Laws Stores,
which progressed from no in-house data processing
facilities to laser scanning in two years, was no
exception. This chapter analyses this progression and the
problems which arose.
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Phase One: Head Office Systems 
THE DECISION TO INTRODUCE 
The origins of the computer proposal, submitted in January
1982, stemmed from the appointment of a new Finance
Director five months earlier. He saw the finanacial
systems that were currently in operation as antiquated and
unacceptable and began to investigate the possibility of
introducing a computer for accounting procedures. With
the Chairman's approval, and without objections from other
directors, the Finance Director also investigated other
areas of the company and found that they too were
out-dated, being paper-based and labour intensive. He
felt that the bureau currently being used for the
company's data processing requirements was becoming
increasingly expensive relative to the falling costs of
computers and software. In addition, the bureau operation
was hampering the development of new systems within the
company.
As a result of his investigations the Finance Director
prepared a proposal,
	 outlining the concept of
computerisation and the associated costs and benefits.
When this was presented to the Board there was some
controversy, mainly because of the high investment that
would be required. Although the other directors regarded
it with suspicion, the Chairman was fully in favour of the
proposal. Thus, according to the Finance Director, 'there
was really no direct opposition to the proposal because
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once the Chairman makes up his mind there is a general
unspoken consensus amongst the others to follow his
decision'. The computer proposal was therefore passed by
the Board. At this stage few people in the company had
any experience or knowledge of computerisation. As a
result of subsequent events and discussions with those
involved, it later became later clear that no-one other
than the Finance Director realised the extensive changes
that were about to occur and the implications these
changes would have for the organization.
THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY
After reviewing a number of computer suppliers (for
example ICL, DEC and NCR) IBM were chosen. The reasons
for this choice included IBM's reputation as a successful
company and their reliability. This was in line with a
company decision 'not to pioneer', but to use a reputable
company, as it was felt that this would minimise the risks
involved. In addition, IBM had software available that
would fulfill Laws' requirements and they would provide
training and support. A further reason for the choice,
and perhaps the most important, was the Finance Director's
previous experience of IBM equipment.
It was originally intended to purchase an IBM 4300, but
this decision was delayed and the System 38 was eventually
chosen. Various reasons were given for the delay.
According to the Finance Director, it was the result of
developments at IBM. They were currently enhancing the
System 38 and, as this would be more suitable for Laws'
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requirements, installation was delayed until it was ready.
However, according to the Chairman, the introduction of
the computer was delayed until September at his
instruction, as he felt that the systems would not be
ready by April, the original date set. Thus, in his
opinion, the fact that this delay enabled the company to
introduce the 'state of the art' technology was merely a
fortuitous turn of events. Whatever the reason, the
System 38 was eventually chosen after some discussion and
was later agreed by all those involved (such as the
Chairman, Finance Director and Data Processing Manager) to
be a suitable choice. It met the company's requirements
in terms of cost, size, maintainance and staffing
requirements.
Recruitment. Having agreed to the proposal and decided on
the supplier, the next step was to recruit staff. In
April the existing Company Accountant was appointed
Project Manager with responsibility for implementing the
financial systems. A Data Processing (DP) Manager was
appointed in May and a data processing team was recruited
consisting of an Operations Manager and three Analyst
Programmers. Given the small size of the DP department,
it was neccessary for the user departments to undertake
some responsibility for the development of the systems.
Individuals were therefore chosen to act as represent-
atives for their departments. According to the Finance
Director the user representatives chosen were either the
most senior members of the department or the one who would
ultimately have responsibility for the system. 	 A
different view was taken by the Data Processing Manager
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who saw the choice of user represntative as 'the one who
drew the short straw'.
Software. By May, five months after the proposal was
submitted, almost all the software packages had been
chosen by the Finance Director. Minutes of the Executive
Meeting of the 6 May 1982 state,
'Packages fairly well identified apart from
payroll and personnel. IBM did not at present
have a personnel package but (the Finance
Director) thought it would not be long before
they did. Agreed that personnel was not one of
the top priorities.
Programmes to be established with DP people and
users.	 In about 4/5 weeks there would be
substantial involvement with users to define
present systems and requirements from packages.'
It is interesting to note from this memo that it was six
months after submission of the proposal and four to five
weeks after identification of packages that the users
became involved. For a variety of reasons Owhich will te
discussed later) the users were not involved in the choice
of software packages for their departments. The
implications of this will become apparant later in the
chapter.
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IMPLEMENTATION
In August 1982 the majority of the computer hardware and
operating programmes were installed. A memo of 20 August
1982 from the Finance Director states,
'The IBM System 38 mainframe computer has been
successfully installed in Head Office with all
its operating programs. The first stages of the
work to introduce the financial accounting
systems is well advanced, the actual
applications program has been set up and is due
for final testing on 24th August. Work is also
fairly well advanced on a new chart of accounts,
and the various input documents necessary to set
it up on the computer installation. I would
anticipate that the chart of accounts approval
by the persons involved would be during week
commencing 23rd August. The anticipated first
run date when input will be live on the System
38 is still scheduled as 24th September. Work
has also begun on the payroll systems and we are
about to commence work on the warehouse and
DIDOS systems. We anticipate that the original
project plans will be met with all our basic
systems in operation by the end of the current
financial year. There would then be a period of
three or four months of necessary refinements.'
Gradually over the next few months additional hardware,
such as processing boards, VDUs and printers were
introduced and the software packages were developed and
tailored to the company's needs.
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Education and Training. It was also neccessary during this
time to undertake training at all levels of the
organization to prepare members for the changes that would
take place. According to the Finance Director,
'The education process took three to four
months, it was a 'them and us' situation. We
had to convince the users. It probably took
four to five months for them to acknowledge the
new systems. In certain cases the Director did
not get involved. We arranged "user visits" in
this country and on the continent for the
appropriate manager and director, but this
failed to convince them, there was just total
lack of commitment'.
As the company's two training officers were mainly
responsible for the branches, training on the new head
office and warehouse computer systems was undertaken by
the DP department. The Analyst Programmer assigned to
each particular application trained the user
representative who then passed on the skills and knowledge
to the rest of the department.
The Finance Director and Data Processing Manager arranged
more general meetings for employees prior to the
introduction of computers to explain what problems might
be likely to occur and to provide an opportunity to ask
questions. However, by their own admission this was not
entirely successful, the Data Processing Manager reported
'it later turned out that this hadn't worked, people had
not understood but had been reluctant to ask questions'.
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In particular the users did not appreciate the speed at
which change would take place and how much their
involvement and commitment was required. According to the
Finance Director,
'nobody understood this, no matter how many
times they were told. They still did not
realise it when we went live. This was one of
the problems and caused opposition from users,
despite training sessions, they did not tell us
what they wanted and did not participate'.
At a more senior level, education for directors took the
form of visits to IBM, either in Britain or abroad, to see
the systems in operation. Also, all directors went on a
residential two-day course organized by IBM, 'the
objective being to outline the company's future plans and
how they will be affected and assisted by DP'.
By December 1982 the first of the systems, payroll and the
nominal ledger, were in operation, the accounts for that
period being produced entirely on the computer. Whilst
some applications were in the 'initial operation stage'
(McLoughlin et al 1985), others had only just been
identified as suitable. Despite having been seen
initially as a low priority, a personnel package was
purchased and the in-putting of data begun. Some
difficulty was encountered in identifying a suitable
purchasing package but after several visits to IBM,
including their office in Milan, and after a great deal of
discussion, the IBM IMPROVE system was chosen. A report
by the Finance Director underlined the importance of this
system and anticipated future problems, 'this is the most
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difficult application and cannot be achieved without full
co-operation of all concerned'.
By January 1983, one year after the initial proposal, all
,
packages had been installed and were at various stages of
development: financial accounts; payroll; warehouse; text
processing; purchase ledger; nominal ledger; purchasing
and personnel. Rapid development took place in order to
have all systems operational by April. The month of March
was particularly important, a report by the Finance
Director on 31 March states,
'this week is a critical time for Laws' internal
management information systems as it is the last
week we will be operating on the bureau. At the
end of week 52 the bureau will run off our
normal month-end and year-end reports and we
will thereafter no longer be utilising their
services'.
INITIAL OPERATION
To many people's surprise the changeover during the first
week of April was successful,
'On day one, 1 April 1983, the systems worked
95%, much to my surprise because I only expected
them to work 75%. The first week was semi-chaos,
but then we were able to build on that' - Data
Processing Manager.
'The initial operation went very smoothly, the
hardware was very straightforward. The payroll
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went on smoothly and the accounts fairly smooth'
- Chairman.
'The introduction of new technology went very
smoothly, more so than expected, there was a
great amount of learning took place which was
very satisfying. There was much less dissention
than expected. Although there were some who had
no concept of reality and expected everything to
go smoothly from day one' - Operations Director.
Although the systems were now operational, development
continued to further refine the systems, adapt them to
user requirements and increase their capabilities. Whilst
superficially it appeared that the introduction of new
technology had been a complete success, it subsequently
emerged that this was not entirely true. An indication of
the problems was given in interviews with the users most
closely involved with systems implementation.
One area of dissatisfaction centred on the provision of
information. Apart form the initial meeting when the
staff were first told about the introduction of the
computer, no other formal communication took place and the
staff were not consulted. Information obtained through
informal channels was confusing and ususally incorrect.
For example, members of some departments were assured that
no changes would take place concerning the information
generated by the system or the format in which it was
produced. Both of which were subsequently found to be
untrue.
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Another controversial issue was the level of staffing.
The wages department was given a two week time limit to
input the data into the system and check that it was
correct, whilst still maintaining the old system. This
was undertaken with the same number of staff, although
other departments in similar situations had extra help.
There was no parallel run of the system which immediately
went 'live', putting severe strain on the departmental
supervisor. The supervisor felt that she had unfairly
been given total responsibility for the system and there
was a lack of concern on the part of management.
The suggestion that the changeover had been problematic
was confirmed by the decision not to proceed with laser
scanning in the autumn of 1983 as planned. The Chairman
issued a memo on 24 August 1983 suggesting that the
company defer scanning until January or February of the
following year, 'I believe the Board should now give the
most serious consideration to extricating the company, if
at all possible, from any commitment to go live with
scanning at two branches this autumn'. Three particular
areas were of concern to the Chairman:
'1. that we have been "flying blind" for longer
than is good for us particularly in respect of
the analysis of charged profit. This makes it
impossible to assess the current financial
performance of the business or to determine the
consequences of current pricing and
merchandising decisions.
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2. following the reversion to manual completion
of the branch stock ledger confidence in branch
stock results is being rapidly eroded 	
,
3. the Buying Department is handicapped in a
number of important ways by inadequacies
(compared with the previous regime) in the
different systems on which they depend and their
interfaces'.
According to the Chairman these problems were currently
placing a heavy burden on the DP department and the
organization in general. In addition the development of
PDCs would further stretch resources and would require
changes in working practices. Therefore, the Chairman
felt that to embark on scanning at this stage would
increase risk and stretch the organization's capabilities
still further. Replying in a later memo, the Financial
Director agreed with the proposal put forward by the
Chairman and it was decide to defer scanning until the
following January or February.
Phase Two: In-Store Systems 
The introduction of laser scanning is arguably the most
significant change in food retailing since the move from
corner shops to supermarkets. Most retail chains have
introduced new technology gradually, beginning with large
central mainframe computers in the 1960s, using portable
data capture units in the 1970s, and experimenting with
laser scanning in the early 1980s. Whilst this took most
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companies over twenty years, Laws Stores attempted to make
the transition in less than two.
As demonstrated in the previous section, the head office
computer was installed in August 1982, the use of PDCs
began in September 1983, and by the end of June 1984 the
company had two stores operating laser scanning. This
section will deal with the latter part of this transition,
the introduction of in-store systems commencing in August
1983. It examines both PDCs and laser scanning, from the
decision to introduce, through choice of technology and
implementation to the initial operation.
THE DECISION TO INTRODUCE PDC UNITS 
Little documentary evidence could be found relating to
PDCs. A memo by the Finance Director entitled 'Future DP
Developments', dated 25 March 1983, includes a section on
the hardware and software required for PDC installation,
'Phase 1 - Pilot system at one local store
	 to prove the system. The pilot will by use
of PDC replace the filling of the current shop
order form transmitting the base order (code and
quantity) via GPO lines to the System 38.
Initial system will be key entry from simple
shelf-edge label (current commodity code and
description)'.
No written justification or reasons for the introduction
of PDCs could be traced. Interviews with respondents
revealed the main reasons as being: reducing the time
spent ordering in the shops; reducing the order lead time
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and reducing the number of data input staff at head
office.
THE CHOICE OF PDC UNITS 
MSI were chosen as the supplier of PDC equipment to Laws
Stores. No documentation was found outlining the reasons
or criteria for this choice. In discussions it was
suggested that, at the time, they were the only supplier.
Investigations by the researcher showed this was not the
case. One of the leading consultancies in retail
technology list seven suppliers with a total of thirty
different models (RMDP 1982). They also note that,
'MSI Data International claim to be the world's
largest supplier of hand-held terminals with
some 200,000 units installed worldwide. They
have been selling portable terminals on the UK
for 16 years and their installed base in this
country is 4000 units. The majority of these
(about 85%) are in retail environments'.
Therefore it is likely, as the most prominent supplier of
retail data capture systems, that MSI were the obvious
choice for Laws Stores and offered the most comprehensive
and suitable package in terms of hardware, software and
cost requirements.
A systems analysis was carried out by a member of the DP
staff and the Work Study Officer to ascertain the best
method of operating PDCs in the stores and the software
was tailor-made by an outside agency to the company's
requirements.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF PDC UNITS 
Implementation of PDCs began with training at a trial
store in August 1983.	 This initial training was
,
undertaken by a member of the DP Department who also wrote
the user manual. The operation of the PDC was quite
simple but required careful attention to detail,
particularly when transmitting the data back to head
office. The procedure involved taking the unit around the
store noting which stocks were low and keying in the
order. The computer room at head office was then
telephoned to inform them that the order was ready for
transmission. The unit was plugged into the telephone and
a sequence of buttons pushed in the store and at head
office. Once the telephone receiver was replaced the
order took approximately three minutes to transmit.
The first trials, undertaken in a store in September,
highlighted a number of problems. In particular,
additional procedures were required to deal with stocks
held in the warehouse and for orders in transit. The
resulting operational changes that were necessary included
continuing to write out the order manually. This provided
the store with a record of the order in transit to enable
it to place the following day's order. This duplication
of work reduced the benefits that would accrue in-store -
a point which was raised by the Work Study Officer.
However, this objection was disregarded by the DP
Department because of the cost required to build such
contingencies into the PDC system.
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When questioned about the use of PDCs, many branch
managers expressed a fairly ambivalent attitude. They did
not have total confidence in the new ordering system
because of the failures in the initial stages. According
to one store manager 'the PDCs were OK but the equipment
was a bit of a headache', and another reported that, 'we
still have to write the orders out, so the only benefit is
the shorter lead time'. Whilst recognising that there was
reduction in head office data input staff, as far as they
were concerned it was an expensive piece of equipment
which only reduced the order lead time by a day and saved
the cost of a first class stamp.
After these initial difficulties had been overcome, the
Finance Director outlined the future plans in a memo at
the end of October, 'PDC units - Further 20 stores
	
The introduction of a second site and the completion of an
operational package to allow "trainers" to carry out
further implementations'. This implementation process
began in January 1984 and was staggered over a period of
several months with an average of three stores coming
on-line each week. The majority of the branches were
trained by the Training Officer, who was also present at
the three test transmissions and the first 'live'
transmission.
INITIAL OPERATION OF PDC'S 
The researcher spent two days in the computer room at head
office, observing the orders being received by the System
38. In addition, the computer operators recorded all the
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PDC failures and their reasons for a six week period (see
Appendix K). Through these methods, and interviews with
branch managers, it became clear that the implementation
of PDCs had not been without problems. Over the six week
period, 60 orders had failed to transmit on the first
attempt. (This is probably a conservative estimate as it
is likely that the operators failed to note some
incidents.) Most of these required three or four attempts
before being successful. On two occasions the
transmission failed completely. In one such case the
Computer Operations Manager went to the store, in the
other the branch manager took his PDC to another store for
transmission.
The majority of reasons given for failures to transmit
were related to difficulties with the telephone lines.
Whilst according to the DP Manager this is unnavoidable,
it is nevertheless frustrating and time consuming for the
store manager. On one occasion a store manager,
suspecting that his PDC unit was at fault, took the
batteries out and lost all his data, causing an additional
two hours work.
During the implementation process, after the first PDCs
had gone 'live', a situation arose which the Chairman
later referred to as 'tragic'. A number of PDCs failed
frequently and the reason could not be traced. The DP
Department attributed this to operator error and blamed
the branch managers and the Training Officer. They cited
an example of a manager not replacing the telephone
receiver to allow transmission to take place. 	 The
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Training Officer pointed out that this manager had in fact
been trained by the DP Department. The fault was finally
traced to an error in the PDC's software which caused it
to malfunction when a certain sequence of operations was
carried out. To rectify this all PDCs had to be withdrawn
and returned to the suppliers for reprogramming of the
microchips.
After the difficulties with the initial operation of the
PDCs their reliability improved and they entered the
routine operation stage. At head office investigations
continued to further improve their capabilities. This
included the possibility of providing links direct to the
distributors for ordering fruit and vegetables, chilled
and frozen goods.
THE DECISION TO INTRODUCE LASER SCANNING 
The initial computerisation proposal had included
provision for laser scanning at a later date. According
to the DP Manager it had previously been decided that
'until a strategy was agreed' no more conventional
checkouts would be introduced. Instead, when they needed
replacing, modular checkouts would be used, supplied by a
German manufacturer, Portrafke. These 'ergonomically
designed checkouts' were found to give an increase in
productivity and could later be used to house the laser
scanning tills.
When laser scanning was formally proposed, in a paper
written by the Finance Director dated 20 August 1982, it
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was seen by him as a natural progression of the
technological developments. This paper devoted a page to
'Competitive Activity', describing the plans for laser
scanning of other regional supermarket chains. This
emphasis on competitor's intentions can be compared to
only five lines of the paper devoted to the likely
benefits to accrue from laser scanning.
'there are special benefits in both costs,
reducing staffing levels within supermarkets by
eliminating price marking of individual
products, the removal of checkout errors and the
provision of substantial sales information for
both marketing and re-order purposes'.
This suggests that competitors' activity was an important
factor in the decision to introduce laser scanning. This
was also supported by evidence from interviews:
'the Finance Director and the Data Processing
Manager wanted to be out in front. They felt
that if the number of laser scanning
installations increased dramatically we would be
at a sharp competitive disadvantage' - Chairman.
'laser scanning is great fun, its just a race to
get there first' - Operations Director.
'it was decided to introduce laser scanning
mainly because others were into it and therefore
it should be investigated' - DP Manager.
At the time the proposal was submitted, according to
information gained by the Finance Director, none of the
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company's immediate competitors, ie those operating in the
same region, had installed laser scanning, but many were
involved in negotiations with suppliers.
The Finance Director presented the paper to the Board
meeting on 26 August 1982. He recommended that two stores
should be installed with scanning, the first in August
/September 1983, and the second in September/October. He
reiterated the comments made earlier, 'we would also be in
a position to keep up with the plans of competitors in
that a number of the stores are planning installations
towards the end of September/October'. The minutes of the
meeting show that 'after discussion agreement was given to
the proposals therein subject to arrangements on
location'.
CHOICE OF LASER SCANNING EQUIPMENT
As discussed in Chapter 2 there is wide variety of EPOS
equipment available to cater for every type and size of
retail outlet. In 1982 there were 11 different suppliers
in the UK scanning market alone, with 14 different systems
available (RMDP 1982). Configurations vary depending on
the degree of sophistication required and whether data
processing and analysis is to take place centrally or
in-store. The type of equipment required by Laws was at
the simplest and cheapest end of the range because of the
small size of the branches and the limited funds
available.
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The DP Manager outlined the criteria laid down by himself
and the Finance Director for the choice of equipment:
1. It must fit into the Portrafke checkouts.
2. It must be modular.
3. It must be able to run a simple price-look-up system
on a stand alone basis.
4. It must be capable of upgrading to laser scanning at
little cost.
5. It must be a master/slave configuration.
6. It must be capable of communicating to the System 38.
According to the Finance Director's paper of 20 August
1982,
'During the last six months, contact has been
made with a number of electronic point of sale
equipment manufacturers, to determine the type
of equipment and systems we should eventually
install. We are now at the stage of
recommending that we use equipment from two
suppliers, namely: Anker Data Systems; NCR
Limited.
We have come to the conclusion after examining
in detail equipment from IBM, Data Terminal
Systems, ICL Limited and Sweda. The equipment
from Sweda and ICL has been discounted on the
basis that neither the equipment nor the
operating systems are currently available. Both
these suppliers have plans and prototypes but no
working equipment is available except at their
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development centres. Prices, similarly, are not
available'.
The final decision in favour of ADS and NCR was based
mainly on lower costs. The NCR deal was particularly
favourable, subject to conditions that it was accepted
before 31 August and that potential customers would be
able to view the equipment in operation at Laws Stores.
Both types of equipment were basically the same, using a
master/slave configuration (Figure 7.2), with some minor
differences in their systems capabilities. Initially it
had been intended to test both types of equipment in the
trial stores and then choose one to be extended to other
branches. However, according to the DP Manager, benefits
were found from playing the two suppliers off against each
other, and so it was decided to continue with both.
IMPLEMENTATION OF LASER SCANNING
The company introduced its first trial laser scanning
store in March 1984, utilising ADS equipment. This was
followed by a second trial store, utilising NCR equipment,
in June of that year. The extensive developments taking
place at head office were already stretching the resources
of the small data processing team. Therefore, the DP
Manager undertook responsibility for laser scanning
himself.
When the laser scanning proposal was passed by the Board,
decisions were taken regarding which stores would be used
for the trials and when it would be introduced (although
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this was subsequently delayed). No guidance was given by
the directors on how this should be done or the objectives
to be achieved. Therefore, decisions concerning the
implementation strategy for laser scanning were left to
the discretion of the managers concerned: the DP Manager;
the Area Manager and the Store Manager. Some weeks prior
to the installation of laser scanning in the first store a
series of meetings were held between these three managers
to discuss how this would be done. Although some
consultation took place, the researcher formed the
opinion, from observation of these meetings and interviews
with participants, that in reality all decisions were
taken by the DP Manager. According to the Store Manager,
	  (the DP Manager) would always let you have your
say, he may not do anything about it, but at least you'd
made your point'.
The reasons for the DP Manager's greater power largely
relate to the question of perceived status. Formally, as
represented by the organization chart and company cars,
the DP Manager and Area Manager were of equal status, but
in reality the DP Manager was perceived as having higher
status. This was partly because he reported direct to the
Board and partly because of his perceived greater
specialist knowledge. There was always a mystique
surrounding computerisation which it was felt the users
could not understand. On the other hand, it was thought
that the DP specialist did not have any difficulty
understanding retail operations. The status of the DP
Manager and his associated power was identified as a key
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issue in the introduction of in-store systems and will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
A provisional date was set to go 'live' with scanning on
26 March 1984. It was decided that the Store Manager
would be responsible for the implementation and that he
would personally carry out all the preparations. In the
Store Manager's own words, 'I didn't mind doing it if
everyone was aware of the fact and if I got additional
assistance to run the store'. A Trainee Manager was
assigned to assist the Deputy in the daily running of the
branch whilst the Store Manager proceeded with
preparations for the change-over.
The Chairman visited the store three weeks prior to the
live date and was not satisfied with this situation. He
felt that the Store Manager's priority should be the
smooth operation of the whole branch rather than the
details of new technology. The Operations Director was
reprimanded for not controlling the situation and the
Personnel Director was brought in to oversee future
events. A meeting was held between the Operations
Director, Personnel Director, DP Manager, Area Manager and
Store Manager to discuss the matter. But according to the
Personnel Director, 'those three had already had a
meeting, made their excuses and had covered their backs'.
He went on to say, 'they've lied once and they'll do it
again, they may have pulled the wool over our eyes this
time but we'll be more wary of them next time'.
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The enforced involvement of the Personnel Director at this
late stage introduced an element of conflict into the
implementation process. This can be illustrated by a
quote from the Store Manager, 'he was told by the
Chairman to become involved and then started sticking his
nose in half way through and saying the wrong things'.
Further evidence showed that the other participants, the
DP Manager, Area Manager and Store Manager resented the
fact that the Personnel Director came in half way through
the implementation process and imposed his ideas on them
without fully understanding the situation.
Other factors contributed to the friction. Animosity had
always existed between the Personnel Director and the
Finance Director, as the DP Manager was part of the
Finance Department the conflict overflowed into this
relationship. It was generally felt that the Personnel
Director was against new technology and therefore
prejudiced his chances of being seen as a neutral observer
and gaining acceptance for his ideas. The conflict
between the Personnel Director and the other participants,
primarily the DP Manager, surfaced frequently and marred
the whole project.
INITIAL OPERATION OF LASER SCANNING
Although the date set for the changeover had originally
been provisional, it was taken to be definite by other
members of the organization, in particular the Chairman.
Therefore, live operation of the laser scanning equipment
began on Monday 26 March 1984 as planned. Considerable
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work had been necessary on the previous weekend in order
to meet this deadline.	 The initial operation did not
appear to experience any major difficulties. In
interviews, respondents differed in their views on how
successful the project had been. According to the Area
Manager it went 'very smoothly' but the Personnel Director
felt it was 'inefficient from start to finish'.
These differences of opinion arose again over the
appraisal of the benefits to be gained from laser
scanning. On 4 April the Chairman wrote a memo noting
that 'at this stage I think it is useful to look again at
the list of advantages claimed for scanning and consider
how far we can exploit them'. At the next Board meeting
the tasks for appraising the various benefits were
assigned to the appropriate directors. For example, the
evaluation of customer satisfaction was assigned to the
Buying and Marketing Director and routine re-ordering to
the Operations Director. However, no action appeared to
be taken on any of these matters apart from the evaluation
of checkout speed which was assigned to the Personnel
Director. As was noted in Chapter 2 this had been the
subject of many previous studies outside the company, the
results of which had been contradictory.
The Personnel Director conducted his investigation by
timing individual operators in the laser scanning store
with a stopwatch and comparing these figures with those
from a conventional store. He concluded that, as a result
of laser scanning, checkout productivity decreased, at
least initially, by 40%. The DP Manager disputed this
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figure, and in particular the way in which it had been
achieved.
There then followed a series of memos (9 in all) between
the Personnel Director and the DP Manager over a period of
a month, each trying to put his case across. Copies were
also circulated to the Chairman and Operations Director in
an attempt to influence their views. Eventually, a
meeting was held between the Operations Director, the
Personnel Director and the DP Manager at which the issue
of checkout productivity was 'thrashed out'. Although the
matter was not totally resolved, a compromise was reached
involving the installation of an extra checkout in the
second store, prior to the introduction of laser scanning.
It was also agreed that further monitoring of checkout
productivity would continue in both stores. The DP
Manager, however, did not believe this task was his
responsibility, so it was left to the Personnel Director.
The equipment in use in the second store automatically
produced information on checkout productivity, both per
operator per day and aggregated figures for all operators
for the total week. This information was sent weekly to
the DP Manager, but neither he nor the Area Manager
notified the Personnel Director of its existence.
According to the Area Manager 'some of the tills give
information on individual operators, but I wouldn't want
everyone to know that'. The Personnel Director,
therefore, continued calculating individual operator
results to achieve a weekly average. He collected the
data until he felt he had sufficient information to prove
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his point. According to his figures, productivity did
improve somewhat as the operators became more practised.
It did not, however, rise above the previous levels of the
conventional checkout as had been claimed.
From the point of view of the individual checkout
assistant laser scanning entered the 'routine operation'
stage as they became more proficient with the necessary
till procedures. To a certain extent this was also true
at the individual store level where the new routine became
part of the normal working day. At head office, however,
laser scanning was not considered routine. It was still
only installed in two stores on a trial basis, and
investigations continued into ways of enhancing its
capabilities. For example a barcoding gun was tested in
the first store over a three week period. Also, the use
of barcoding scales was investigated.
During this time, June 1984, the Finance Director
resigned. As he was not replaced, some changes were
necessary to the organization structure. These included
bringing the DP Department under the supervision of the
Operations Director. Thus giving even greater control to
family members (see the organization charts in Chapter 4)
and reinforcing the trend towards computerising in-store
systems.
As the debate continued various reports were written to
try and prove the viability or otherwise of introducing
laser scanning into more stores. In a report written in
September 1984, entitled 'A Summary of Scanning at Laws
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Stores', the Data Processing Manager outlined what he saw
as the choices available to the company:
'OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR LAWS 
A number of practical alternatives are available
to us now we have six months scanning experience
at Laws.
1. Keeping our two pilots stand alone - review
again in 12 months time.
2. Keep two pilots link one to System 38 -
review again in 12 months time.
3. Extend scanning on a stand alone basis to
those stores that can justify it, each case
being judged on merit. Provide the link
when sufficient stores are scanning to
justify the cost.
4. Extend scanning as in (3) but review the
alternative to a HO link (eg micros
in-store).
5. Abandon the scanning route for the
foreseeable future.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
My own view is that we should continue with
current company policy, where new stores or
total front end changes are necessary, to
install modular tills and Portrafke type check-
outs and then to take Option 4 as previously
defined'.
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The Chairman replied with a paper which again outlined the
potential benefits of laser scanning and the alternatives
as he saw them (these were similar to those of the DP
Manager but expressed rather differently). He also noted
that 'we do not yet have a comprehensive evaluation of
costs and benefits'.
As indicated by the above comments of the Chairman and the
responses of those interviewed, it appeared that the
appraisal of benefits was continuing. Further papers were
written commenting on the benefits to the existing stores
and the choices available. No new information was produced
and no decision taken on the future of laser scanning
within the company. Nevertheless, a list of DP
Developments produced by the DP Manager in November
indicted that he was proceeding on the basis of his
recommendation, 'work has started on gathering information
on hard benefits that would accrue from scanning in two of
our stores. This is with a view to proposing an upgrade
in the first quarter of 1985'.
The DP Manager produced a report in December 1984
outlining in greater detail the laser scanning system he
envisaged using an in-store micro. He proposed that 'the
next step is to meet early in the New Year to agree the
way forward'. That meeting never took place. On 27
December 1984, when the staff returned from their
Christmas break, the Chairman announced that the company
was to be sold to Wm Low & Company PLC of Dundee. The
takeover and the implications this had for the
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technological developments, will be discussed in Chapter
10.
SUMMARY
This chapter has demonstrated the rapid devlopments that
took place in Laws Stores over a three year period,
beginning with the computer proposal in January 1982,
through to the routine operation of laser scanning at the
end of 1984. Whilst initially the introduction of head
office systems appeared to go smoothly, it later emerged
that problems had occurred during the implementation
process. The introduction of in-store systems was
similarly problematic, particularly as the users had begun
to question the decisions of the specialists. The
problems stemmed from the organizational processes
involved in bringing about the change, such as lack of
commitment, conflict and the use of power and politics.
The way in which these processes influenced the strategy
to introduce new technology will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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8. NEW TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES 
,
The previous chapter discussed the introduction of head
office and in-store systems into Laws Stores over a three
year period. The aim of this chapter is two-fold: first,
to examine the strategy by which the new technology was
introduced; second, to identify the processes which
influenced the formation and implementation of that
strategy.
Chapter 7 raised important points with regard to new
technology, strategy and organizational processes:
Technology - the wide choice available both in terms of
the technology itself and the ways in which
it can be used;
- the uncertainty surrounding laser scanning
and its potential benefits.
Strategy - the absence of a clearly defined strategy or
objectives for the new technology;
- the tendency of the functional managers to
develop an implementation sub-strategy
reflecting their own departmental interests.
Processes - the intervening influence of organizational
processes, such as politics, conflict and
communication, through which the strategy is
formulated and implemented.
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TECHNOLOGY
Chapter 2 detailed the variety of new technology on the
market. This present chapter serves to emphasise the wide
choice that was available, both in terms of the technology
itself and the way in which it could be used. In 1982
there was a choice of 11 laser scanning suppliers with 14
systems and 7 PDC suppliers with 30 different models.
Although a wide range of hardware existed this was not
necessarily recognised by the Board. For example MSI were
seen as the only supplier of PDC equipment. Also the
choice of a laser scanning equipment supplier was limited
to four because of the criteria laid down by the Finance
Director and the DP Manager. This was also constrained by
a previous decision taken by the Board - to proceed with
modular, Portrafke checkouts until a strategy was agreed.
Similarly, the alternative methods of use for the
technology were not fully realised. When designing the
ordering system for use with the PDCs the computer
specialists failed to take into account the benefits that
might accrue in-store. Enhancements could have been built
into the software to subtract the order in transit. This
would not only have saved the store managers time but
would also have encouraged greater commitment to the new
technology. In the case of laser scanning the wide
variety of benefits that might accrue were forgotten, as
the debate centred on checkout productivity.
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THE STRATEGY TO INTRODUCE HEAD OFFICE SYSTEMS 
One definition of strategy which has frequently been used
by other writers (Miles and Snow 1978, Robbins 1983) is
taken from Chandler (1962),
'Strategy can be defined as the determination of
the basic long-term goals and objectives of an
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of
action and the allocation of resources necessary
for carrying out these goals'.
An analysis of documents was undertaken at Laws Stores to
ascertain the company's strategy to introduce new
technolgy. In Chandler's terms, this was the objectives to
be achieved and the necessary courses of action. No
statement could be found outlining the company's strategy
at the time the computer proposal was accepted or prior to
its installation.
A limited number of references (ten) to plans, policies
and objectives were found in documents subsequent to the
installation of the computer. The first of these was in a
memo issued by the Data Processing Manager relating to a
course being held for the directors, 'The course is
designed as a first stage Planning and Policy Instrument.
The objective being to outline the Company future plans,
and how they will be affected and assisted by Data
Processing'. Once again no documentary evidence could be
found showing the outcome of this course or stating the
company's policies and plans. The only explicit reference
to a new technology strategy was made by the Chairman in
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August 1983, five months after the company had become
totally dependent on its own in-house computer. The
Chairman stated 'I accept also the general strategy of DP
development, namely to get things up and running first and
add the refinements later'.
Other references to plans included, for example, 'the DP
menu outlining possible future DP developments' drawn up
by the Finance Director, but this related only to the next
six months. In addition, according to the Finance
Director, 'the Chairman was very keen, but at too low a
level....rather than work out a strategy he would get too
bogged down in detail'. There was considerable emphasis
on drawing up priority lists for development projects and
on time scales for their implementation. This evidence
would seem to suggest that any plans made by the company
were generally of a short or medium-term nature.
Although analysis of documents did not give any clues to
the new technology strategy, interviews with respondents
and informants revealed the guiding principles behind its
introduction. These were indicated by such phrases as 'the
aim was...', 'this was a policy decision...', 'it was
decided it should be...', 'the board decided to...'. On
this basis, six principles or 'policy decisions' governing
the introduction of new technology could be identified.
These were all closely inter-related and characterised the
Laws approach. As these principles exhibit a degree of
consistency they could, according to Mintzberg's (1978)
definition, be said to compose the new technology
strategy, ie 'a pattern in a stream of decisions'.
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1. The first and overriding principle was that the new
technology had to be introduced quickly. According to the
Finance Director 'the Board decided to take the fastest
route'. The justification for this was that technological
developments at Laws were so far behind those of its
competitors that something had to be done quickly to
redress the balance. Estimates of just how far behind the
company was varied from 5 years to 25 years. According to
the Data Processing Manager, 'there was 5-7 years work to
do in 12 months'. Furthermore, to have done it slowly,
whilst still maintaining the services of the bureau would
have been more costly and the company could not afford
dual running. The Project Leader suggested that the
technology was introduced under such strict time limits
because the Finance Director was on a three year contract
and wished to make his mark with Laws before moving
elsewhere.
2. The second principle was that in order to introduce
the systems in a short space of time packages had to be
bought in and tailored to the company's needs. The
alternative, according to the Finance Director, would have
been to employ a team of analysts to investigate the
systems in great detail and identify what was required -
taking at least 2 years to complete. It was felt the
company could not afford the time and cost involved in
this approach.
3. In line with this policy it was decided to employ only
a small in-house data processing team. The Chairman
disapproved of the large Data Processing Departments which
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he had witnessed in other retail organizations. He felt
they created a large overhead and were unnecessary for
Laws' requirements.
4. As a consequence of the small number of specialist
staff a large amount of work was expected of the members
of other departments, ie the users. Therefore, the
introduction of computers was said to be 'user driven'.
Each application had a specific project team consisting of
a user representative from the appropriate department and
an Analyst Programmer. They held a meeting each week with
the user director; the Finance Director; the Data
Processing Manager and representatives from IBM to discuss
the progress of the project.
5. The fifth principle was, in the words of the Chairman,
'to get things up and running and add the refinements
later'. Consistent with the decision to take the fastest
route, they chose, as the Finance Director explained, 'to
have the systems 90% operational within 6 months instead
of 99% in 2 years'.
6. It was further decided 'not to be first in the field'
and 'not to pioneer'. Considering the self-imposed time
constraint, if untried software or hardware had been
utilised and had subsequently failed or been difficult to
implement this would have caused delay and additional
costs would have been incurred.
It appeared from interviews that these principles were
generally accepted within the organization. It is not
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clear how these decisions were arrived at, the degree of
concensus that existed or how they were communicated
throughout the organization. Based on the evidence of
other decisions relating to new technology, it could be
postulated that these principles were probably proposed by
the Finance Director or Data Processing Manager, gained
the support of the Chairman and were therefore accepted by
the other directors. As no documentary evidence could be
found to support this, it is possible that these
principles were never subject to the formal
decision-making processes at all. They may have evolved
during the introduction of new technology as a reaction to
circumstances (McLoughlin et al 1985), or as a result of
the influence of particular individuals, such as the
Finance Director and Data Processing Manager.
Similarly, it is not apparent if these policies were
formally communicated to the rest of the company from the
outset. A meeting was held prior to the introduction of
new technology to inform key organization members of the
proposed changes, but on the admission of those involved
the full implications were not really understood. Also
most information (or misinformation) was disseminated
throughout the company by informal channels, leading to
differences	 in	 interpretation	 and	 further
misunderstanding.	 This can be illustrated by the
different definitions given to 'user-driven':
'A project that is formulated at the user's
request, and run by them under their total
control, with the exception of the technical
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requirements. They are responsible for it from
start to finish' - Data Processing Manager.
'User driven means that the computer department
does not input the information, the users do.
The users also access the database directly.
Generally, the DP Department does not hold the
user department's hand' - Operations Director.
'User driven means blame the user - anything
that went wrong was our fault, even though we
are not computer people' - Training Officer.
The evidence from Laws Stores indicates that the
principles guiding the introduction of new technology
evolved over a period of time and were never clearly
articulated. Only in retrospect, and by virtue of their
general acceptance, were they identified by respondents as
'policy decisions'.
THE STRATEGY TO INTRODUCE IN-STORE SYSTEMS 
The pressures for the introduction of new technology in
Laws Stores branches stemmed from the perceived need to
keep up with the developments of competitors. Although at
that time, August 1982, only 16 companies, with a total of
27 stores, were currently operating laser scanning in the
UK (Musannif 1983). Indeed, even by 1984 it had only
penetrated a mere 1.7% of all the country's supermarkets
(ICL 1985). This is an indication of the speed at which
the company was progressing. Six months previously it had
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been said to be '25 years behind the times', now they had
not only upgraded their technology to current levels but
were attempting to be at the forefront. This rapid rate
of technological development did not go unnoticed by the
Project Manager, 'they were looking at things like laser
scanning whilst we were still struggling with the nominal
ledger'.
Despite previous statements about 'not pioneering', Laws
introduced technology which even the most advanced
supermarket chains were treating with caution. Although
both ADS and NCR were long established companies, the
equipment chosen by Laws were both new models, previously
untested in the field. This competitive pressure to
introduce laser scanning can be compared with a study
undertaken in the US by the National Retail Merchants
Association (NRMA) into reasons for installing point of
sale systems. They found the main reason was improved
merchandising and display decisions (76%). Whilst
expected clerical savings was also given as a major reason
(51%), competition (8%) was not found to be a major factor
(Musannif 1983).
Initially Laws placed little emphasis on the benefits to
be gained from laser scanning. It was not until after its
introduction that a memo by the Chairman on 'Scanning -
Exploitation and Appraisal' triggered the debate that was
to continue for many months.
As with the head office systems there was no
pre-determined strategy for the implementation of new
192
technology into the branches. The directors did not give
any indication of how it should be implemented or what
objectives were to be achieved. A decision was made on
what technology to introduce, into which shops and when.
,
This was passed down to the functional managers concerned
and it was left to their discretion to implement.
THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY
The strategy to introduce new technology into Laws Stores
is closely related to Mintzberg's (1978) concept of an
'emergent' strategy which he describes as 'a pattern in a
stream of decisions'. This concept contains three
important elements:
(a) strategy is not explicit,
(b) it is not developed conciously and purposefully,
(c) it is not made in advance of the specific decisions.
In this way the six principles outlined above can be seen
as 'ex post facto results of decisional behaviour'. This
'emergent' strategy only becomes formalised as a
deliberate or 'intended' strategy retrospectively.
This is similar to the work of McLoughlin et al (1985) who
saw the introduction of new technology as a series of
flexible and changing sub-strategies. According to
McLoughlin et al, each sub-strategy is formed at a
different stage in the introduction of new technology as a
reaction to current pressures,	 opportunities and
constraints. Following the work of McLoughlin et al,
five stages were identified in the introduction of new
technology into Laws Stores. These were: the decision to
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Choice
and
Design
Routine
Operation
introduce;	 choice
	 and	 design	 of	 technology;
implementation; initial operation and routine operation
(Figure 8.1). These stages were not necessarily
sequential, they frequently over-lapped and the process
was an iterative one, as decisions taken at a later stage
would often necessitate the review of an earlier decision.
Stages in the Formation of an Emergent Strategy Figure 8.1 
The Decision to Introduce
Initial < 	 Implemen
Operation
	
-tation
Mintzberg notes the danger of an intended strategy
becoming 'overrealized', in that it is implemented beyond
the original intentions and the organization is unable to
halt its momentum. The 'overrealization' of an emergent
strategy is even more dangerous for the very reason that
it was not intended and thus the implications were not
fully considered. Mintzberg also questions the advice
'make your strategy explicit', as to do so invests it with
an even greater momentum. In the context of this research
it would seem that to have made the strategy explicit
would have overcome some of the misunderstanding which
existed.
194
The lack of a clearly defined strategy or objectives for
the introduction of new technology in Laws Stores created
a void, thus allowing the middle managers considerable
opportunity to influence each stage according to their own
wishes. Although this emergent strategy created
difficulties for Laws Stores, other organizations where a
similar approach to strategy was identified were reported
as being successful. Mintzberg (1978) finds differing
levels of success in his research into the emergent
strategies of Volkswagen and the US Government's policies
on Vietnam. Smeds' (1986) reports a successful emergent
strategy to introduce a computerised information system
(CIS) into a Finnish high technology company. Indeed, she
argues that 'any rigidly explicated CIS strategy would
have been an impediment'.
It will be noted later in this thesis that the new
technology strategy at Wm Low also 'emerged' over time but
was, nevertheless, a successful one. To understand why
similar emergent strategies can have differing outcomes,
it is necessary to examine the processes which shaped the
formulation of the strategy in the context of the
particular organization.
ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES 
The factors influencing the success of the new technology
strategy can be classified under the heading of
organizational processes. These processes are defined as
'the way in which people in groups behave and interact
when they are setting objectives, solving problems or
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introducing change' (Johannsen and Page 1980). The focus
of this study being the interaction of groups, computer
specialists and users, when introducing technological
change. Four processes in particular were identified as
being important in bringing about change at Laws Stores:
communication; commitment; conflict; power and politics.
COMMUNICATION
At times when new technology is being introduced,
considerable co-ordination between departments and
commitment to the project is required. Where
circumstances and technology are changing rapidly,
decisions need to be taken quickly and implementation
co-ordinated. However, communication in the case study
company was poor, information passed between different
departments was often distorted or, in some cases, totally
withheld, either knowingly or unknowingly. For example,
the DP Manager and the Area Manager were not prepared to
tell the Personnel Director of the existence of
information which could help him with his investigation
into checkout productivity. As long as he was not using
this information, they could continue to criticise his
method of collecting data and so cast doubts on his
results. Whilst the Personnel Director spent time
soliciting information from other store managers and
working out his results it was at a cost to the
organization, both in terms of time which could have
valuably been spent elsewhere and in terms of friction
within the organization.
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The DP Manager did make some attempt at reconciling the
opposing views. During one meeting, which was observed by
the researcher, he said repeatedly that he thought, in
effect, the Personnel Director and himself were saying the
same thing. In a memo following this meeting his opening
words were, 'following a number of conversations we have
had on the scanning timing exercise you are carrying out I
conclude that our views are not so far apart but being
expressed in different ways'. All attempts such as this
by the DP Manager to rationalise the situation were
ignored by the Personnel Director.
Thus, despite attempts at communication, the predisposed
views of each party continued to prevail. Each was
concerned with their individual goals - the Personnel
Director in aiming to 'prove' that laser scanning was
slower and the DP Manager in getting the new technology
accepted by the company - rather than the goals of the
company as a whole. Although not originally defined,
these goals later emerged as identifying the benefits to
be gained from laser scanning and which could justify it
being introduced into other stores.
The case study demonstrates how the Data Processing
Manager utilised the formal communication channels to
influence the Board of Directors by reporting direct to
them on data processing developments and through the many
memos which he issued. He also utilised informal
communication channels by developing a close relationship
with the Finance Director and, after the latter's
resignation, with the Operations Director.
	 Therefore,
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although lateral communication, 	 ie that between
departments, was restricted; the vertical communication
channels between different levels in the hierarchy
appeared to be more open, thus allowing the DP Manager
access to the Board.
The lack of communication in the company and the type of
language used illustrated the gap that existed between the
computer specialists and the users. For example,
respondents frequently referred to 'them and us'. The
Finance Director and DP Manager repeatedly stressed the
length of time it took to 'educate the users'. Whilst in
return the other departments were somewhat doubtful of
their knowledge of the supermarket business. This lack of
integration was a feature also reported by other
researchers investigating the introduction of new
technology (Pettigrew 1973, Wilkinson 1983). Wright and
Rhodes (1985) noted the lack of understanding they
experienced when integrating two different approaches.
Mumford and Banks (1967) also note that a cmiticismvt
programmers was that they 'spoke a technical jargon'.
This disparity was particularly acute at Laws because of
the traditional, conservative nature of the organization
and its employees, many of whom had been with the company
for some length of time. Most of these had their roots in
the North East and were unwilling to move elsewhere. The
poor employment prospects in the region further increased
their dependency on the company. In contrast the computer
specialists were relatively young with highly marketable
skills and stayed with the company for only a short period
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of time (all three analyst programmers recruited at the
beginning left within two years). The Chairman believed
that 'in the case of DP you are dealing with people who
have a lot of job opportunities. , They have strong
professional interests..., but can be quite stubborn'.
The integration of computer specialists into the company
was further strained by the organization's previous lack
of exposure to new technology and the rapid developments
it was attempting to make in such a short time. The
pioneering nature of the specialists work and short time
with the company led them to be committed to the task
rather the organization. The high profile of the DP
Department and the far-reaching implications of the
changes also led to resentment. As time progressed, most
of the original computer specialists left the company,
those that remained developed closer relationships with
members in other departments with whom they had worked in
developing particular systems. Their work no longer
appeared quite so urgent or pioneering and so the
cohesiveness of the DP Department was less strong. The
few that remained developed a stronger identification with
the company as a whole and gradually became more
integrated into it, but never fully so.
COMMITMENT
A review of events in Laws Stores and the comments of
respondents suggests that lack of commitment to the
technological change was the source of many of the
difficulties.
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'We did not manage to get the directors
involved. They didn't attend any of the project
meetings until the Chairman put his foot behind
them .... there was just total lack of
commitment' - Finance Director.
'nobody was really committed to it' - Data
Processing Manager.
The user directors failed to recognise the need for change
and so their attitude was somewhat ambivalent. They
agreed to the computer proposals put forward by the
Finance Director largely because of the Chairman's
enthusiasm. They were reluctant to criticise or raise
objections despite the fact that they were not totally
convinced of the need for change. Without recognising
this need for themselves it was difficult for them to
identify with the systems in their own departments.
Furthermore, the perceived need to develop the systems
quickly meant that the Finance Director chose all the
application programs which were simply 'rubber stamped' by
the user director, further alienating them from
developments within their own departments.
Only at this late stage, because of the small size of the
DP Department and the 'user driven' policy, was it
necessary to involve the users. They were required to
implement computer systems which they did not necessarily
perceive a need for, and which they had played no part in
designing. Their involvement at this stage took the form
of a ten minute report to the Project Meeting each week.
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Consultation was still at a fairly superficial level and
the users continued to have little influence in the design
of the system or the way in which it was introduced. The
enthusiasm of user representatives was an important
element, noted by both the Chairman and the Finance
Director, in the success of particular systems, yet little
effort was invested in choosing those individuals or in
gaining their commitment to technological change. Their
ability to comprehend the systems and their skill in
passing their knowledge on to others in the department was
also not taken into account.
Many writers (Mumford 1979, Hedberg 1980) argue for the
participation of users at an early stage in order to
ensure commitment and a feeling of 'ownership' of the
project. As this approach is expensive in terms of time
and resources it may be counter-argued that the decision
to develop systems quickly, and the cost constraints,
necessitated an autocratic, 'top down' approach at Laws.
The method used was similar to that described by Bessant
and Dickson (1982) as the 'marketing approach' (Figure
8.2). The proposal, although passed by the whole Board,
really only had the support of the Finance Director and
the Chairman. The attempt to 'sell' the decision to the
rest of the organization came some months later when the
policy of 'user driven' development required that others
became involved and undertook responsibilty for their own
systems.
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The reaction of the users was
resistance to the change but
acceptance.
	 In Judson's (1966)
Marketing Approach	 Figure 8.2 
Selling Communication --> Favourable but incorrect
, interpretation
4,
Acceptance
4,
Implementation
Disillusionment
4,
Conflict/alienation
Source: Bessant and Dickson (1982)
The response to the 'marketing approach' employed in Laws
was also similar to that predicted by Bessant and Dickson.
The initial reaction was favourable but the implications
of introducing new technology were not fully understood.
This is demonstrated by the different interpretations of
'user driven' and a quote from the Chairman, 'according to
company policy the users do the initial input and it was
not appreciated at the time the considerable workload it
created'.
not one of outright
more one of passive
spectrum of possible
behaviour to change it would be classified as
'indifference; apathy;.... doing only what is ordered'.
Commitment tended to be based on loyalty to the Chairman
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and carrying out his decision, rather than any belief in,
or commitment to, the task itself. Owing to the lack of
participation the users had no feelings of 'ownership'
concerning their projects.
The technology seemed initially to be accepted because the
first systems to be introduced were within the finance
department. As the DP Department came under the Finance
Director this had the advantage of keeping developments
under the control of one director who could ensure greater
commitment to the project and keep all the difficulties
within his own department. The documents produced by the
Finance Director gave no indication of any serious
problems. However, interviews with the Project Leader and
the Wages Supervisor, who were responsible for the first
computerised systems indicated that they were not entirely
satisfied. Owing to their subordinate relationship with
the Finance Director, manifest conflict would have been
unacceptable and therefore different reactions resulted.
The reponse of the Wages Supervisor was to become
distressed and suffer strain whilst the Project Leader
responded by withdrawing - he left the company in July
1983. He attributed his resignation not to the new
technology itself but to 'the way in which it was
introduced'. This view was representative of most
respondents, and is supported by other researchers
(Blackler and Brown 1985, McLoughlin et al 1985) who note
that the implementation of change is often more important
in shaping attitudes than the technology itself.
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As Bessant and Dickson note, 'the early acceptance may
lead to a later disillusionment as problems implicit in
the use of technology emerge'. They suggest that one way
to overcome this is by continuous monitoring and feedback.
Attempts to involve the users at Laws in this way were not
entirely successful. The weekly Progress Meetings
continued, but were said by one participant to be,
'mainly a formality. It was a "them and us"
situation.	 the	 Finance	 Director,	 Data
Processing Manager and IBM representatives sat
on one side of the table and we came in, in
turns, and sat at the other. It was a question
of them telling us what was required and we
reported back about any problems and whether we
had met our deadlines'.
This view was supported by minutes of these meetings
showing 'report time' at ten minute intervals for each of
the departmental applications.
Once the basic systems had been implemented in each
department and appeared, at least superficially, to be
working smoothly, the weekly progress meetings ceased.
The computer specialists then devoted most of their time
to developing new systems. The users were expected to
identify problems with their own systems and actively seek
out solutions, drawing on the expertise of the specialists
as necessary. However, they failed to fully understand
the implications of the 'user driven' policy. As a
result, problems still existed with the systems which were
not tailored to the user's requirements. This led to
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further conflict, particularly over the development of the
in-store systems.
CONFLICT 
As was noted above the initial reaction to the new
technology was one of passive acceptance and there was
very little manifest conflict. There are three major
reasons for this. The first was the unwillingness of
directors to oppose the Chairman. This has already been
referred to and the role of family members will be
discussed later. The second was due to the lack of
experience and technical knowledge of the users. They
therefore felt dependent on the computer specialists for
advice and were unwilling to challenge their decisions.
Third, the new systems were first introduced into the
Finance Department which came under the same director as
Data Processing. Thus, any difficulties which arose could
be restricted to this area. When the systems were
introduced into other departments, such as Buying,
Personnel, and the Warehouse, other directors and senior
managers outside the Finance Department, became affected.
The bugs in the system then became more apparent and new
technology was subject to greater debate. The users
gained confidence in their own knowledge of the computer
systems and began to question the decision of the
specialists, often prompted initially by the Chairman.
The inter-departmental friction was evident in the
prioritising of DP development projects. This became
something of a contentious issue within the company, as
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each department head fought to get his system development
at the top of the list. One buyer referred to the
priority list as the 'Smith's-ometer' (Smith being used
here as the psuedonymn for the Data Processing Manager).
He indicated that if a user department requested a system
development that the DP Manager did not agree with it
would simply go to the bottom of the list. Conflict was
also apparent in the episode concerning the failure of the
PDCs. This was said by the Chairman to have caused a lot
of 'bad blood' between the departments concerned: Data
Processing; Operations and Personnel, which he attributed
largely to the arrogant' attitude of the computer
specialists who considered everybody else to be
'peasants'.
The question of responsibility was something of a major
issue within the organization. At what stage should the
system be handed over to the total control of the users?
Who is responsible for monitoring the system? Within Laws
Stores it had always been decreed that the users would
have ultimate responsibility for the systems. However,
this responsibility did not include power to influence the
choice of systems or the way in which they are
implemented. For example, in the laser scanning project
the system was chosen by the DP Department without any
input from Operations. In addition, whilst there was some
pretence at consultation with the Area Manager and Store
Manager in the decisions about implementation, in reality
the DP Manager controlled these meetings.
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The Store Manager accepted responsibility for implementing
and operating laser scanning, but no-one monitored the
effectiveness of the system. This was a vital factor
considering that these were trial stores on the basis of
which it would be decided whether or not to extend the
system to other branchess. The Area Manager did not
consider laser scanning to be his responsibility 'I've too
much to do, it should be the responsibility of someone at
head office'. Similarly the DP Manager was only concerned
with designing and implementing the system and not
following it through. The Operations Director drew
attention to the fact that in a priority schedule drawn up
by the DP Manager, items 1-10 were all new projects,
whilst 11 onwards were enhancements to existing systems.
It was also illustrated in Chapter 7 that although no
decision had been taken on the future of laser scanning,
the DP Manager proceeded to evaluate the benefits that
might accrue in a further two stores. When asked if the
cost had been justified in the two stores already
installed, he was hesitant and unsure.
Conflict has frequently been noted as a feature of
technological change. This may be between computer
specialists and line management (Mumford and Ward 1966),
management and workers (Wilkinson 1983), head office and
branch factory (Rowe 1985) or within the management
services group itself (Pettigrew 1973). This conflict
stems from the nature of technological change whereby one
group is often seen as promoting and benefitting from the
change, whilst the other has a vested interest in
maintaining the status quo. Thus, they immediately form
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two opposing camps, referred to by Kahn et al (1964) as
the 'old guard' versus the 'new guard'. The resentment was
particularly acute at Laws where heavy investment was
being made in data processing despite the fact that the
company had limited funds and cut-backs were being made in
other areas. These particular features, related to the
stagnation or slow decline of Laws, will be discussed in
the next chapter.
In Laws Stores, conflict existed primarily between
computer specialists and other staff functions. These
differences were illustrated in two ways. First, by the
terminology used, the Data Processing Manager was said to
be 'empire building', and there was frequent reference to
'them and us', ie the computer specialists and the users.
Second, in the contradictory views on the success of the
laser scanning project. According to the DP Manager it
went very smoothly, but the Personnel Director judged it
'inefficient from start to finish'.
The difficulties between the Personnel Director and the DP
Manager have already been illustrated. These were caused
by the Personnel Director being installed as a watchdog
over the project, the DP Manager felt that he was usurping
his role without being qualified to do so. Difficulties
also arose between the DP Department and the Buying
Department. The latter felt they should have been involved
in the laser scanning project at an earlier stage when
they could have been helpful in obtaining barcodes from
manufacturers. When, later on in the project, barcodes
became a problem the DP Manager reported that barcoding
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was not his job and the problem should be taken up by the
Buyers. The Buyers on the other hand no longer considered
barcoding to be their responsibility, but felt that it was
up to the DP Manager to 'earn his corn'.
It has been demonstrated that the level of conflict
increased over time, reaching a peak over the issue of
laser scanning shortly before the takeover. Greater
manifest conflict in the earlier stages may actually have
been advantageous as it would have facilitated a greater
searching for alternative solutions, in particular more
suitable software packages. In addition, if the users
felt they had been responsible for the choice of
technology, this would have led to greater commitment in
the later stages. However, several respondents indicated
that their first encounters with the DP staff influenced
their attitudes to the whole department and to the new
technology. Therefore, if increased conflict had taken
place in the early stages it may have been detrimental, by
leading to what the Chairman termed 'bad blood' at a later
stage.
POWER AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS 
Another feature of the introduction of new technology into
Laws Stores was the exercise of power and the political
behaviour which was involved. This was explicitly
referred to in interviews, when respondents attributed
political behaviour to others, or even in some cases, to
themselves. This contradicts the view of Burns (1961) who
noted that individuals are reluctant to admit to behaving
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politically.	 The Chairman, in his description of DP
staff, said that 'they need to be encouraged and dealt
with in a negotiating sense.	 They have to be
manipulated'. Comments made by other members included:
'I had to use my power to get or change the user
to one which was committed' - Finance Director.
'I saw through.... (the Finance Director) early
on, it was clear he was going to do his own
thing. He and.... (the Data Processing Manager)
were great buddies, there was a lot of politics
in it' - Project Leader.
The Finance Director clearly recognised the importance of
gaining the Chairman's support,
'In the decision-making process it was the
Chairman who had most influence. If he had not
been convinced the changes would not have gone
through 	  It was my job to convince the
Chairman who would then make the decision'.
The power of the Data Processing Manager appears to be a
significant aspect in the emergent strategy to introduce
new technology into the stores. Power is defined as 'the
ability of one party to get another to behave in ways
incompatible with the latter's immediate interests'
(Brown 1983). The effect of this power is demonstrated by
the seeming ease with which the Data Processing Manager
was able to persuade the Area and Store Manager to
sacrifice what would normally have been their first
priority, the management of the total store, in favour of
210
the specific details of introducing new technology. This
power stemmed from a variety of sources. First, is the
perceived specialist knowledge of the Data Processing
Manager and his 'assessed stature' (Pettigrew 1972).
Others in the company believed him to have a technical
competence which they did not possess. Therefore, this
created a situation of dependency, which was increased
still further by the uncertain nature of the innovation
they were introducing.
The second source of power stemmed from the Data
Processing Manager's structural position immediately below
the level of directors. By acting as a 'gatekeeper'
(Pettigrew 1972), through which information was
channelled, he was able to distort or withold information
and thereby influence the decision-making process. For
example, the details on productivity, automatically
captured by the checkout equipment, were sent to to him
each week, but this information, which would have assisted
the evaluation of laser scanning, was never made available
to the directors. The third source is related to the
second and involved the access of the Data Processing
Manager to the key decision-makers, sometimes referred to
as the 'dominant coalition' (Child 1972). By reporting
direct to Board Meetings on the stage of data processing
developments, and through his great propensity for writing
and circulating reports, he had frequent opportunities for
influencing their decisions.
Observation of meetings, analysis of documents and
interviews with individuals, showed that the Data
211
Processing Manager not only possessed these three sources
of power but also had the ability to use them effectively
(Pettigrew 1972). The fourth factor, therefore,
contributing to the Data Processing Manager's power, was
his political sensitivity and the skillful use of his
resources. The introduction of laser scanning
demonstrates his skill in identifying individuals who were
involved in new technology decisions. By developing
inter-personal relationships and issuing memos, he
attempted to influence their views. The Data Processing
Manager himself described laser scanning as a 'classical
example - no-one wanted it, not the Board or the users,
no-one, but you only had to convince the Chairman and he
would tell the others'.
The Personnel Director attempted to gain support for his
own views by visiting company branches and through
discussions within his own department. The fact that
those he attempted to influence, Store Managers and
Personnel Officers, did not play any role in the
decision-making process, showed his lack of political
sensitivity compared to that of the Data Processing
Manager. He was also hindered by his lack of assessed
stature, despite being senior to the Data Processing
Manager he did not possess any technical skills which
would give credibility to his claims.
In addition to the DP Manager, the Chairman and his son
also exercised power. However, there were several
distinctions between these two types of power. The DP
Manager used his power over other members of the
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organization, such as the Store Manager, Area Manager,
Accountant and Directors, in order to gain acceptance for
his proposals concerning new technology. His power was
multi-directional and those who were subject to it did not
neccessarily agree without question, for example the
Personnel Director. This particular dimension of power is
termed 'influence' by Bacharach and Lawler (1980). The DP
Manager exercised his influence by making proposals,
offering advice and persuasion. He was not in a position
to make the final decision and therefore devoted much of
his attention to influencing the Chairman and his son, who
possessed the authority to make the final decision.
In contrast, the authority of the Chairman was accepted
without question. For example, it was shown in the case
study that once he had made the decision to proceed with
computerisation the other directors raised no objections,
despite not being totally committed. Therefore, the major
distinction between the power of the DP Manager and that
of the Chairman was that the former possesed influence
which was multi-directional, those who were subject to it
did not suspend their critical faculties, and he was only
able to affect decisions indirectly. The Chairman
possessed the authority to make the final decision, it
flowed in one direction (ie downwards) and subordinates
acquiesced without question (Bacharach and Lawler 1980).
The sources of the DP Manager's power discussed earlier,
were identified as specialist knowledge; access to
decision makers; political sensitivity and structural
position. This is contrary to the findings of Bacharach
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and Lawler (1980) who note structure only as a source of
authority. Nevertheless, the DP Manager's influence
stemmed, in part, from his structural position as
'gatekeeper', through which information about the new
technology was channelled. The authority of the Chairman
was also found to stem from his structural position at the
top of the hierarchy. As chief executive he was in a
position to control material and symbolic rewards, and as
such apply sanctions where necessary. In addition, as
Laws operated with a functional structure he was the only
one who was fully informed of what was happening in the
company as a whole. A point which will be expanded upon
later in this chapter.
The Chairman also commanded 'traditional' authority (Weber
1947), a source of power not noted by Bacharach and
Lawler. This traditional authority stemmed from his role
as owner of the firm and an established belief within the
organization that it was his prerogative to make decisions
such as the introduction of new technology. As Weber
notes 'the obligation of obedience is not based on the
impersonal order, but is a matter of personal loyalty'.
Thus, commitment was to the Chairman himself rather than
to the task. A point which was raised previously in the
section on commitment.
Faced with the power of the DP Manager and the Chairman
and his son, other members of the organization appeared to
have little opportunity to influence decisions concerning
the new technology. In view of this, their attitude was
one of acceptance and apathy. Initially, the DP Manager
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and the Finance Director, were given something of a free
rein to develop the technology according to their own
wishes, receiving the necessary rubber stamp from the
Chairman. However, as time progressed the approval of the
Chairman was more dificult to gain. This can be seen from
minutes of meetings and memos at that time.
'There was discussion about the Future
Development list. ....(The Chairman) said it
would be desirable to have a separate one-page
evaluation, including time scale, for each
project' (Minutes of Executive Meeting 6 April,
1984).
....(The DP Manager's) report of September 1984
draws together such information as we have and a
number of alternatives for future development
but we do not yet have a comprehensive
evaluation of costs and benefits' (memo from
the Chairman 21 September 1984).
Thus, the balance of power began to shift away from the DP
Manager towards the Chairman and his son. This was
further reinforced when the Finance Director resigned, by
bringing the DP Department under the authority of the
Operations Director (the Chairman's son). This shift also
meant that, following the initiative of the Chairman, the
users felt more inclined to criticise the DP Department.
Political activity, defined as 'the deployment of
strategies and tactics through bargaining and negotiating,
aimed at the protection of personal and departmental
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interests' (Stephenson 1985), was a notable feature of the
introduction of new technology into Laws Stores. It was
illustrated by such episodes as: the DP Manager's
continuous proposals for new developments; attempts to
influence the Chairman by memos and meetings; the
Personnel Director visiting stores to gain information
from, and influence the views of, the branch managers.
A review of the literature provides possible reasons why
political activity should be such a significant feature of
the introduction of technology at Laws Stores. Pettigrew
(1973) identifies four critical factors in political
activity: the history of social relationships;
organizational attachments; likes and dislikes and
uncertainty. The first three factors were found to be
closely related at Laws. Organizational attachments were
strongly grouped along functional lines. This was
particularly noticeable when respondents gave their views
on certain issues (often unprompted) in exactly the same
terminology as other members of their department. For
example, both the Personnel Director and Training Officer
spoke of the DP Department as 'empire building' and
preferring to work with 'yes men'. The DP Manager and
Finance Director often spoke of 'educating the users',
their 'lack of commitment' and 'they don't know what they
want'.
Likes and dislikes also focused on departmental groupings,
the Personnel Director's dislike of the Finance Director
spilled over onto his relationship with the DP Manager, a
subordinate and close ally of the Finance Director. This
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feeling also extended to the rest of the Personnel and
Data Processing Departments. After the Finance Director
helped the Training Officer following a minor car
accident, she reported feeling guilty and disloyal to her
boss (the Personnel Director) because she now liked the
Finance Director! These inter-departmental difficulties
were not restricted to the above departments but extended
throughout the organization. The Operations Department
had a poor relationship with the Buying Department. Both
functions were inter-dependent with the faults of one
easily being blamed on the other. The Chief Accountant
felt that the Finance Department was ostracized from the
rest of the organization altogether, describing the
department as 'the lepers in the corner'.
The third factor, the history of social relations within
Laws Stores was simiarly marked by poor lateral relations.
The history of the firm, as told by the organization
members, was marked by conflict between different
functional directors. Relationships became so bad, that
at one point the Chairman called together meetings with
pairs of executive directors in order to,
examine the state of play, whether there are
problems, and if so, to establish a timetabled
programme for dealing with them'.
'It is up to those concerned to raise any and
all cases where the performance and costs of
activities for which they are responsible are
adversly affected by the performance of
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activities for which the other Executive is
responsible'. (Memos from the Chairman to all
Executive Directors).
The fourth factor noted by Pettigrew, and possibly the
most important in the context of this research, was the
degree of uncertainty and instability. This is a feature
which has been noted throughout the thesis. Uncertainty
could be found in many areas, in particular the
environment. Several changes were taking place in the
supermarket industry, not least of which was the number of
takeovers that were occurring. This created considerable
doubt regarding the future of Laws Stores. The technology
itself also created instability. To introduce a whole new
management information system into a company which had no
previous experience of computerisation, provided not only
a technically complex set of problems, but also created
uncertainty in the way in which the organization would be
able to adapt to the new situation. In addition, the
technology itself, for example EPOS, was highly dynamic.
At the time of its introduction into Laws Stores (March
1984), it was still not well established in the UK, and
the price was continuing to drop, whilst improvements were
being made in the quality and range of systems available.
Two further factors also enhanced political activity in
Laws Stores. One stems from the lack of strategy or long
term objectives for the introduction of new technology
which has already been discussed. This void left
considerable opportunity for different individuals or
departments to manouevre the situation to their own
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advantage. The second relates to the company's lack of
growth. This led to a decreased number of resources, and
increased political activity in order to control those
resources. The issue of the company's decline will be
dealt with in the next chapter.
SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that, in principle, a number of
alternatives were open to the company. This was not only
in terms of the hardware and software that was available,
but also the way in which the technology was introduced
and utilised. Nevertheless, the senior management failed
to recognise this choice. From the evidence presented in
this chapter it can be concluded that the strategy to
introduce new technology into Laws Stores was not
formulated and explicitly stated in advance.
As developments progressed the strategy evolved as a
'pattern in a stream of decisions' (Mintzberg 1978).
Important elements of this strategy included introducing
the new technology quickly and adopting a 'user driven'
approach. The organizational processes that existed
within the company were found to play a key role in
shaping the strategy and influencing its implementation.
In particular, communication, commitment, conflict and
power and politics were identified as important.
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9. FACTORS UNDERLYING THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES 
The previous chapter illustrated how the strategy to
introduce new technology into Laws Stores evolved. It
demonstrated the role that the organizational processes
played in shaping that strategy and in influencing its
implementation. However, it did not explain the factors
underlying those processes and why they existed at Laws
Stores. The aim of this present chapter, therefore, is to
analyse the causes which gave rise to those processes. It
then goes on to demonstrate the relationship that existed
between the organizational processes, their causes and the
strategy to introduce new technology and illustrates this
with the aid of a model.
The underlying factors were traced through a closer
examination of events at Laws Stores and the comments of
respondents. Further insights were gained through
analysis of the grocery retailing environment and a review
of the relevent literature on organizational behaviour.
The key factors giving rise to the processes were
identified as:	 the environment;
	
the organization
structure; family ownership of the company and the decline
of the organization.
ENVIRONMENT 
Chapter 2 identified a number of important features of the
grocery retailing industry, for example increased
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concentration in the hands of multiples, a move to larger
stores in out of town sites, a proliferation of takeovers,
more sophisticated management techniques including the use
of new technology. These factors combined to make the
environment in which Laws operated highly dynamic and
unstable. However, as will be explained in the next
chapter, Wm Low operated in a similar environment and was
faced with the same technological problems as Laws Stores
but did not experience the same difficulties. The key
difference lies in the company's perceived ability to
enact' the environment in which it operates (Weick 1969)
or, where necessary, its ability to adapt to it.
Previous chapters have demonstrated how Laws was unable to
alter the environment in which it operated. The case of
technology was illustrative of this. Prior to the
introduction of the in-house computer it had been unable
to proceed with the developments it wished because it was
constrained by the bureau. When the in-house computer was
installed Laws failed to obtain a satisfactory service
from IBM. In the case of laser scanning the company was
largely led by its suppliers, to whom they felt obliged,
despite the fact that the suppliers were benefitting by
using Laws as a demonstration site for prospective
customers.
Laws generally took a reactive attitude to what was
happening in the environment. For example, the main spur
to introduce laser scanning was because its competitors
were doing it. Similarly, PDCs were introduced into the
branches because other supermarket chains were using them,
221
not because a specific need had been identified. In this
sense Laws fits closely with Miles and Snow's (1978)
typology of a 'reactor'. These are 'organizations in
which top managers frequently perceive change and
uncertainty occurring in their organizational environments
but are unable to respond effectively'. The detailed
comparison with Wm Low in Chapter 11 will show how it took
a much more proactive role in shaping its environment,
this is illustrated both by its approach to new technology
and its takeover of Laws Stores.
Another key factor in the case study was the rate of
adaptation to changes in the environment. Laws Stores had
been slow to adapt to environmental change in many
respects, for example it still operated a large number of
small stores, under 1000 square feet in size, whilst its
competitors were closing their smaller stores and opening
much larger ones. The last store to be opened by Laws,
10000 square feet in size, was still considerably smaller
than those of its competitors. (The average size of store
opened by Wm Low in that same year was 16,500 square feet;
J Sainsbury, 19,000 square feet and Tesco, 33,000 square
feet). Laws Stores was particularly slow to adapt to
changes in new technology (with the exception of laser
scanning). Other supermarket chains, including Wm Low,
introduced their first in-house computer twenty years
before Laws Stores.
To a certain extent, Laws had begun to redress the balance
and was attempting to respond to environmental pressure,
for example by the introduction of new technology.
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However, the organization seemed unable to adapt
successfully to such rapid change. One reason already
suggested was associated with the decline of the
organization, another lies in the organization structure.
Prior research has suggested that in order to improve
adaptability to environmental uncertainty and instability
an organization should adopt a flexible, organic type of
structure (Burns and Stalker 1961, Lawrence and Lorsch
1967). However, as has already been indicated in previous
chapters, and will be expanded in the next section, such a
structure did not exist at Laws Stores.
STRUCTURE
Contrary to other research findings (Andersen and Pedersen
1980, Dawson 1983, Child 1984) the research at Laws Stores
and Wm Low showed that the introduction of new technology
had little impact on the organization structure. Some
minor structural changes were necessary to accommodate the
new Data Processing Department, but there was little
impact on the structure of the rest of the organization.
On the contrary, the important implication of the case
study was found to be the effect of the existing
organization structure on the introduction of new
technology.
Laws Stores operated with a functional type of
organization structure in which each individual had a
clearly defined role and departments were confined within
particular boundaries. This type of structure was suited
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to stable conditions (Burns and Stalker 1961, Mintzberg
1979, Miles and Snow 1978), in which the high degree of
specialisation leads to greater efficiency. However, in
unstable conditions this type of structure leads to
problems in lateral relations, ie those between
departments. In the case study company the functional
structure and associated vertical lines of communication,
ensured that only those at the top of the hierarchy saw
the total picture. The 'user-driven' approach to the
introduction of new technology, in which the members of
user departments co-operated with computer specialists,
was alien to them. The view taken by many of the users
was that it was the duty of the DP Department to undertake
all technological developments, from initiating the
proposal, through implementation, to maintainance of the
system. By putting the emphasis on the users, DP
specialists were somehow thought to be shirking their
responsibility.
Furthermore, the structure promoted divisions between
departments and created boundaries which could not easily
be crossed. This lack of interaction encouraged members
to put sub-goals, departmental goals, above those of the
company as a whole. Thus managers tended to develop
sub-strategies reflecting their own departmental
interests. This ultimately led to inconsistencies in the
introduction of new technology and an absence of common
goals. The case study illustrates how the Data Processing
Manager was more concerned with the implementation of
laser scanning rather than the costs and benefits to the
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total organization. The failure to take into account the
views of the store managers in the design of the PDCs
resulted in an increased workload and a lack of commitment
to the new system.
The introducton of technology created situations in which
it was necessary for departments to co-ordinate their
actions and intentions. As was shown earlier, this led to
problems of conflict and poor communication. This type of
organization structure and the limited lateral
relationships also made it more difficult to integrate the
new computer specialists into the company. Hedley (1970),
in a study of computerisation, also noted insufficient
liaison and lack of communication which he attributed to
specialisation of functions and internalisation of sub-
goals. The differing views of the Personnel Director and
the Data Processing Manager on the success, or otherwise,
of the laser scanning project and whether or not it led to
increased checkout productivity demonstrates the problems
of conflict that surrounded the project and the
polarisation of the stances taken (Argyris 1967).
Such conflict led to an increased dependence on superiors
as disputes frequently had to be referred up to them to be
resolved. This difficulty was identified by a number of
respondents within the company, including the Chairman,
'lateral relationships are not so good, decisions go up to
director level, across and back down again'. When a
director was himself involved, the decision was referred
to a more senior director. As the Personnel Director was
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involved in the laser scanning dispute the problem went to
the Operations Director (who is also Deputy MD and son of
the Chairman) for a decision on action to be taken.
Inter-departmental difficulties aside, the traditional
functional pyramid leads to a rigid organization which is
less innovative and lacks commitment to new ideas. Who
could blame the Store Manager and his staff for not being
committed to laser scanning when they could see the
conflict going on above them. The disputes were not
always held behind closed doors, but frequently took place
in the store in front of the Manager. The Store Manager
admitted finding 'the clash' between the Personnel
Director and DP Manager 'unsettling', particularly as he
was in the middle of it all.
The functional organization structure also had
implications for the level and direction of communication
within the company. The previous chapter demonstrated
that horizontal communication was restricted to the extent
that the exchange of information across departments could
be distorted or witheld. In addition, the vertical
communication channels were used by the DP Manager to
influence the Board on decisions concerning the
introduction of new technology.
Therefore, it is argued that the organization structure at
Laws Stores constrained the company's ability to adapt to,
and fully exploit, the new technology. It was not found,
as was suggested by Chandler (1962), that structural
changes automatically followed the changes in strategy.
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Chandler failed to recognise the necessary intervening
variable of the dominant coalition who must, as Child
(1972) indicated choose to make structural changes. In
addition, this thesis has demonstrated that the emergent
strategy is shaped by the processes arising, at least in
part, out of the existing organization structure.
Furthermore, unless an organization structure is chosen
that is consistent with the strategy, implementation of
that strategy will be limited in success. In this sense,
contrary to the views of Chandler, strategy follows
structure.
LAWS STORES AS A FAMILY FIRM
Laws Stores was owned and managed by descendents of the
founder. The important influence of the Chairman in new
technology decisions has already been referred to. The DP
Manager commented,
'If there was any disagreement over the new
technology it would largely be over-ridden,
there was little attempt to discuss it.... you
only had to convince the Chairman and he would
tell the others'.
As highlighted in earlier chapters, this family interest
was found to be a key factor in the introduction of new
technology. The Chairman and his son were unable to
divorce their roles as owners from those as operating
managers. It is questionable whether such rapid
development and investment in technology (considering the
company's poor financial state) would have been allowed to
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At Laws the problem of recruiting and retaining suitably
qualified and experienced staff was not confined to the
Data Processing Department. The Finance Director left
after less than three years, one of the reasons given for
this was that he had put a number of proposals to the
Board and when these were not accepted he became
frustrated and disheartened. The Marketing Director and
several middle managers, for example Buyers, Personnel
Officers, and Accountants, also left after only a short
time. One reason for this, the difficulties associated
with a declining organization, has already been discussed.
A second reason was the lack of influence and opportunity
in a company dominated by family members.
One senior executive who did remain with Laws until it was
taken over was the DP Manager. As demonstrated in the
previous chapters his specialist knowledge and political
skills enabled him to exercise power quite successfully
and gain acceptance for most of his new technology
proposals. The coalition of the DP Manager and the
Finance Director during the early stages of technological
developments was particularly powerful and considerable
changes were achieved in short space of time. According
to the DP Manager he did consider leaving when the Finance
Director announced his resignation, but later found he was
able to work successfully reporting to the Chairman's son,
the Operations Director.
A further difficulty at Laws was that there were not
enough family members to fill all the positions of power
within the company. Although at first the Data Processing
229
Department was under the control of the Finance Director,
when he resigned the opportunity was taken to bring it
under the control of the Operations Director. This was
done ostensibly because he claimed to-be more 'objective'
about data processing matters. However, it is likely that
now the family members had acquired some knowledge of
computers the opportunity was taken to bring this vital
function under their control and attempt to reduce their
dependency on the technical expert, the DP Manager.
Another feature of Laws as a family firm was the tendency
of the Board of Directors (with the exception of the
Finance Director) to readily concur with all decisions
taken by the family members. Donnelly (1964) describes
this as a 'yes man' management team. This loyalty to the
company, and in particular the Chairman, could have been
an advantage when introducing new technology enabling it
to be done quickly and without any outright objections.
However, through interviews it became apparent that
commitment was to the individual rather than to the task.
(This was also noted as a feature of the Chairman's
'traditional' authority). Employees did what was
necessary with the new technology because this was the
Chairman's wish. They were not convinced that this was
necessarily advantageous to themselves or the company as a
whole. Consequently, when problems became apparent later,
staff were not committed enough to the new technology to
be able to identify and rectify those problems.
Lack of capital was also a limiting factor in the
introduction of new technology in Laws Stores. Dual
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running of all systems on the bureau and the new in-house
systems was thought to be too costly, therefore
developments had to take place quickly. This compares
with Wm Low where there was no cost ceiling imposed on the
new developments, the capital for which having been raised
by a rights issue. As a private family firm, Laws Stores
did not have this option of raising money for investment
on the open market. The alternatives being internal
funding or a loan from a financial institution. Both of
which have their limitations, either in terms of
availability or cost.
ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE
Before discussing the implications of decline for the
introduction of new technology, it is first necessary to
establish that Laws Stores was experiencing decline. As a
privately owned firm, detailed financial information was
not available, but other indications suggest that, if not
actually in decline, the company was at least stagnating.
Analysis of company documents showed that sales
consistently fell below those budgeted. A memo from the
Finance Director (3 April 1982) proposing a three year
plan notes that 'the 1982/3 budget shows a negative growth
rate'. The Personnel Director also identified one of the
company's weaknesses as our sales have consistently
fallen below budget for far too long a period' (memo 2
August 1982).
The year to April 1984, showed a profit of £45,000. This
was an increase over the loss of £500,000 the previous
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year during which much of the investment in new technology
had occurred. However, the comments of the Chairman at
the time of the takeover indicate that this increase was
not viewed as a major turnround in the company's fortunes.
In a report in the Newcastle Journal of 9 January 1985 he
describes the company as 'a business that could not be
seen to be viable in the medium or long term'.
Whetten (1980) notes a decrease in the number of employees
as an indication of decline, but at Laws the number of
staff employed actually increased. This was due to the
replacement of full-time staff with part-timers. At head
office a small number of staff, including one Buyer,
agreed to take volountary redundancy. In addition, some
executives left and were not replaced, for example the
Finance Director, Personnel Officer and Work Study
Officer.
The significance of the decline of Laws Stores is best
represented by comparison to what it had been before, and
by comparison to the current developments to its
competitors. At one time Laws had been the major
supermarket chain in the North East of England, at its
peak operating over 60 stores in the region. It was later
overtaken by Presto, Hintons and Fine Fare, whilst other
chains such as Sainsbury, Tesco and the Dee Corporation
were expanding into the area. Laws was experiencing what
Whetten (1980) described as 'decline-as-stagnation',
whereby the percentage share of the market decreases, as
opposed to a contraction of the total market. The major
chains were opening up to fifteen new stores each year,
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Laws had not opened a new store for two years prior to
being taken over.
The major implication that the organizational decline had
for the introduction of new technology was that the Data
Processing Department were seen to be getting a large
proportion of the limited resources that were available.
Investment in computers was being made, whilst at the same
time no new stores were being built and the number of head
office executives was being reduced. This led to
increased conflict as departments fought for their share
of the smaller cake. Increased political manoeuvering
took place as they attempted to influence decisions in
favour of their own needs. The user departments lacked
commitment to the changes which they could see as being of
no direct benefit to themselves or their own departments.
For example the Non-Foods Buyer was unwilling to assist in
resolving the problem of poor barcodes as his department
had not been consulted about laser scanning in the early
stages of development. Other writers have also noted that
organizational decline tends to lead to increased conflict
and increased politicking (Robbins 1983). As Whetten
(1980) notes 'decline tends to exacerbate interpersonal
and interunit conflict within an organization'.
A further problem which may have been associated with the
decline of the company, was the loss of valuable executive
staff. The Finance Director left after less than three
years, there was a high turnover of DP staff and several
other executives stayed for only a short while. Robbins
(1983) notes that
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some of the first people to leave an
organization when it enters the stage of decline
are the most mobile individuals such as skilled
technicians, professionals and talented
managerial personnel. These, of course, are
typically the individuals that the organization
can least afford to lose'.
Whilst increased conflict, politicking and difficulty in
retaining staff has obvious implications for the
introduction of new technology, an even more significant
feature is the way in which an organization in decline
responds to change. According to Robbins (1983), decline
leads to increase resistance to change as vested interests
thwart change efforts. Hannan and Freeman (1978) conclude
from their research that organizational systems respond
more slowly to environmental changes in decline. Whetten
(1980) also notes that as a result of poor integration in
declining organizations top management were unable to
formulate a co-ordinated response to environmental change.
STRATEGY, PROCESS AND UNDERLYING FACTORS 
Chapter 8 has shown how the emergent strategy to introduce
new technology was influenced by the processes of
communication, commitment, conflict, power and politics.
The reasons for these processes were traced to four
factors: environment; organization structure; family
ownership and the decline of the company. Figure 9.1
illustrates the complex set of inter-reltionships between
the different elements of strategy, process and the
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underlying causes. This shows how, within the constraints
of the the uncertain environment and the decline of the
company, the members of the dominant coalition, ie the
owning family, made decisions about the organization
structure and the strategy. The processes, operating
within the constraints of the formal organization
structure, also directly effect the strategy to introduce
new technology as it emerges. Feedback loops exist from
the structure as members of the organization attempt to
influence the decisions of the dominant coalition.
Similarly, feedback from the emerging strategy may also
cause some decisions to be reconsidered.
SUMMARY
This chapter has identified four factors as being
significant in the introduction of new technology into
Laws Stores. These were: the family ownership of the
firm; organizational decline; an uncertain environment and
a functional organization structure. These factors gave
rise to organizational processes such as internal
politics; conflict and poor lateral communication which
shaped the emerging strategy to introduce new technology.
In addition, they constrained the company's ability to
implement that strategy and fully exploit the potential
benefits of new technology.
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10. THE TAKEOVER AND WM LOW & CO PLC 
During the early 1980s a large number, of acquisitions and
mergers took place in the retail trades. This chapter
discusses the takeover of the case study company, Laws
Stores, by the larger Scottish supermarket chain, Wm Low.
The takeover itself is dealt with briefly, the main focus
is on the technological implications. This includes the
direct effects on Laws' technology and an explanation of
computer developments in Wm Low.
THE TAKEOVER
At 8.30 am on Thursday 27 December 1984 Laws Stores
Executive Directors were called into the Chairman's office
to be notified of the takeover. Each Director then called
in his immediate subordinates and made the announcement.
Whilst this was taking place, the Chairman informed all
other office staff over the public address system. The
Area Managers visited the stores with written
announcements of the takeover.
The takeover was described by one respondent as 'a very
well kept secret'. As a family-owned private company,
only one person outside the family had been told of the
plans. This was the Finance and Administration Director
whose involvement was necessary because of the financial
and property details required by the purchaser. Although
a number of acquisitions had taken place in the retail
industry recently, no-one in the company (with the
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exception of the Chairman, his son and the Finance and
Administration Director) was aware that the takeover of
Laws Stores was imminent.
The shocked response of the directors, executives and
employees is best summed up by the comments of the
Computer Operations Manager,
' On Thursday morning we were told to go into
the Director's office. The Area Managers,
Warehouse Manager and others were also there.
We expected a pat on the back for getting
deliveries out and things over Christmas.
Instead we were handed an envelope and told, "In
there is a statement from the Chairman and from
the Managing Director of Wm Low, announcing that
the company has been sold to them." everyone was
open-mouthed.'
The following Wednesday the Managing Director of Wm Low
spoke to the executives of each department informing them
of the current situation and the immediate plans. A
number of Wm Low executives then undertook a survey of the
operations of Laws to ascertain their future plans
regarding the integration of the two companies, branch
closures, future system development and possible
redundancies.
In the Newcastle Journal of 9 January 1985, the Chairman
of Laws Stores outlined why the company had been sold.
' The going had become just too tough for a
company of our size
	
 You can't pin it down
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to a particular date. I would say that for over
a year tentative plans were being made which I
saw as contingent only. If we'd had a recovery
I would probably have deferred selling. At the
end of the day, however, it was inevitable 	
in 1984 there were approaches from six different
companies or their agents.'
The takeover of the company was formally agreed on 11
January 1985 and the Chairman resigned. His son had
already done so before the new year. The other directors
had left the office early in the new year, although they
effectively had not resigned because of legal
complications concerning severance pay.
By then Wm Low had made it clear that they would close
down Laws Stores head office. A core of area executives
and support staff (approximately ten) would be based at
the warehouse. Most of the secretarial and clerical staff
were given redundancy notices for the end of March. Some
were retained for a little longer to maintain
administration services in Gateshead until the two
companies were integrated. Four secretarial and clerical
staff (the longest serving employees) were retained to
work in the office to be established at the warehouse.
The departure of the executive staff was staggered over
the following months depending on the rate of integration
of the systems and when the executives secured positions
elsewhere. Three executives were offered positions at Wm
Low's head office in Dundee. Only one of these, the Data
Processing Manager, accepted. He had been largely
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responsible for the rapid technological developments at
Laws and was reported to be highly regarded in the
computer industry. Wm Low intended to upgrade their data
processing capabilities so he was, appointed to the
position of Information Systems Controller, above the
incumbent Data Processing Manager, and reporting to the
Finance Director.
TECHNOLOGY IN LAWS STORES - THE EFFECT OF THE TAKEOVER
Immediately following the takeover it was implied, by the
Operations Director and the DP Manager, that the
technology had been a major factor in the acquisition and
that Wm Low may wish to install the IBM system 38 in their
head office in Dundee. In the event, however, this did
not occur. Laws Stores' systems were gradually
transferred to Wm Low's ICL mainframe over a six month
period. The system 38 was sold off to a third party and
the DP Manager took up his position in Dundee.
Members of Wm Low were critical of all aspects of Laws
Stores, including the technology. The comments included
references to laser scanning as 'barking up the wrong
tree' (Senior Methods Manager) and PDCs as 'building on
sand' (Productivity and Distribution Controller).
Describing Laws' technology in general it was said 'there
were no controls - no-one was held accountable'. However,
these criticisms were not extended to the DP Manager. The
Methods and Distribution Controller reported that 'I don't
blame him, from his own point of view as DP Manager he was
doing OK'.
	 The Senior Methods Manager agreed, 'the
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technical systems were good at Laws, I don't doubt the DP
Manager's ability from the data processing point of view'.
The Head Grocery Buyer, who was critical of Laws' buying
system, later reported that,
'I had an argument with ... (Laws' DP Manager)
over this, but now I understand his position.
The DP department only did what it was asked
for, if no-one asked for it, they didn't do it'.
The general opinion was that the new equipment and systems
were technically sound. If some of them were not
satisfactory from an operational standpoint, the DP
Manager was not blame as he had fulfilled the requirements
of his role.
Not surprisingly, considering the above comments, Wm Low
acted quickly to change, or cease operation of, Laws'
technology. As already noted, the head office and
warehouse systems were transferred to Dundee. The PDCs
were criticised by the Productivity and Distribution
Controller as,
'simply a replacement for the the postal
service. They saw the availability of PDCs and
then thought what to do with them, when it
should have been the other way around'.
The operation of the PDCs was, therefore, altered to bring
it into line with the rest of Wm Low's branches. It was
used in conjunction with the Stock Labour Inventory
Management (SLIM) system. This consists of shelf-edge
labels indicating the line code, stock-holding requirement
and case quantity. The operator can carry the PDC around
the store, calculate the amount of each line required and
241
key it directly into the PDC. A written record of the
order is no longer required.
The operation of laser scanning was discontinued in the
two branches shortly after the takeover. The reasons for
this were two-fold. First, it was not consistent with Wm
Low's policy of introducing laser scanning only into
larger stores, which were considered more able to justify
the investment. Second, a number of operational
difficulties had arisen, particularly with the second
installation. These resulted from a breakdown in control
and discipline in the store after the branch manager
responsible for establishing the system left the company.
The criticisms included inaccurate prices held in the
price-look-up file, incorrect price tickets on the
shelves, goods displayed in the wrong place and lines
without barcodes which had not been priced. According to
the Productivity and Distribution Controller, 'at the shop
there was a file full of complaints from the trading
standards authority which no-one was worried about or
doing anything to remedy the problems'.
HISTORY OF WM LOW & COMPANY PLC
James Low opened his first grocery shop in Dundee in 1868.
He was later joined by his brother, William. In 1871
James Low formed a partnership with William Lindsay and
started a preserves, bread and confectionary manufacturing
business, Lindsay and Low. In 1879 James Low handed over
the running of the grocery business to his brother.
Whilst James still retained a small financial interest,
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the business became known as Wm Low & Company. The family
interest in the firm was further reinforced when William
Rettie joined the company. He was married to Anne Low,
sister of William and James.
The earliest records of the firm show that in 1881 there
were seven branches in Dundee. By the turn of the century
there were sixty-four branches stretching from Dingwall to
Hawick. In 1917 the partnership between William Low and
William Rettie was converted into a limited company which
continued to be passed down through generations of both
families. Archibald Rettie became Managing Director in
the 1920's and was joined by William Low's son, also
called William. In 1947, Ian Stewart (grandson of Wm Low)
joined the company to be followed by Phillip Rettie
(grandson of Wm Rettie) in 1948. These two were joint
Managing Directors whilst Mr. Drysdale (another grandson
of Wm Low) was Chairman.
In 1963 the company opened its first supermarket and in
1968 it celebrated its centenary year with 48 branches,
16 of which were supermarkets. Family influence in the
company remained strong until going public in 1972. Most
members of the owning families were not interested in the
running of the business and wished to realise their assets
and therefore took this opportunity to sell a large
proportion of the shares. After going public, 30% of the
shares were still held by the family, with P. Rettie and
I. Stewart acting as spokesmen for the family interests.
P. Rettie was Chairman and Managing Director until 1982
when he resigned his post as Managing Director. He
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remained as Chairman of Wm Low, with I. Stewart as Deputy
Chairman. The Finance Director then took over as Managing
Director. He had been with the company for over twenty
years, starting his career as an accountant. P. Rettie
continued as chairman until March 1985 when he was
succeeded by Prof. C. Blake (Professor of Economics at
Dundee'University). He was the first non-family chairman,
apart from a period during the war when a- 'caretaker
Chairman' was in charge.
In 1972 the head office and warehouse moved to larger
purpose-built premises on the outskirts of Dundee. A
freezer centre division, Lowfreeze, was established in
1979 (later sold in 1987). As these increased and the
size of supermarkets grew to over 20,000 sq ft, the
warehouse capacity doubled and the head office was
extended. At the end of the financial year 1983/4 the
company operated 45 supermarkets and 16 freezer centres.
The average size of supermarket was 11,000 sq ft. The
company employed approximately 7000, mostly part-time
staff. This included seventy executives and sixty
clerical staff at head office, and another two hundred
staff based in the warehouse.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The organization structure was basically functional but,
owing to to its larger size, was rather more complex than
Laws Stores, with a two-tier board structure. The main
board consisted of three non-executive directors (the
Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and a representative of the
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company's merchant banker) and four executive directors
(the Managing Director, Finance Director, Marketing
Director and Property Director). The full board met
quarterly to discuss strategic finance and investment
policies.
Under the main board was the Management Committee. This
was headed by the Managing Director and included the
Marketing Director, Finance Director, Property Director,
Retail Controller, Development Controller and
Methods/Distribution Controller. According to company
literature,
'The principal operating policy body is the
Management Committee which meets weekly
	  Its
members are responsible directly to
	  (the
Managing Director) for their divisions as
undernoted and in turn are responsible for the
departments making up that division.'
The company did not have a formal organization chart as
job titles and roles were continually changing. However,
a chart was drawn up by the Methods/Distribution
Controller showing the position in 1985 (Figure 10.1).
This illustrates the number of divisions which reported to
the Managing Director. The organization structure and the
control exercised by the Managing Director will be
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
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Figure 10.1
Wm Low
	 Co PLC - Senior Management Structure, March 1985
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Deputy Chairman 
• Managing Director
•	 Marketing 1•	 Finance •	 Property •	 Development •	 Productivity 'RetailDirector Director Director Controller & Distribution Controller
Controller
Head	 Marketing	 Information
	 Chief	 Administration	 Development	 Personnel	 Distribution
Buyer	 Manager	 Systems	 Accountant	 Manager	 Manager	 Manager	 Manager
Controller
• Management Committee 	 Non-Executive Directors
Chairman
Deputy Chairman
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TECHNOLOGY IN WM LOW - HEAD OFFICE 
Computerisation in Wm Low dates back to 1967 when the
company purchased its first mainframe computer, an ICL
1300. This was updated in 1973 to a 2900. At this time
they also installed PDC's into all their branches. This
gave the company a 24 hour order cycle and also provided
useful information through the analysis of data that was
captured. As with Laws Stores, these PDCs were supplied
by MSI. Most of the company's systems dated back to this
time, for example payroll, accounting and management
information systems. The budgeting and direct delivery
systems have been running since 1978. In 1981 an ICL ME29
was installed. On-line warehouse systems were developed
which facilitated automatic re-ordering. An additional
ME29 was purchased as a backup in 1984. Therefore, when
the company acquired Laws Stores in 1985 it had two ICL
ME29 processors at head office, four ICL DRS mini
processors based in the warehouses and one hundred PDCs in
the stores.
The development of the on-line warehouse system was the
only major data processing development to have taken place
at the head office in recent years. It was introduced in
stages over a period of two and a half years, the last
stage being completed in 1984. The system development was
initiated by the Managing Director who saw it in operation
in the U.S. It was developed totally in-house by two
senior programmers liaising with the methods department
and the eventual users. Briefly, the system, which was
very comprehensive worked thus: as orders are received
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from the branches they are deducted from the stockfile.
When a line requires re-ordering the computer generates a
recommended order on the basis of average previous orders,
stock held, and orders in transit. This can be either
passed or amended by the stock control clerk and then
issued as a purchase order to the relevant supplier. A
copy of the purchase order is held on file, so when the
delivery arrives it can be checked against what was
ordered. The computer then indicates where the order is to
be stored in the warehouse.
In addition to the ordering and reception of deliveries
from suppliers the system also deals with issuing orders
to branches. The picking list for each branch order is
drawn up in the form of a series of adhesive labels. As
each item is picked by the warehouseman, the label is
removed from the list and placed on the box. Any labels
remaining when the order is complete indicates lines which
are out of stock. The benefits derived from the system
are the availability of information, increased accuracy
and savings in time. Whilst the warehouse system was the
most recent major development, investigations by the
researcher showed that a few other 'minor' developments
had taken place.
One of these developments was the produce buying system
introduced in 1985. This is run in conjunction with the
operators of Wm Low's produce distribution service, Geest,
who intend using the system with other companies after it
has been tested with Wm Low. The system consists of a
terminal on the buyers desk linked to the Geest warehouse
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and to Geest's central computer at their head office in
Spalding. The information provided by the system
includes: the amount of each product sold, either totally,
or by branch; historic information; stock in warehouse and
records of deliveries. This information assists the buyer
in his purchase decisions.
Another recent technological development at head office
was the introduction of ICL One Per Desks (OPDs). These
consist of a personal computer with a telephone attached.
The facilities include a calculator, telephone directory,
telephone answering service, link to PRESTEL, graphics and
the possibility of programming in Basic. The Finance
Director had ordered ten of these which were allocated to
various executives including the Finance Director himself
and the Managing Director. The basis for the allocation
was unclear. It appeared that the Finance Director used
his own judgement as to who would benefit most from
personal computing facilities. The Produce Buyer believed
he had been given one because he used the telephone a lot.
The Management Accountant reported that 'the Finance
Director said one day - "go and pick it up" - I don't know
what I'm supposed to do with it.' The Data Processing
Manager reported that he got one because five boxes
appeared in his office one day, each contained an OPD
which did not work - 'The Finance Director broke three in
ten days.' So the Data Processing Manager was able to
assemble one working OPD for himself out of the five
broken ones.
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Most of those executives that had been allocated an OPD
found it of little use. A month after they had been
introduced, as far as the researcher was aware, no-one was
using them for any purpose other than as a telephone and
directory. According to the Produce Buyer, 'it's just an
expensive telephone'. The main reasons given for not
using the OPD were lack of time, lack of skill, and not
being 'computer orientated'. The only executive with any
enthusiasm for this new piece of technology was the Chief
Accountant. He had recently been recruited and had been
allocated an OPD when he took up his appointment. In his
previous position he had used a micro-computer frequently,
and if he had not been given an OPD he would have
requested other personal computing facilities.
IN-STORE DEVELOPMENTS 
According to the Retail Controller, the introduction of
PDCs in 1973 'totally transformed the company, they made
a big difference in lead times and accuracy'. Since then,
the branches had seen little in terms of new technology,
although two developments were currently being tried in
selected branches. The first of these was the Building
Management System (EMS). Through this system, all
heating, lighting, and refrigeration in the store could be
controlled electronically, either in the branch itself, or
at head office. The project was initiated by the
Technical Services Manager. After opening a new store in
Oban, difficulties were encountered with the heating
system. The Technical Services Manager had to visit the
store on several occasions to rectify the problem.
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Frequently the task itself took only fifteen minutes
whilst the return journey from Dundee took four hours.
Therefore, he began to search for equipment that would
allow control of the branch's energy system and
fault-finding from head office.
An electronics firm was eventually found which would
design the system exclusively for, and in conjunction
with, Wm Low. The Technical Services Manager put the
proposal to his superior, the Development Controller, who
readily agreed. The Development Controller then submitted
the proposal to the Management Committee. Further
clarification of the system was requested and the proposal
was referred back to the Technical Services Manager. The
proposal was submitted six times and each time the
decision was deferred. According to its initiator, this
was because his superior, and thus the Management
Committee did not fully understand the implications.
Eventually the Technical Services Manager put the proposal
to the committee himself and it was immediately accepted.
The system consists of an in-store controller which
monitors all aspects of the branch energy requirements.
The system reports to the head office controller on an
exception basis. If a fault occurs, this is indicated on
the screen at head office and a hard copy can be made on
the printer. Plans of the branch's energy system showing
air ducts, valves, fans, pumps and boilers allow the
Technical Services Manager to locate the problem. He can
then telephone a local contractor and indicate what is
required and which equipment needs replacing.	 The
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benefits accrue not only because of the time saved by the
Technical Services Manager but also because the energy
requirements of the branches are controlled and run more
efficiently. The first store was installed in 1984, in
the following year four more were installed and a further
twelve were planned. The Technical Services Manager
reported that the main difficulty with the project was
co-ordinating the different parties involved: the hardware
supplier; software design and electrical contractor. He
also reported difficulty in explaining the system to some
branch managers.
LASER SCANNING 
Laser scanning was introduced into one of the company's
stores in September 1984. The idea had been under
consideration for some time. The Retail Controller
reported that it had been discussed at the Management
Committee meetings four or five times, each discussion
lasting approximately half an hour. He also reported that
they decided to install laser scanning because it was 'the
in thing to do'. In September 1983, the Senior Methods
Manager was told by the Management Committee to proceed
with plans for the introduction of laser scanning.. The
criteria laid down for the choice of store were that it
should be close to the head office, large enough and with
sufficient turnover to justify the investment and have a
'forward thinking', and stable management team. Only one
store fitted these criteria.
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The Senior Methods Manager, who had responsibility for the
introduction of laser scanning, headed the Organization
and Methods department. The role of this department was
to act as an 'internal consultancy' streamlining the
company and cutting costs. They developed systems mainly
for the distribution services and retail operations, and
considered themselves a 'task force' moving from project
to project as dictated by the Management Committee, which
in turn was 'kicked into shape' by the Managing Director.
The Senior Methods Manager began by having discussions
with the existing checkout supplier, Sweda. He reported
that,
'The Managing Directors of both companies (Sweda
and Wm Low) were very friendly, so there was
just one bit of paper outlining the agreement,
with a clever clause written in so Wm Low could
pull out at any point.'
Sweda set up a project team to work on Wm Low's
specifications. However, some months into the project it
became apparent that the Sweda laser scanning equipment
would not communicate with the ICL mainframe. Therefore,
Wm Low terminated the agreement with Sweda. A further
review of laser scanner suppliers was undertaken. Through
personal contacts the Senior Methods Manager became aware
that an ICL laser scanning system had been developed with
J. Sainsbury. After reviewing the system, Wm Low decided
to purchase it. According to the Senior Methods Manager
the system was 'very soft' and could therefore be
programmed to Wm Low's requirements. He believed that the
supermarket company must be able to define the system to
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the equipment supplier. The company must know why it
wants to go into scanning and how it will use the
information. Wm Low were able to define their future
requirements and 'put ICL through hell trying to design
the system'. For example, as Wm Low required duplicate
files to be held in the store, ICL had to build the stock
control system into scanning. This meant that each
barcode had to be linked with an in-house order code which
was used for branch charging.
Eight months prior to the installation, the Grocery
Manager at the designated store was told that he would be
'Project Leader' for the scanning development. He visited
the head office for a briefing by the Senior Methods
Manager. The branch staff were informed approximately six
months before the introducing the technology and attempts
were made to reduce any fears that they might have.
The Project Leader spent the next six months building up
the files that were required and adding new lines or
deleting discontinued ones. The change from Sweda to ICL
caused extra work. The product descriptions were
originally a maximum of twelve characters long but, after
the change, up to sixteen characters could be used. The
Project Leader reported difficulty in 'educating staff'
and also suffered some stress. As the 'live' date grew
closer and it became apparent he would not have the file
created in time, he was given extra assistance. The
central processing units and two training tills were
installed two months prior to going on-line. Each checkout
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operator had 20 half-hour training sessions on the new
equipment.
The system that was installed consisted of sixteen laser
scanning checkouts. This was reduced from eighteen
traditional checkouts in anticipation of an improved
checkout flow and in order to justify the investment. At
the checkout, goods could be scanned, the price entered or
a velocity code entered (used for products which did not
carry a barcode, such as oranges). The weighing scales on
the meat, delicatessan and produce departments produced
barcodes which could be attached to the weighed item.
Therefore, a high percentage of items could be scanned. A
printout for December 1984 shows that 86% of items were
scanned on that day.
Two central processing units were located in the
administration office. One of these supported the sixteen
checkouts, the other acted as backup and processed the
information for three workstations and a printer. One
workstation, located in the Manager's office, was used for
producing reports on sales history (either by line or
commodity group), supplier or checkout details. The
workstation in the administration office had facilities
for price changes, adding and deleting lines. The cash
office workstation was used for cash reconciliation and
issuing change.
Initial operation of the laser scanning checkouts caused
some problems. Despite having extensive training, the
part-time operators were unaccustomed to operating laser
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scanning in a 'live' situation. During the first few days
long queues formed at the checkouts, increasing pressure
and further harassing the operators. Frequent apologies
were made by the management over the 'store public address
system and 'compensation' was offered to customers in the
form of two free game cards. Understandably, customer
reaction was reported to be 'mixed' by the Project Leader.
The difficulties at the checkout were not solely because
of slow operators. As with Laws Stores, problems were
encountered with some barcodes which would not scan
properly. Therefore, a 'bad barcode list' was drawn up and
these items were taken out of the system.
The Senior Methods Manager was impressed by a report on
checkout productivity which he thought had been written by
the Data Processing Manager at Laws Stores (it had
actually been produced by the Personnel Director). This
showed, graphically, the drop in checkout throughput
immediately after the introduction of laser scanning. This
trend was followed by a steady increase as operators
became more proficient and poor barcodes were identified,
and then later levelled out. The Senior Methods Manager
noted that if this report had been available at the time
they were planning laser scanning it would have enabled
them to anticipate some of the pitfalls.
To help rectify the problems an additional checkout was
installed. After the initial difficulties, throughput
improved and the customers returned. In May 1985, nine
months after the introduction of laser scanning, average
throughput had risen to 24 items per minute, with some
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operators reaching 28 or 29. The first operator to reach
30 items per minute was rewarded with a box of chocolates!
Most operators seemed happy with the new technology with a
few complaining of an aching arm.
The Cash Office Supervisor had some reservations about the
new system. These stemmed mainly from the implementation
stage, when she had to establish the new system and train
subordinates, whilst still maintaining the old system.
She reported that the initial operation of the system was
'chaos'. She requested some changes which improved the
system. Nine months later, however, some changes were
still outstanding. The Superviser reported that the
system created more work, and extra staff had to be
employed in the cash office, but she did not wish to
revert to the old system.
The Senior Methods Manager continued to monitor the
progress of the laser scanning store. Further changes to
the system were planned, but these had been delayed
because of the takeover. A formal evaluation of the laser
scanning project would be undertaken in the future. The
costs would have to be justified in terms of the hard
benefits, although additional soft benefits were also
expected to accrue. At the store, the Project Leader
identified the benefits as being improved checkout
throughput, reduced shelf-filling staff and the itemised
till receipt.
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FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AT WM LOW
The DP Manager at Laws Stores was the only executive to
move to Wm Low's head office in Dundee, where he became
Information Systems Controller. This new position
reflected the increasing importance which the company was
placing on data processing and the developments it wished
to make in this area.
Even before the takeover, the company had identified a
need to review its data processing requirements. This was
the result of recognising that they were behind
developments in other companies and pressure from within
the company itself. These pressures came from
inadequacies in existing systems, for example the fixed
asset register and the purchase ledger, and the
requirements for increased information, particularly from
the marketing department. The rapid growth in the
company's size following the takeover reinforced the need
for technological developments. The Information Systems
Controller identified the particular problems faced by Wm
Low when he was appointed:
(a) the systems were labour intensive;
(b) information was not sufficient or timely;
(c) there was no room available for expansion.
He acknowledged that the systems were efficient but that
the computer installation had not developed at the same
rate as the company and things had become 'out of
balance'. He saw his new role as being 'to develop the DP
strategy over the next few (two to five) years'.
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Prior to the appointment of the Information Systems
Controller, a Consultant had already been engaged to
undertake a review of the systems.	 He began his
investigations by talking to representatives from each
department, usually the most senior member. He identified
the 'inputs' and 'outputs' of each department and asked
what improvements they would like to see in the systems.
He noted four types of request:
(a) 'tweaking' - minor improvements to the system;
(b) totally new systems where none existed;
(c) general requests for 'on-line' information;
(d) others, for example a reduction in the work being
manually keyed-in to the system and double-checked,
word processing.
At this point the Information Systems Controller took up
his position in Dundee. He identified three stages in the
development project:
(a) 'fact-finding' - this had already been undertaken by
the Consultant;
(b) planning the future data processing strategy and
presenting it to the Board;
(c) implementation of the strategy.
The next stage, therefore, was for the Information Systems
Controller and the Consultant to work together on planning
a strategy and presenting it to the Board. The
Information Systems Controller outlined three alternative
ways of doing this: a short, sharp study; a complete
review; employment of an outside agency to undertake the
review. According to the Information Systems Controller,
the users were already anxious and the second and third
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options would only have 'dragged out the pain'. Therefore,
the first option was chosen, a short, sharp study lasting
ten weeks. He saw the collaboration with the Consultant
as an advantage as it 'added weight' to the proposals.
'They were not just coming from within, from someone with
a vested interest, but from someone who was independent'.
The only guideline provided by the Board was that the
company should continue with its current computer
supplier. They were satisfied with the service from ICL
and to change at this stage would have caused too many
problems. The Information Systems Controller reported the
major difficulty in drawing up the DP plans was that
'there's no corporate strategy, at least not one that is
articulated. Those at the top, especially the Managing
Director, know where we are going, but those below are
working blind'. No cost ceiling had been specified by the
Board as they felt that to impose a maximum expenditure
would place a constraint on the plans. In addition, it
would encourage the Information Systems Controller and the
Consultant to spend up to the limit. Nevertheless, they
were working under implicit, albeit wide, cost parameters.
According to the Information Systems Controller, £2
million was unlikely to be sufficient, but they would not
submit proposals costing £10 million as they knew this
would not be acceptable.
The final proposals and costings were submitted to the
Board at the end of September 1985. The Information
Systems Controller outlined the proposals to the
researcher in the same way in which he presented them to
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the Board. The recommendations were classified under six
headings: hardware; building and services requirements;
software and systems development; departmental staffing;
documentation standards; authorisation procedures.
a. Hardware. Having decided to remain with ICL, the
company was faced with two alternatives - proceeding with
its existing equipment or using new equipment. The
existing equipment was judged not to have a viable future
being somewhat outdated. In addition, it offerred no cost
advantage and had large physical and maintainance
requirements. ICL had recently brought out a new range,
the series 39, which included a system of suitable size
and price. The Information Systems Controller recommended
that this system should be purchased, despite the fact
that it was so far unproven.
The head office system configuration would consist of a
series 39 twin node mainframe (ie two central processing
units, one of which would be used as a backup), plus
another series 39 machine to be used for development
projects. Linked to the twin node mainframe would be
terminals located in all user departments, plus the ICL
OPDs and word processing facilities. Additional links
would be provided to the mini-computers in the depots, to
outside suppliers and to mini or micro-computers in the
branches. Dependent upon a favourable evaluation by the
Methods Department, laser scanning would be introduced
into all stores over 20,000 square feet. Laser scanning
in smaller stores had not been ruled out and this would be
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investigated at a later date. This proposal was presented
diagrammatically to the Board as in Figure 10.2.
b. Building and Services. Owing to the limited space at
Wm Low's head office, another building was purchased
approximately a mile away to house the new data processing
facilities. However, this was later found not to be
feasible as the communication cables necessary to carry
the vast amounts of data between head office and the new
site had not yet been developed. Consequently, the
Projects Department moved to the new building and the
existing computer room was extended to three times its
previous size. Other factors which had to be taken into
account were the electrical supply and the air
conditioning. The total cost of the building and services
requirements amounted to £90,000.
c. Software. Recommendations were made concerning the
operating system, database and programming language to be
used. Proposals were also submitted relating to the areas
of the business to be developed and the purchase of
suitable packages.
d. DP Department Staffing. A total staff of 39 was
proposed for the Data Processing Department, the structure
of which is shown in Figure 10.3. The incumbent DP
Manager at Wm Low became Special Projects Manager with
responsibility for 'one-off' projects, personal computing
and word processing. He was also responsible for the
internal audit which the Information Systems Controller
described as 'spying' on the analyst programmers to ensure
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that they were working to full capacity. The other
managers were promoted internally or recruited from
outside where necessary.
The three teams of analyst programmers were divided
functionally, for example one team to deal with Finance
/Accounts, another with Buying/Marketing, to enable them
to develop specialisms in these areas. An additional
'pool' of eight analyst programmers was also requested.
e. Documentation Standards. As the proposals were
dependent upon on a database system, recommendations were
made concerning documentation standards and a database
dictionary. Different teams would be working on separate
programs which would eventually interface and be accessed
by a variety of departments. Therefore, it was necessary
to standardise procedures. The data dictionary would
define the terms to be used and thus avoid inaccuracies
and inappropriate use of the terms.
f. Authorisation Procedures. Four levels of authorisation
were proposed. These were:
(1) projects requiring up to one man week's work - Special
Projects Manager;
(2) up to six man weeks' work - Information Systems
Controller;
(3) up to 12 man weeks' work - Finance Director
(4) over 12 man weeks' work - the DP Committee.
The DP Committee consisted of the Managing Director,
Finance Director and Information Systems Controller. It
was established by the Managing Director in a manner
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similar to other committees set up to discuss particular
areas of the business, such as transport and wages. This
authorisation procedure was used only for manpower
requirements. Capital authorisation was dealt with
separately, either by the Board or the Management
Committee, depending on the sum required. The total
capital expenditure involved in the above proposals
amounted to £1.7 million.
The Board of Wm Low agreed to most of the proposals, with
discussion focusing on two areas, authorisation and
staffing. The authority levels caused controversy because
some members considered it an erosion of their power. It
was not apparent who objected to the procedure, but
previously all decisions had been taken by the Managing
Director. Nevertheless, the authorisation procedure, as
laid down in the proposals, was agreed to. 	 The
Information Systems Controller later pointed out that in
reality the Managing Director and Finance Director could
be excluded from the authorisation procedure because all
large projects could be broken down into individual
smaller projects of less than six weeks.
According to the Information Systems Controller, the
staffing of the DP Department was a 'contentious issue'.
He described this as the only proposal which he 'lost' and
which was subsequently changed. In particular, the pool
of eight programmers originally requested was cut to
three. The pay and benefits for DP staff also caused
problems because of the need to remain within the
company's grading system. The DP Manager believed that
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this would not be sufficient to retain the computer
specialists for any length of time. The allocation and
type of company car was also strictly controlled by grade,
so these could not be given as an incentive. The
Information Systems Controller requested that all five
managers within the department be given cars, but this was
only granted to two.
Having agreed to the proposals, with the reservations
mentioned, the plans were announced to the rest of the
company. This was done in a document written by the
Finance Director and circulated to executive directors,
executive staff and branch managers. The report, on 2
October 1985, was entitled 'Information Processing
Strategy'. Little detailed information was supplied in
the short report, but an indication was given as to the
extent of the changes that would take place.
'The technology behind our existing systems is
out of date. With this new equipment we will
transfer, convert and enhance our existing
systems as well as bringing on entirely new
systems. This will impact not only at head
office but also at branches. The new systems
will have greater user involvement in the
departments where the systems and information
are most required. There will be extensive use
of screens and VDUs and communication links are
likely to be established across the company for
the transfer of information'.
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The implementation of these changes, which started in
January 1986 and were expected to last for two years, were
outside the scope of this research. Nevertheless, the
technology that had been introduced- over the previous
twenty years and the above proposals for future
developments provided sufficient evidence for comparisons
to be drawn between Wm Low and Laws Stores.
SUMMARY
This chapter has shown the origins of Wm Low as a
traditional, family-owned supermarket chain based in
Scotland. In 1967 it purchased its first computer, an ICL
mainframe. The company went public in 1973 and continued
its technological developments with the upgrade of the
mainframe and the installation of PDCs in all the
branches. Over the next 12 years, the company continued
to improve its data processing facilities. This included
the computerisation of all head office and warehouse
systems, the use of micro-computers and the introduction
of laser scanning into a trial store in 1984.
In January 1985 Wm Low purchased Laws Stores. This
doubled the number of branches operated by the company and
extended the trading area into the North East of England.
Following the takeover, major changes were made to the
technology in operation in Laws Stores. First, all head
office and warehouse systems were transferred to Wm Low's
computer. Second, changes were made to the operation of
the PDC units in the branches and third, they ceased
operating laser scanning in the two trial stores. In
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addition, major changes were proposed for the data
processing facilities at Wm Low to enable it to
accommodate the increased turnover and take advantage of
recent developments in microelectronics.
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11. LAWS STORES AND WM LOW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Chapter 10 provided background information on Wm Low in
terms of its history and structure. More detailed
information was given on the computer developments that
had taken place over the last twenty years and those which
were proposed for the future. This chapter summarises the
similarities between Laws Stores and Wm Low. It then
analyses the introduction of technology into Wm Low using
the technology, strategy and process framework used
earlier. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the
different approaches taken by the two companies and show
the implications these had for computer developments.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Historically, there were many similarities between Laws
Stores and Wm Low. Both were family-owned firms and,
until recently, family members had taken a prominent role
in the management of the company. Both companies were
established around the turn of the century and had, at
times, been prosperous and the leading supermarket chain
in their respective regions. In the 1960s both chains
followed the industry trend and opened their first
supermarkets. However, from about this time the
similarities began to decrease.
Wm Low continued to grow and prosper by closing their
smaller stores and opening larger ones, whilst Laws Stores
failed to adapt. Wm Low also decided to go public which
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enabled them to have access to greater funds for
investment and expansion. Most significantly for this
research, during the 1960s Wm Low invested in
computerisation which they progressively upgraded over the
following years and added to with other forms of new
technology such as PDCs. By comparison, Laws Stores
failed to invest in computerisation, choosing instead, to
contract out their DP requirements to a bureau.
Consequently, when they decided to introduce new
technology almost twenty years later than Wm Low there
existed a large 'cultural gap' to overcome without any
in-house expertise or experience.
The similar historical development of Laws Stores and Wm
Low is summarised in Table 11.1. There are, however,
major differences in terms of technology, strategy and
organizational processes which will now be studied in
greater detail.
TECHNOLOGY
A major contrast between the two companies was a question
of time span.	 Wm Low had 18 years experience of
computerisation. Most of their systems were well
established and reliable. According to McLoughlin's (1985)
categorisation, they had been undergoing 'routine
operation' for a number of years. Laws Stores systems
were relatively new, many were still in the initial
operation phase and were continually being developed and
refined. They were, by no means, infallible.
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Laws Stores and Wm Low: Summary Comparison 	 Table 11.1 
ASPECT LAWS STORES WM LOW
Historical
	 Development
1907
1960 =	 51	 branches
1959
private
very	 strong
functional
1982
,
1868
1968 = 48	 branches
1963
public
strong	 but	 decreasing
in	 the	 1980's
functional
1967
-	 first	 store
- rate	 of	 development
-	 first	 supermarket
- ownership
-	 family	 influence
-	 basic	 structure
-	 initial	 computerisation
Technology
2 years
initial
	 operation
high
on - line
DP department
low
18	 years
routine operation
low
batch
Methods department
high
- experience of
technology
- phase of development
- DP	 profile
-	 input mode
- innovators/motivators
-	 company's perceived
power
Strategy
rapid
packages	 bought-in
small
high requirement
low
generally	 low
emergent
slow
in - house
relatively	 small
low	 requirement
high
low
emergent
-	 rate of change
-	 system	 development
-	 size of DP department
-	 user	 involvement
-	 degree	 of	 refinenv.,• nt
- willingness	 to pioneer
-	 strategy	 formation
Organizational
	 Processes
little
poor
good
low
high
high
some
good
extended
unable	 to ascertain
low
low
-	 flexibility
- horizontal
communication
-	 vertical
communication
- commitment	 to new
technology
-	 level	 of	 conflict
- power of DP Manager
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Different approaches had also been taken by the two
companies in the design of the systems. Virtually all Wm
Low's systems had been developed in-house by the company's
own team of programmers. The disadvantage of this
approach was that it took a long time, according to the
Senior Methods Manager 'too long'. Nevertheless, it did
ensure that the technology was tailored exactly to the
company's requirements. As described in Chapter 7 almost
all Laws Stores systems had been bought as packages.
Whilst this had the advantage that a large number of
systems could be introduced in a short space of time they
rarely fulfilled the requirements of the users. The DP
Manager insisted that, given time, they would have been
'perfect'. However, there was a tendency to amend only
those packages that were particularly inadequate or where
the users were most vociferous in their demands. The DP
Department then moved on to new developments, such as
laser scanning, whilst many users were still working with
unsatisfactory systems.
At the time the research was undertaken, 1984/5, a very
striking difference between the two companies was the
importance attributed to technology. At Laws Stores, it
experienced a very high profile, the researcher could
question anyone in the organization (including the canteen
assistant) and receive a lengthy response on their
attitudes, opinions and personal experience of the
company's new technology. Whilst at Wm Low even many of
the managers interviewed were unable to report any
personal experience of, or attitudes to, the company's
technology.
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The major reason for this was that at Laws the technology
was relatively new and therefore very topical. Everyone,
except the most recent recruits, could remember its
installation, which as already described, was quite
traumatic and contentious in some cases. In addition,
Laws' systems were on-line and user driven, ensuring that
almost everyone in the company had direct contact with the
technology through the use of VDUs. Furthermore, despite
the fact that Laws had been late in adopting new
technology, two years after its introduction virtually all
departments in the company had been covered.
By comparison, at Wm Low most systems had been established
many years ago. They were generally accepted as part of
routine company operations. In addition, the ICL
equipment used batch processing, so the nearest most
members came to technology was through a computer
printout. The notable exceptions to these generalisations
were the technological developments which had recently
taken place: the building management system; the produce
buying system; the ICL OPDs and laser scanning. Whilst
these were in themselves significant developments they had
so far had little effect on the organization as a whole.
They were largely ad hoc projects, isolated from each
other and dispersed throughout the company.
This raises the next question of who was the motivating
force behind technological change in the respective
companies? Earlier chapters demonstrated that in Laws
Stores this was the Finance Director and DP Manager. At
Wm Low, the initiators were not quite so easy to identify.
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When the new Information Systems Controller was questioned
on this matter, he replied that he could only answer
negatively, 'it definitely isn't the DP Department'. The
Distribution and Methods Controller agreed, 'operational
innovation comes from the Methods Department, not from
DP'. The Senior Methods Manager, however, suggested that,
'we're	 not	 innovators,	 we	 just	 think
innovatively, led by the Management Committee or
the MD.... Line management don't have the time
to review their methods or systems, so we're the
DP user representatives for the operations
area'.
The Methods Department's main involvement centred on the
distribution and retail areas of the business rather than
head office. The most recent developments in other
departments, such as the building management system and
the produce buying system, would seem to suggest that
innovation came from within the departments themselves or,
in the case of the OPDs, from a director. As some
departments, and individuals within those departments, are
likely to have a greater tendency to innovate than others,
this would explain why developments at head office in
recent years had tended to be isolated and ad hoc.
A further contrast between the two supermarket chains
related to their size and perceived power. Wm Low ranks
14th in terms of supermarket turnover in the UK (Taylor
1985), but in Scotland where it has an 11% market share it
is a very important company, particularly from a suppliers
point of view. This is also true of the supplier of it's
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computer equipment ICL, as Wm Low are one of their largest
Scottish clients. ICL have for some time been attempting
to become a major supplier of retail technology. In 1982
they 'took the major strategic decislon to make a long
term commitment to the retail market'. They established a
Retail Business Centre and, by 1985, were reported to have
a 25% share of the EPOS market (ICL 1985). To be able to
secure a contract with Wm Low who, after the acquisition
of Laws operated over a hundred stores, and were expanding
at the rate of six stores a year on average, would give
them a significant boost in the market for EPOS equipment.
Wm Low recognised their importance as customers and were
able to exploit it to their own advantage. This was
illustrated by laser scanning, as the Senior Methods
Manager reported 'we put ICL through hell trying to design
the system'.
In contrast, Laws Stores regarded themselves as being in a
disadvantaged position in relation to their equipment
suppliers. Documentary evidence showed that they did not
always receive a satisfactory service from IBM. These
include such comments as,
'major concern was expressed about the ...
support likely to to be available during 1983'
(minutes of the Project Meeting 26 January
1983).
'we are still not happy with the level of field
support being given in relation to both the
hardware and software products' (memo from the
Finance Director 31 March 1983).
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In addition, when reporting on a visit to the USA arranged
by IBM, the Finance Director noted, 'the meeting was badly
arranged ... IBM was very disappointing ... the major IBM
development centre which we were not allowed to visit'.
Laws Stores lack of confidence in their own ability was
commented on by a representative of one of the laser
scanning equipment suppliers, 'to a certain extent they
have to be led through the system more than other
companies'.
Memos written by the Finance Director on the subject of
laser scanning suggested that Laws Stores were under some
kind of obligation to the equipment suppliers, 'a lot of
help and support had been given by such people as ADS and
it was important that once the pilot schemes have been
evaluated we make an early commitment'. This was despite
the fact that in both cases Laws were •using previously
untried equipment and the suppliers were able to bring
potential customers to the site to view it in operation.
Thus, it could be suggested that Laws were not in such a
disadvantageous position, as the suppliers themselves were
benefitting from Laws' willingness to pioneer.
STRATEGY
Historically, technology in Wm Low can be divided into
three phases:
(a) 1967-1981. This phase began with the introduction of
the first, and subsequent, ICL mainframe computers. It
included the design and installation of the major systems
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(budgeting, payroll and accounts) and the use of PDCs in
the branches.
(b) 1981-1985. The major technological change during
this phase was the warehouse system. Other developments
included the produce buying system and the ICL OPDs.
In-store, the major project was the laser scanning
installation, plus the building management system.
(c) 1985 Onwards. These most recent developments included
the appointment of a new Information Systems Controller
and the purchase of ICL hardware. This would cost,
according to the Finance Director, 'well in excess of £1.0
million, plus a substantial increase in the number of
personnel in the Data Processing Department'. The exact
nature of the change in the systems was not specified, but
he did suggest that they would have greater user
involvement and would impact not only at head office but
also at the branches.
Each of these periods will now be examined in turn and
later analysed to identify the factors which influenced
these developments.
(a) 1967-1981. The reasons behind the introduction of new
technology in the first phase were difficult to identify
because of the time lapse involved. It could not be
ascertained whether an 'intended strategy' (Mintzberg
1978) was formulated and articulated from the outset. The
strategy identified retrospectively was in stark contrast
to that which emerged at Laws. In Chapter 8 this was
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noted as consisting of six inter-related 'policy
decisions', which can be compared with those at Wm Low.
1. The overriding principle at Laws was that the
technology had to be introduced quickly. At Wm Low twenty
years previously it was unlikely that the company felt
'left behind' technologically, nor was faced with any of
the environmental pressures which Laws perceived as being
important in the 1980s. Therefore computerisation could
be introduced much more slowly.
2. The second principle at Laws was that because of the
time constraint systems had to be bought in as packages.
As no such time constraint existed at Wm Low, systems were
developed in-house. More significantly, it is probable
that at the time, the company had no option but to design
its own systems as suitable packages may not have been
available.
3. Both companies were similar in that they operated with
a small DP Department. This was possible at Wm Low,
despite the relatively large size of the company and the
efficient and reliable systems, because of the long time
period over which they had been developed. Although at Wm
Low, because of the different type of computer equipment
in use, a larger number of operations staff were required.
4. At Wm Low, in comparison to Laws, the systems did not
require a great deal of user involvement. This was for
two reasons. First, programmes operated in batch mode and
therefore all information was input by the data
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preparation staff. Second, a positive step seems to have
been taken to remove the responsibility for systems from
the end users. This was indicated by the establishment of
the Methods Department in 1969 and the comments of the
Senior Methods Manager.
5. The fifth principle at Laws was 'to get things up and
running and add the refinements later'. At Wm Low the
systems were subject to extensive testing and were
relatively reliable before being put into 'live'
operation. Although, where necessary, refinements could
be added later.
6. A further policy decision at Laws was not to pioneer,
but in practice this was not always upheld. Similarly, at
Wm Low the company appeared not to pioneer. Nevertheless,
it monitored the developments of competitors closely and,
once new technology had been proven elsewhere, it was
quickly adopted. This is demonstrated by its relatively
early entry into computerisation and PDCs.
(b) 1981 - 1985. Little evidence could be found to
indicate the strategy underlying this period of
technological development. The major project, the
warehouse system, was a continuation of the long term
developments in the previous phase and followed the same
principles. Other projects appeared to be ad hoc and
without links to any other areas of the business. This
was in contrast to the policy at Laws where all DP systems
were interlinked. Nevertheless, most of these developments
at Wm Low had clearly defined objectives. The potential
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benefits had to be investigated and the investment
justified to the Management Committee. The only exception
to this was the introduction of the ICL OPDs, which
appeared to have no objectives and for which few benefits
could be identified by the respondents.
Therefore, for this phase there was no intended, long
term, overall DP strategy linking the different elements.
However, as time progressed it is likely that a strategy
would emerge to enable these projects, such as laser
scanning and OPDs, to interface with the developments
taking place in the next phase.
(c) 1985 Onwards. The decision to introduce new technology
at this stage was prompted by both internal and external
factors. Externally, the company was aware that its
hardware capabilities were behind the latest technological
developments and those being adopted by other companies.
Internally, it was pressured by a need for greater and
more timely information. In addition, there was limited
room for expansion on the current hardware to allow it to
accommodate the company's increasing size.
After agreement had been reached at board level to
introduce new technology, the Information Systems
Controller was brought in to, in his words, 'develop the
DP strategy over the next few years'. Other than the
requirement to use ICL equipment, no other guidelines were
provided by the Board. The Information Systems
Controller, assisted by the Consultant, was free to
develop a strategy without any constraints on time, cost
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or other resources. Whilst this may be considered an
advantage and an encouragement to initiative, it
nevertheless created a degree of uncertainty. As the
Information Systems Controller himself ,explained, he was
working 'blind' and had not been in the company long
enough to be able to anticipate what was in the minds of
the Managing Director and the rest of the board.
The strategy which was submitted for board approval
consisted largely of hardware and technical requirements,
for example the equipment to be used, operating system,
building and services. In addition, it also dealt with
the internal details of the DP Department: staffing;
structure; standardisation and controls. The proposals
did not include the way in which the technology would be
introduced, the effect on, or the involvement of, the user
departments. Although staff were informed of the
developments in a memo entitled 'Information Processing
Strategy', no specific details were provided.
The Concept Of Strategy. In each of the three time
periods outlined above, no explicit reference was made to
the principles or objectives governing the introduction of
new technology prior to the decisions being made. In
terms of strategy, or rather the lack of it, there are
similarities between Wm Low and Laws Stores. In both
companies there were no clearly defined objectives for new
technology and a comprehensive strategy was not formulated
and articulated at the outset. Instead, it evolved as a
result of decisions taken at the various stages during the
introduction process. Evidence from Wm Low lends further
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support to Mintzberg's (1978) view that strategies emerge
as the result of a series of decisions rather than being
formulated in advance. This contradicts Chandler's (1962)
definition of strategy as 'the determination of the basic
long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the
adoption of courses of action and the allocation of
resources necessary for carrying out those goals'. The
factors likely to influence the 'emergent strategy' are
discussed in the next section.
ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES 
As with Laws Stores, Wm Low was formally organized into
functions, with department heads responsible for Finance,
Administration, Buying, Personnel, and Branch Operations.
In reality, however, the structure was more flexible, with
roles and titles changing in response to the needs of the
company and the environment. Horizontal communication did
not appear to be to problematic, but vertical
communication was occasionally criticised by respondents.
There were six or seven hierarchical levels between the
Chairman and shop assistant which created a somewhat
extended hierarchy, due to the larger size of the company.
As already described, company systems were sophisticated
and reliable.	 All methods were standardized and
documented in procedure manuals. Close control was
exercised, particularly in the stores, through line
management.
These features would seem to suggest that the structure of
Wm Low was in some respects organic and in others
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bureaucratic
(using the
respondents
others saw
functional.
• However, when questioned on this matter
interview schedule in Appendix H), most
viewed it as definitely bureaucratic, whilst
it as a combination of -bureaucratic and
This reflects the strong position and
decision-making power held by the Managing Director, which
was identified by many respondents as being a major
feature of the company. This power was illustrated by the
number of departments he had reporting directly to him and
by such comments as, 'you can't change your mind around
here unless he says so' and 'the Managing Director decides
everything anyway'.
Communication. Horizontal communication was achieved by
what the Senior Methods Manager termed 'lateral
gangplanks' and through numerous committees. The most
important of these was the Management Committee, on which
all divisions were represented and which acted as a forum
for discussion of all operational aspects of the business.
These committees provided an opportunity for members to
submit, and give their opinion on, proposals, although it
was recognised that the final decision rested with the
Managing Director. No comparable committees existed
within Laws Stores where proposals came mainly from the
Chairman and his son, except in the case of new technology
where they came mainly from the Finance Director and DP
Manager. The DP Project Meetings were only a temporary
measure. They did not act as an open forum, but provided
just ten minutes for each group to report back on their
respective projects.
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Evidence showed that the Management Committee at Wm Low
had previously been used for discussion of new technology
decisions, for example the building management system and
laser scanning. Whether or not this would continue to be
the case for the major developments initiated in 1985 is
debatable. It is possible that the new developments would
be driven by the DP Department (rather than the Methods
Department, as had frequently been the case previously)
and the DP Department did not have a direct representative
on the Management Committee. In principle the DP
Committee had been established to perform this function
but, in reality, the Information Systems Controller was
able to bypass this procedure.
Commitment. Chapter 8 noted that lack of commitment to
technological change was a major problem in Laws Stores.
In Wm Low, many departments did not have any direct
involvement with DP Developments and therefore this issue
did not arise. Where user involvement was necessary,
considerable time was taken to design the systems
according to their needs and introduce the technology
slowly. For example, the warehouse system was developed
in-house and introduced over two and a half years; the
Building Management System was designed by an electronics
firm in conjunction with Wm Low in response to a specific
need identified by the Technical Services Manager; the ICL
laser scanning system was adapted to the precise
requirements of Wm Low and introduced over six months,
with two months spent training checkout assistants.
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At Wm Low the systems requirements were identified first
and then the technology used as a vehicle for the systems.
This contrasts with the Laws approach of buying software
packages, installing them quickly and then tailoring them
to the company's needs. As a result of the approach taken
at Wm Low, users recognised the need for new systems, the
change was slower and less traumatic and the technology
more easily accepted. The only exception to this was the
introduction of the OPD's. These were introduced without
any need being identified and without any explanation.
Consequently, those assigned an OPD were not committed and
rarely used them.
Conflict. There appeared to be little conflict at Wm Low,
frequent reference was made to the strong 'one company'
feeling. This was equally true of technology which was
rarely seen as an important issue for debate. The well
established systems had been introduced gradually, they
were now recognised as efficient and generally accepted
without question. Recent developments tended to be
isolated, but where co-operation between departments was
required, no conflict was reported.
This lack of conflict could largely be attributed to the
nature of the organization structure and the way in which
the technology was introduced. The Productivity and
Distribution Controller reported that in the Methods
Department 'we work hand in hand with the DP Department
and the branches, but at Laws they had the systems imposed
on them'. A further advantage of this approach was that
the Methods Department was not seen as having a vested
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interest. This was clearly a contentious issue at Laws,
with frequent references to 'empire building' and 'trail
blazing', those responsible for DP development were
thought by others to benefit from the introduction of new
technology. The stated aim of the Methods Department was
to design efficient systems, regardless of technology and
therefore could not be subject to such accusations.
Furthermore, the members of the Methods Department
appeared to have a more open attitude than the DP staff
who, in previous chapters were noted as being insular and
poor communicators. The Productivity Controller also had
the advantage of a background of many years in Store
Operations, before being promoted to his position in head
office.
The question that remains is whether this approach and the
associated lack of conflict would continue with the new DP
developments. The Information Systems Controller
identified the issue of staffing as 'contentious' and one
which he 'lost'. Other points which gave rise to some
discussion were the authorisation procedure and time
scales. The Information Systems Controller wanted to
introduce systems quickly (as he did at Laws) whilst
others were holding him back. These developments,
however, were still at an early stage, ie the choice of
technology. The design of systems, implementation and
initial operation would come later. The contrast between
the emergent strategy at Laws (which, as illustrated in
Chapter 8, was largely influenced by the DP Manager) and
that of previous developments in Wm Low, would suggest
that conflict may arise later over the differing
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approaches. Different opinions may exist about such things
as the degree of user involvement, the speed at which
developments should take place, the purchase of packages,
or in-house development.
Other important questions regarding the future DP
developments include: Would the increase in the size of
the department lead to resentment? Would the DP
Department assume a more dominant role and 'impose' the
systems on the rest of the company? These are largely
issues of power and politics which will be dealt with in
the next section.
Power and Politics. In contrast to Laws Stores, the
incumbent DP Manager in Wm Low did not appear to possess a
great deal of power. This view was derived from the
evidence of previous developments and interviews with
respondents. For example, when referring to the choice of
laser scanning equipment the Senior Methods Manager noted
that, 'if I was the DP Manager I wouldn't have let me make
that decision'. The DP Manager was generally considered
competent at his job but, because of his age (late 50s)
and 'mild-mannered' nature, it was felt that he would be
unable to cope with the rapid developments that were
taking place in retail technology, and therefore this
would limit the DP Department's progress. Consequently,
the Information Systems Controller was appointed as his
superior. This would seem to lend further support to
Pettigrew's (1973) observation that access to sources of
power are not sufficient without the skills to utilise
them.
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In his new position would the Information Systems
Controller be able to exercise the power he had
demonstrated in Laws? As most of his proposals were
accepted by the board, the evidence initially available
would seem to suggest that this was the case. Those
issues which provoked discussion (staffing, authorisation,
timing) were non-technical' matters. Thus indicating
that where the issues were more technical, the Information
Systems Controller 'won' because of his greater specialist
knowledge. However, this was only the first stage in the
introduction of new technology, during which he may have
been experiencing something of a 'honeymoon' period.
The other stages of the development were outside the scope
of this research. Nevertheless, based on available
evidence (for example the progress of developments in
Laws, a comparison of the two companies and the previous
behaviour of the Information Systems Controller), it is
possible to speculate on what may happen. As shown above,
the approach by the Information Systems Controller to the
introduction of new technology was incompatible with that
previously employed in Wm Low. In future stages conflict
may arise over a number of issues as the strategy emerges.
Four significant factors would be likely to influence the
outcome of that conflict.
(a) It was shown in the Laws Stores case study that as
time passes other individuals gain experience and
knowledge of computerisation and begin to question the
decisions of the specialists.
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(b) The structure of the company and processes in
operation required the involvement and co-operation of
other departments.
(c) The location of the Information Systems Controller in
the management hierarchy was less powerful than that of
other members, in particular the Productivity and
Distribution Controller, who sat on the Management
Committee and reported direct to the Managing Director.
(d) The leadership style of the Managing Director was
different and more autocratic than that of the Chairman at
Laws Stores.
Therefore, it is possible to speculate that the
Information Systems Controller would be unable to exercise
the same degree of power as he did at Laws Stores and
would have less influence over the emerging new technology
strategy. This is further supported by the fact that less
than a year after the new technology proposals were agreed
by the board, the Information Systems Controller resigned
to take up a new position elsewhere.
SUMMARY
Historically, there were many parallels between Laws
Stores and Wm Low. In terms of technology, the only
similarity was that in neither case was the strategy
formulated and articulated in advance. However, the
factors influencing the emerging strategy, and therefore
the outcome, were significantly different. In Wm Low, the
structure of the organization was more flexible and
adaptable. There was a greater degree of communication,
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facilitated largely by the Management Committee which
acted as a forum for discussion on all aspects of the
business, including new technology. Innovation came from
a variety of sources, but not from the DP Department,
which played a less dominant role than in Laws Stores.
Strong control was exercised by the Managing Director.
Consequently, technological developments in Wm Low, which
had begun almost twenty years prior to those in Laws
Stores, had progressed slowly and cautiously. They had
been designed with the full co-operation and commitment of
the user departments. They were less subject to political
manoeuvering and the influence of powerful individuals.
As a result, the systems were more efficient and created
less conflict. It is concluded that, following the
resignation of the Information Systems Controller, the
latest developments announced in September 1985 would
probably progress in the same manner as those of the last
twenty years.
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12. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has four aims. First, it aims to summarise
the findings of previous research on new technology and in
particular new technology in retailing. Second, it aims
to analyse the findings of the thesis and its relationship
to previous works. The third aim is to extend the
findings of this research and show its applicability for
other retail organizations, as well as its usefulness for
practising managers. Finally, this chapter reviews the
major conclusions of the thesis and the implications these
have for future research.
THE FINDINGS OF EARLIER RESEARCH
As noted in Chapter 6, there has been relatively little
research on retail technology. What work has been done
falls broadly into three categories. First, the technical
reports, second the works which tend to be largely
prescriptive and optimistic and third, the pessimistic
studies investigating the impact of technology on the
workforce. Many of these works are not based on any
empirical research. Of those that are, the focus has
generally been at a global level, investigating the
'before' and 'after' situation and predicting likely
future trends. There has been an obvious neglect of the
process of introducing and implementing new technology
into a retail organization.
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For previous works on the actual process of introducing
new technology into a company it was necessary to review a
broader range of literature, often referring to
manufacturing industry. Even in this much wider field,
the processual viewpoint was found lacking. Again, much
of it was technical, or not at the appropriate level.
Some studies were too generalised, for example looking at
the rate of diffusion of technical change. At the other
extreme were those concerned with the role of, and the
effect on, the individual operator. The implications of
new technology at the organizational level were less well
covered. Another deficiency in the literature is that it
focuses on the impact of technical change rather than the
problems of managing its introduction. Those works which
have looked at the actual process of introduction have
tended to be prescriptive in nature and have generally not
been based on original research. Those few that have
investigated the process of introducing new technology
have invariably looked at only one stage in this process.
This is largely for practical purposes as the whole
process, from the decision to introduce technology through
to its routine operation usually takes several years.
As a study of organizational behaviour, the thesis also
drew on works from an even wider field, in particular the
work of the contingency theorists. Most relevant in this
field was the work of Woodward (1965) and the subsequent
debate on 'technological determinism' versus 'strategic
choice'. Other works by the contingency theorists that
were referred to include Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and
Burns and Stalker (1961) who researched the effect of the
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environment in shaping the organization. There are two
major criticisms of the contingency theorists in respect
to this research. First, they deal almost exclusively
with manufacturing industry. Second, each study deals
with a single factor (for example technology or
environment) which, it is thought, influences the
structure of the organization and its success. There are
no works which synthesize the different views of the
contingency theorists and certainly none which relate them
to a retailing context.
A major element of the thesis was the study of the of the
strategy to introduce new technology. A review of the
relevant literature showed there to be some confusion over
the definition of strategy, in particular whether the term
should refer to both ends and means, ie both the goals and
the methods used to achieve them or just the means.
Another area of confusion is the concept of strategy
formulation. Many works view strategy as a concious plan
and explicit set of guidelines developed in advance.
Others see it more as an evolutionary process in which the
strategy emerges as a result of decisions made over a
period of time. On the whole, the studies of strategy
have tended to take a rather global and long term view.
There has been a neglect of the actual processes involved
in the formation of the strategy and of the many factors
which may in reality limit a company's ability to
implement that strategy.
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THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The relatively good access to a company enabled the
researcher to study the process of strategy formation and
discover the 'real world' problems of introducing new
technology. The use of particpant observation was chosen
as the most appropriate research technique in this context
and one which enabled the researcher to derive greatest
benefit from this potentially rich source of information.
In previous studies of the introduction of new technology
in retailing, the primary research techniques have been
questionnaires or single interviews. Although some
studies may have included a period of participant
observation, these have only been for a short time and
have not formed the major data source. Therefore, the use
of participant observation in this research provides a new
approach to the study of retail technology. It enabled
valuable insights to be gained into this previously
under-researched area.
As part of the research strategy, two other techniques
were used: interviews and analysis of documentary
evidence. Thus, by employing this method of
triangulation, the inherent weaknesses of any one method
were avoided and a solid empirical basis for the thesis
was established. A comparative investigation into a
similar organization with a different approach to new
technology was then undertaken. This enabled the
researcher to gather additional information and further
refine the thesis.
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RESEARCH FINDINGS 
By using the methodological approach described above, the
research provided valuable empirical evidence to support
or refute ideas developed in previous works on new
technology. The thesis draws together literature on
strategy formation, organizational processes and the
various underlying factors and relates them to the
technological changes taking place in two retail
companies.
Strategy Formation. The research supports the view of
McLoughlin et al that the introduction of new technology
can be divided into five different stages: the decision to
introduce; choice and design of the technology;
implementation; initial operation and routine operation.
By studying the whole process, the research found that
these were not logical, discrete, sequential steps, they
often overlapped and the process was an iterative one.
Furthermore, 'new technology' was not a single element,
but was found to consist of a number of different
components, both hardware and software, which were
progressively introduced into the head office and stores
over a period of two and a half years.
The strategy to introduce new technology was not
formulated and articulated in advance, but evolved as a
result of decisions made at different stages during its
introduction.
	
The strategy could therefore only be
identified retrospectively. 	 This lends support to
Mintzberg's (1978) view of an	 emergent' strategy that
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is: (a) not explicit; (b) not developed conciously and
purposefully and (c) not made in advance of specific
decisions. It is also in line with McLoughlin's findings
that sub-strategies are developed at the various stages in
response to prevailing circumstances. This is contrary to
Chandler's (1962) view of strategy as planned courses of
action to achieve the basic long-term goals of an
enterprise.
The evidence presented here would seem to refute
Mintzberg's advice not to make the strategy explicit
which, he states, would invest it with even greater
momentum. However, such momentum would have been
beneficial, as members of the DP Department often
complained that they were making all the progress and
'dragging the rest of the company' with them. To have
made the strategy explicit would also have made it more
legitimate, direction would have been seen as coming from
the Chairman, rather than the Finance Director or DP
Manager, as was often thought to be the case. It would
have given the organization members a clearer idea of the
objectives and greater confidence to achieve those
objectives. Making the strategy explicit would also have
provided an opportunity for others to express opinions,
ask questions or raise objections. Thus ultimately, by
having clear objectives and the opportunity for
participation, commitment to the changes would have been
increased.
As the strategy was not formulated and explicitly stated
in advance, it was possible for functional managers at
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each stage to influence the emerging strategy in their own
interests. A further appreciation of how this took place
is gained by looking at the organizational processes
involved in bringing about the change.
Organizational Processes. Organizational processes were
identified as being important in forming the strategy to
introduce new technology into Laws Stores and the
subsequent implementation of that strategy. These
processes can be summarised under the headings of: power
and politics; commitment; communication and conflict.
Following on from the work of Pettigrew 19731, pwer and.
politics were found to be key factors in the introduction
of technology. However, unlike his study, political
manoeuvring was not confined only to the Management
Services Department, but existed in all areas of the
company. Furthermore, it did not just take place during
the initial computer purchase decision but throughout the
whole introduction and implementation process.
The DP Manager was found to exercise considerable power.
The sources of his power came from his specialist
knowledge, his access to decision makers, his political
sensitivity and his structural position. This latter
aspect contradicts the work of Bacharach and Lawler
(1980). In their terms, the DP Manager could be said to
possess influence, but they found structural position to
be a source only of authority. Nevertheless, the DP
manager's influence stemmed, at least in part, from his
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structural position as 'gatekeeper' through which
information about the new technology was channelled.
Conflict has often been noted as a feature of
,
technological change. However, contrary to what most of
these works (and the coverage in the media) would lead us
to believe, hostility and resistance to change are not an
automatic reaction of the workforce. At Laws, the initial
reaction to the new technology was one of passive
acceptance both from the workforce and executives. The
thesis highlighted the three reasons for this. First, an
unwillingness to oppose the Chairman. Second, lack of
experience and knowledge coupled with a perceived
dependence on the computer specialists. Third, by
introducing the first systems into the Finance Department,
which was also under the same director as the DP
Department, problems could be restricted to this one area.
Only as developments progressed and the users gained the
confidence to question the specialists, did conflict
arise. This conflict was largely at executive level,
between the computer specialists and other staff
functions. At the level of the workforce the attitude
remained one of passive acceptance.
Another key process was the communication between
different departments. This was an important aspect of
technological change as the developments that were taking
place required changes in working practices and a level of
integration between the different departments which did
not previously exist. Communication tended to flow
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vertically, so only the Chairman and his son at the top of
the organization got the total picture of what was
happening. There were well defined boundaries between
departments that were not easily crossed. Lateral
communication was poor, sometimes leading to the
withholding or distortion of information between
departments.
The barriers between departments also meant that it was
difficult for the computer specialists to become
integrated into the rest of the company. This feature was
also noted by Pettigrew (1973) and the early works of
Mumford (Mumford and Ward 1966). However, in reporting
her later studies, Mumford (1981) notes that the situation
had changed. Computer developments were no longer the
sole prerogative of the specialists. It was now
recognised that the users were capable of making a useful
contribution, leading to co-operation between different
departments. Nevertheless, the integration of computer
specialists and the users still appeared to be a problem
in this research.	 Two major reasons for this were
identified. First, the functional nature of the
organization structure (an aspect which will be dealt with
later). Second, as Laws had no previous experience of
in-house computing this created something of a 'culture
gap' between the computer specialists and other members of
the organization. These differences covered attitudes,
motivations and job aspirations as well as more practical
problems of communication and the use of 'jargon'.
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There was also a problem with commitment to the changes
that were taking place at Laws. Many members thought the
change was being imposed on them and, as noted earlier,
their reaction was one of passive acceptance. Whilst this
may have been sufficient in some circumstances, the
' user-driven' approach adopted at Laws required a greater
degree of commitment, as the users were expected to take
responsibility for the development of the systems. Some
attempt was made to consult with the users, but this was
largely superficial. When 'bugs' became apparent later,
no-one felt sufficient 'ownership' of the systems or the
responsibility to correct them. This was similar to
Bessant and Dickson's (1982) 'marketing approach' in which
there is an attempt to 'sell' the systems to the users,
but the initial favourable response turns to
disillusionment later as problems with the technology
emerge.
Underlying Factors. The evidence gathered from Laws
Stores, supported by the comparative study at Wm Low,
showed that four major factors gave rise to the above
organizational processes, which subsequently influenced
the emergent strategy to introduce new technology. These
were identified as the decline of the organization; family
ownership of the company; environmental uncertainty; and
the organizational structure.
Previous works on organizational decline showed that such
companies experienced increased conflict, politicking and
poor integration. The implications for bringing about
change included a loss of skilled staff, resistance to the
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changes in order to protect vested interests and a slower
response to environmental shifts. These features were
particularly marked in Laws Stores because the large and
growing investment in new technology represented an
increasing share of a smaller cake. At Wm Low, the
company was expanding, therefore the investment in new
technology did not create such resentment and did not
result in so much conflict and political manoeuvring.
Family ownership of the company was found to be an
important factor in determining how members behaved.
First, the family members themselves were unable to
divorce their roles as owners from that of operating
managers and thus experienced 'role ambiguity'. This
contributed to the ill-defined and poorly articulated
strategy which was noted earlier and led to concentration
on operational decision-making. There was also a tendency
to develop 'pet projects' which were not necessarily
financially justified and which other members of the
Board, because of their loyalty to the Chairman, were
unwilling to question. Laws had difficulty in recruiting
and retaining suitably qualified data processing staff
because of the lack of opportunity and influence in a
family-dominated firm. A further drawback was the lack of
capital available for investment.
The environment in which both Laws Stores and Wm Low
operated was identified as being highly dynamic and
uncertain. In terms of new technology, laser scanning was
not yet well established and there was still some doubt
about the possible benefits. 	 This uncertainty was
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compounded by a large number of suppliers offering a
variety of systems and the rapidly falling cost of the
hardware. Although applicable to both companies, this
uncertain environment seemed to create greater problems
for Laws Stores who were unable to respond effectively to
the changes that were taking place. A number of reasons
for this were identified. One of which, the relative
decline of the organization, and the associated resistance
to change, has already been noted. Another reason, the
functional nature of the organization structure, will be
dealt with shortly.
A third reason was the companies' differing perceptions of
the environment and their own ability to alter it.
Although there was a wide variety of choice of technology
the Board at Laws Stores did not perceive this. They did
not systematically review all the alternative suppliers,
different types of equipment and different ways in which
it could be used. As their search activities were
limited, they failed to recognise the wide variety of
strategic choices that were available to them.
Consequently, the technology was used in a deterministic
manner. Furthermore, Laws perceived themselves as having
little power to alter the environment and took very much
of a reactive stance. This is in comparison to Wm Low,
who took more of a proactive approach, particularly with
regards to new technology where they dictated their
requirements to the equipment suppliers.
The last, and possibly most important, factor which was
found to give rise to the organizational processes was the
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organization structure. There have been many studies into
the relationship between technology and structure.
However, most of these have concentrated on the impact of
technology on structure, rather than, how the existing
structure could influence the process of introducing new
technology, which is the focus of attention in this
thesis.
The functional structure at Laws was found to be a major
cause of the poor lateral relations. It restricted
interactions between departments, creating conflict and
leading to the internalisation of sub-goals. This reduced
the company's ability to adapt to the new technology. The
investigations in Wm Low further supported this view. They
adopted a more flexible, organic type of structure and
used committees for consultation and decision-making. This
led to improved lateral relations and better adaptation to
the new technology. Burns and Stalker (1961), found that
an organic structure was more appropriate to unstable
conditions. Whilst their work was not specifically
related to technology, it is consistent with the earlier
observation that the recent developments in retail
technology created an uncertain environment. Therefore,
it is argued that Laws should have adopted a more organic
organization structure. This would have enabled it to
respond more effectively to the uncertain environment and
succesfully implement the emerging new technology
strategy.
It has already been noted that the concept of strategy
identified in this thesis is contrary to that used by
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Chandler. Furthermore, the evidence presented here also
fails to support his hypothesis that structure follows
strategy. The strategy to introduce new technology into
Laws Stores and Wm Low was found to have only limited
effect on the organization structure. Indeed, it is
demonstrated that the structure plays a large part in
influencing the emerging new technology strategy.
Therefore, it is argued that changes in structure should
precede strategy, and only in doing so will the strategy
be successfully implemented.
APPLICABILITY OF FINDINGS TO OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
The type of intensive approach employed in this research
provides a rich source of empirical evidence, but is
extremely time consuming. Thus, it is only possible to
investigate a small number of case studies in this way.
Therefore, the possiblilty of generalising the findings to
the wider population, in this case the retail industry as
a whole, is limited. However, the benefit of the deep
insight gained more than outweighs the restrictions on
generalisation. Based on a knowledge of the retail
trades, other works in this field and a process of logical
deduction, the findings of this research can be applied to
other retail companies which display some of the
characteristics identified at Laws Stores.
First, there are many medium-sized companies facing an
uncertain environment and pressure from the larger
multiples. In the supermarket trade in particular, a
large gap exists between the small regional chains and the
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national multiples. This gap is not only in terms of the
number of stores, turnover and profits, but also
management techniques, structure and attitudes. Second,
some retail companies are still family firms, ie owned and
managed by descendents of the founder. In view of the
many takeovers that have taken place in the early 1980s,
many are struggling to maintain their independence. This
thesis may give some clues as to why independent retailers
are something of a 'dying breed' and, in cases where it is
not already too late, offer at least partial solutions to
enable them to survive.
Third, for historical reasons many of these companies have
developed a functional structure. This is largely due to
the organic growth of the firm which, after establishing a
number of units, centralises control and decision-making.
Then, for reasons of efficiency, the organization is
divided into separate functions responsible for Buying,
Accounts and Store Operations. Unless these companies
also employ some integrative mechanisms, as Wm Low did,
they may experience some of the problems with lateral
relations, such as poor communication and co-ordination,
that were observed at Laws.
Fourth, the lack of strategic planning that was
highlighted in this thesis has also been noted elsewhere
as a common characteristic of retail companies. According
to Knee and Walters (1985), retailers exhibit something of
a 'butterfly spirit', flitting from one operational
problem to another without concern for the long-term
implications. Davies et al (1985) also note that only the
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top three or four grocery retailers use any form of
strategic planning. Evidence on the diffusion of new
technology in retailing would suggest that many of these
smaller retail chains are now beginning to introduce EPOS.
From January 1982 to December 1984 the number of scanning
stores increased four-fold (Euromonitor 1985).
Furthermore, if the predictions are correct many more
companies are contemplating EPOS. A survey undertaken by
Post-News found retailers anticipated that 73% of their
checkouts would be fitted with laser scanners by 1990
(Brown 1986).
The findings of the thesis, therefore, have significance
for retailers who are currently introducing new
technology, or who intend to in the future. Undoubtedly,
at least some of these companies will encounter the
problems described here. Whilst the thesis does not
provide all the answers (indeed it may not even identify
all the problems) it does provide a situation which it is
hoped other companies will be able to identify with. In
doing so it offers a framework which will enable them to
trace the causes of the problems within their own
organizations and enable them to take appropriate action.
In particular, this research should encourage them to look
beyond the technical, economic and financial aspects of
new technolgy to the underlying factors which may be
constraining their ability to fully realise all the
benefits.
Many of the above factors also provide the justification
for studying retailing as a special case, rather than
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generalising from the evidence of manufacturing
organizations. This includes the predominance of family
firms and functional structures in retailing as well as
the neglect of strategic planning. Most importantly the
rapid technological changes that are taking place, the
widespread nature of these changes and their far-reaching
implications make it a particularly worthwhile area of
study. However, although it is possible to make
deductions about the possible differences between
manufacturing and retailing, it is not until significantly
more research has been done in the latter area that more
meaningful comparisons can be made.
MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The major contribution of the thesis stems from the nature
of the research and the methodological approach adopted.
This enabled the author to study the whole process of
introducing new technology from the perspective of the
total organization. Only in this way was it possible to
identify the complex interaction of factors influencing
technological change. The thesis demonstrates how four
major factors gave rise to the processes which
subsequently influenced the emerging new technology
strategy.
One of the major outcomes of this work has been the
emphasis which it gives to the interplay between
structure, technology and process which it is important
for companies to understand if change is to be
successfully implemented. The thesis also draws attention
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to the importance of utilising the freedom of choice that
is available. The conclusion here is that where existing
organization structures do not enable companies to
exercise this choice, then their chances of successfully
introducing new technology are considerably reduced. In
the light of this evidence, the major conclusion of this
work would appear to be that structural change, combined
with a clear understanding of the process issues involved,
needs to precede rather than follow as a result of
technological change.
Implications for Future Researdn. Uew tednnology
retailing is still a relatively under-researched area.
However, as developments are now progressing more rapidly,
the possibilities are also becoming greater. 	 More
companies are beginning to introduce EPOS, thus providing
scope for more in-depth research, such as that reported
here. In addition, it will also provide the opportunity
to test some of the findings of this research by
undertaking a survey of a number of different retailers in
different situations.
In addition to EPOS, there are other technological
advances taking place which provide opportunities for
further research. One such development is the Tradacoms
standards laid down by the Article Number Association
(ANA) to enable retailers and suppliers to exchange data
using a common format. Linked to this is Tradanet, a
bureau designed to sort the data and deliver it to the
correct recipient. Probably the most widely publicised
development is Electronic Funds Transfer at the Point of
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Sale (EFTPOS). This will enable the retailer to debit the
customer's bank account instantly, upon production of the
appropriate card at the checkout. Such developments
provide a wide range of issues for research, including the
relationship between retailers and other organizations
such as suppliers and banks.
What implications do the findings reported here have for
future retail technology developments? The thesis has
demonstrated the difficulties that retailers encounter
when introducing new technology within their own
organizations. It is likely that these will be even more
acute as it becomes necessary to liaise with outside
organizations. Therefore, just as the diffusion of EPOS
has been much slower than predicted, so these more recent
innovations will progress more slowly than anticipated.
The constraining factors are-not, as is often claimed, the
hardware or software. The underlying reasons are much
more complex and rest within the organizations themselves.
Until further attention is devoted to the organizational
aspects of introducing new technology into retailing (both
on the part of researchers and the companies themselves)
the rapid developments that are predicted will not take
place and the potential benefits will not be fully
realised.
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GLOSSARY
ADS	 Anker Data Systems: Supplier of EPOS equipment.
ANA	 Article Number Association: The UK organization
responsible for controlling and co-ordinating
the introduction and use of a unified system of
numbering for all manufactured or processed
products (the Article Numbering System).
Barcode	 The article number converted into a
machine-readable form. The barcode consists of
a series of bars and spaces of varying width.
When read by a light pen or laser, the barcode
is translated back to its original number.
EMS	 Building Management System: A computer-based
system used for monitoring and controlling the
energy requirements of a store.
CASS	 Collaborative Award in the Social Sciences.
CIS	 Computer Information System.
DIDOS	 Direct Invoice Delivery Order System: Method by
which invoices and delivery notes are matched
for goods delivered direct to branches.
DTS	 Data Terminal Systems: Supplier of EPOS
systems.
EAN	 European Article Number: International system
for controlling article numbers.
EFTPOS	 Electronic Funds Transfer at Point Of Sale:
Payment for goods by automatically transferring
funds form the customer's bank account to the
retailers.
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EPOS	 Electronic Point Of Sale: A general name for
systems which record sales data at the point of
payment onto cassette tape or computer file.
ESRC	 Economic and Social Research Council.
,
IBM	 International Business Machines: Supplier of
computers and EPOS systems.
ICL	 International Computers Limited: Supplier of
computers and EPOS systems.
IMPROVE	 Inventory Management Product Replenishment and
Order Validity Evaluation.
Laser	 A type of EPOS system usually found in
Scanning supermarkets. Comprises a flat-bed device or
light pen with a low-powered laser to read
barcodes.
MSI
NCR
NISA
MSI Data International: Supplier of PDC units.
National Cash Registers: Supplier of EPOS
systems.
National Independent Supermarkets Association:
Organization representing 352 independent
retailers with the main aim of increasing
buying power.
OPD	 One Per Desk: An ICL personal computer with
telephone attached.
PDC	 Portable Data Capture (Unit): Hand-held device
capable of recording data at the point of
origin and transmitting it, via
telecommunications links, to a central point.
Also called Portable Data Entry Terminals
(PDET).
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PLU	 Price Look Up: System whereby the price of a
product is held on computer file. By entering
the product code at the checkout the file is
automatically accessed and the price
transmitted back to the checkout.
SLIM	 Stock Labour Inventory Management: System used
in conjunction with PDCs for the order and
replenishment of goods in-store.
UPC	 Universal Product Code: United States
equivalent of article numbering.
USDAW
	 Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Workers:
Main union representing the retail trade.
Velocity Short code assigned to the fastest moving items
Code
	 in a store, used in conjunction with PLU
systems.
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APPENDIX A
DIARY OF VISITS TO LAWS STORES: OCTOBER 1983 - MAY 1985 
DATE	 CONTACT AND PURPOSE OF VISIT 
October 1983 
19th	 Personnel Manager: Introductory visit.
' 25th	 Personnel Manager: Store visits.
26th	 Branch Management and Staff: Visit to Shields
Road branch for explanation of company
procedures for the reception of goods at the
backdoor.
31st	 Branch Management and Staff: Visit to Shields
Road branch for explanation of company
procedures for checkout operation,
reconciliation of cash, banking procedures,
etc. Observation of cashiers' meeting.
November 1983 
8th	 Training Officer, Branch Management and Staff:
Visit to stores for explanation and
demonstration of problems associated with
cashier operations and store administration.
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9th	 Warehouse Managerand Staff: Explanation and
demonstration of warehouse systems focusing on
problems of stock-taking and stock results.
11th Training Officer and Branch Staff: Visit to
Shields Road branch for explanation of store
administration including invoices, wages and
branch statements.
15th Head Office Administration Staff: Explanation
and demonstration of administration procedures
for dealing with deliveries from the warehouse
and direct deliveries from suppliers.
16th	 Chief Accountant and Accounts Staff:
Explanation of accounting systems including
purchase ledger; branch stock ledger; delivery
note and invoicing matching/mis-matching.
22nd	 Training Officer and Branch Manager: Visit to
Forest Hall branch for demonstration of
Portable Data Capture (PDC) unit and test
transmission.
23rd	 Chief Accountant and Accounts Staff: Follow up
visit to Accounts Office and Post Room.
29th	 Wages Supervisor: Explanation of payroll
system. Discussion of problems encountered when
system was first computerised.
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30th	 Area Manager and Branch Manager: Visit to
store to understand the operation of the
various departments, eg Provisions, Produce,
Meat. Explanation of ordering systems,
replenishment, merchandising etc. Discussion
of Price Look Up (PUT) tills with Area Manager.
December 1983 
2nd	 Buying Director and Buyers: Introduction to
Buying Department and overview of systems and
procedures.
6th	 Company Secretary and Secretaries: Explanation
of administration procedures by Company
Secretary. Demonstration of word processing
system by secretary.
7th	 Branch Manager: Visit to Whickham branch to
question the Manager on the introduction of PLU
tills into his store.
12th
	 Buyers: Explanation and demonstration of
buying systems. Discussion of problems and
advantages.
14th
	 Data Processing (DP) Manager: Explanation of
the background to introducing in-house data
processing facilities. Detailed description,
in chronological order, of the way in which
all head office and store systems were
332
introduced, the principles behind them and the
problems encountered. General discussion of
the management of change.
February 1984 
23rd	 D.P. Manager: Discussion of the preparation for
laser scanning in Whickham branch.
24th	 Personnel Director: Visit to two stores to
observe the operation of in-store bakeries
which had recently been introduced.
March 1984 
22nd	 Area Manager and Branch Manager: Visit to
Whickham branch to observe preparations for the
introduction of laser scanning. Discussion of
the difficulties encountered, in particular the
problems with barcodes.
26th	 Branch Manager: Visit to Whickham branch to
observe laser scanning on its first day of
'live' operation.
27th	 Chief Cashier and Checkout Operators: Visit to
Whickham branch for further observations of
laser scanning. Discussions with Chief Cashier
and Checkout Operators on the advantages and
disadvantages compared to conventional
checkouts.
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April 1984 
4th	 Personnel Director: Discussion of some of the
issues which had recently arisen relating to
the introduction of PDC's and laser scanning.
5th	 Training Officer and Branch Manager: Visit to
Whickham branch to investigate if the original
'teething troubles' with laser scanning had
been overcome. Discussion with Training
Officer on the way in which new technology had
been introduced.
6th	 Personnel Director and Training Officer: Visit
to head office for attendance at board meeting
as previously arranged. Unfortunately, this was
not agreed by all the board members. However,
whilst waiting, an incident occurred concerning
PDC's which it was possible to observe.
11th Training Officer and Senior Analyst Programmer:
Observation of a meeting between the Training
Officer and the Senior Analyst Programmer.
This covered some of the current problems with
new technology and arrangements for future PDC
transmissions.
12th Buyer: Interviewed one of the buyers to
investigate his department's role in the
introduction of new technology.
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13th	 D.P. Manager: Explanation of the current state
of laser scanning and PDC's and recent
developments within the DP Department.
Senior Analyst Programmer: Discussion of his
own involvement in new developments and
explanation of recent problems with PDC's.
16th	 D.P. Manager: Visit to Morpeth branch to
investigate plans for second laser scanning
installation. Observation of meeting between
DP Manager, Area Manager, Branch Manager and
representatives from NCR covering the
preparations necessary and the timings
involved.
17th	 Training Officer and Branch Manageress:
Visited Jarrow branch to observe their first
'live' transmission with the PDC. Discussion
with the Branch Manageress concerning the
benefits and drawbacks of the new system.
18th	 Computer Operations Manager: Investigated his
involvement in new developments, the nature of
some of the problems that had arisen and how
they had been resolved.
26th	 Computer Operations Manager and Staff: Time
spent in Computer Room observing PDC
transmissions. Explanation and demonstration
of procedures involved by Computer Operations
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staff. Discussion with Computer Operations
Manager covering the problems and benefits of
PDC's and the reactions of branch managers.
Buyer: Discussion with a Buyer on the changes
to be made to the buying and warehousing
system.
27th	 Computer Operations Staff: Further discussion
of PDC transmission.
Personnel Director: Discussion on the
evaluation of laser scanning to be completed by
July. Comparison of checkout speeds of laser
scanning tills compared with those of PLU
tills.
Deputy Branch Manager: Visit to Whickham
branch for their views on the comparison of
laser scanning, PLU and conventional checkouts.
Further observations of laser scanner in
operation.
May 1984 
2nd	 Branch Manager: Visit to Whickham branch to
discuss the present state of the scanning
trial. Observation and interviewing of
checkout operators. Discussion with ADS
representative on the operation of the laser
scanning system.
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	3rd	 Area Manager: Visit to Benwell store to
interview Area Manager. Investigated his views
on the productivity of scanning checkouts and
the benefits of PDC's.
Deputy Branch Manager: Visit to Shields Road
to investigate the performance of their PLU
tills compared to laser scanning.
D.P. Manager: Discussion of his views on the
comparison of checkouts speeds. Observation of
a meeting between the D.P. Manager, Personnel
Director and Operations Director. Followed by
observation of a further meeting between the
D.P. Manager and Personnel Director.
	
4th	 Personnel Director: Visit to Whickham and
Rowlands Gill branches to assist in timing of
checkout operators.
	
9th	 Personnel Director and DP Manager: Observation
of a meeting between the Personnel Director
and D.P. Manager for further discussion of
checkout timings.
	
10th	 Branch Manager and Deputy Manager: Visit to
Morpeth branch and Blaydon branch to
investigate information available from NCR
tills without laser scanning.
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14th	 Personnel Director and DP Manager: Visit to
Morpeth Branch to observe a meeting between the
Personnel Director and D.P. Manager. The
meeting was called to agree a ,method of
investigating checkout productivity before and
after the installation of scanning equipment.
The Branch Manager and a representative from
NCR were also present.
Training Officer: Discussion of latest
developments with laser scanning and PDS's.
Computer Operations Manager: Discussion of
latest developments with PDC's.
15th	 Area Manager: Visit to Askew Road branch for
an interview with Area Manager to discuss the
latest developments with laser scanning and
PDC's.
Attendance at a Briefing Meeting held for all
head office executives. This covered the
current financial state of the company, a new
advertising campaign and other new
developments.
June 1984 
6th	 Personnel Director: Discussion of recent
events concerning checkout productivity.
D.P. Manager: Discussion of checkout
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productivity and preparations for the second
laser scanning trial to be installed at
Morpeth.
7th Personnel Director: Attended a presentation
given by a consultancy firm to demonstrate a
space management software package.
13th	 Deputy Manager: Visit to Morpeth Branch to
observe preparations for the introduction of
laser scanning.
D.P. Manager: Discussion of the problems with
some barcodes.
14th	 Merchandise Accounting Manager: The interview
covered her responsibilities, involvement in
various systems and problems encountered.
Buyer: Investigation of the latest
developments with the buying system.
Area Manager: Visit to Blaydon branch to
interview the Area Manager who reported that
problems with the system at Morpeth has now
been corrected.
18th	 Area Manager and Branch Manager: Visit to
Morpeth to observe scanning on the first day of
'live' operation. Discussions with Area
Manager and Branch Manager.
339
20th	 D.P. Manager: Discussion on the current state
of scanning and possible future developments.
	
21st	 Operations Director: Interview to investigate
the company strategy regarding new technology,
particularly laser scanning, and his own role
in such developments.
Trainee Manager: Visit to Morpeth branch to
observe laser scanning in operation.
July 1984 
	
4th	 Personnel Director: Discussion of the latest
developments with laser scanning. Also
covered future hardware and software
requirements for the computer and past
problems.
	
5th	 Checkout Operators: Visit to Morpeth for
further discussion of laser scanning and
discussions with checkout operators.
	
9th	 Work Study Officer: Visit to Whickham branch
with Work Study Officer for investigation of
'problem products' with barcodes that would not
scan.
17th	 Area Manager: Visit to Benwell store to
inverview Area Manager about his views on the
progress of laser scanning.
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Buyer: Discussion of the buying system and any
possible benefits laser scanning might have for
the Buying Department.
Chairman: Detailed discussion on the company
in general and new technology in particular.
18th Branch Manager: Visit to Morpeth branch to
interview the Branch Manager on the current
state of scanning and future developments.
24th	 Operations Director: Discussion of the
possible introduction of barcoding guns and
scales. Also discussed linking the two laser
scanning branches to the head office computer.
25th	 Branch Manager: Visit to Whickham branch to
interview the Branch Manager regarding benefits
and drawbacks of laser scanning.
D.P. Manager: Detailed interview on the
purchase and introduction of the computer up to
the present day.
August 1984 
22nd	 D.P. Manager: Discussion of the recent
computer failure. Also covered future
development of PDC's.
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30th	 Personnel Director: Discussion of the
preparation of a laser scanning report to be
presented to the board. Also covered recent
computer failure.
Area Manager: Brief up-date on current state
of scanning stores.
October 1984 
	
3rd	 Personnel Director: Discussion of the further
evaluation of laser scanning which he is
undertaking.
	
5th	 D.P. Manager: Discussion of his report on
'Summary of Scanning at Laws Stores Ltd'.
	
10th	 Personnel Director: Interview to investigate
future technological developments.
Deputy Cashier: Visit to Morpeth to
investigate checkout performance and observe
laser scanning.
23rd Personnel Director and Branch Manager: Visit
to Jesmond branch to observe preparations for
the installation of PLU checkouts.
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November 1984 
13th	 Personnel Director: Discussion of possible
future technological developments.
D.P. Manager: Discussion of possible future
technological developments.
20th/21st Personnel Director: Visit to Head Office to
study minutes of meeting relating to new
technology developments from January 1982 to
December 1984 (Appendix C).
27th/28th Personnel Director: Visit to head office to
study memos relating to new technology
developments from January 1982 to December
1984. (Appendix B)
14th	 Training Officer: General discussion on
company philosophy and attitudes to new
technology.
19th	 Personnel Director: Visit to head office for
Christmas lunch.
January 1985 
3rd	 Personnel Director and Training Officer: Brief
visit to head office for update on recent
events and future prospects.
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10th	 Training Officer: Informal discussions with
the Training Officer and other staff about
recent events.
16th	 Personnel Manager (Wm Low): Introduction to
the Personnel Manager of Wm Low. Discussion of
the research project and possibility of
continuing with Wm Low. Also discussed Wm
Low's approach to new technology compared to
that of Laws Stores.
Training Officer and Merchandise Accounting
Manager: Discussion of initial impression of
Wm Low and comparison with Laws.
23rd
	
D.P. Manager: Comparison of Laws Stores and Wm
Low.
24th	 Operations Director: Conducted a structured
interview. Topics covered included the
organization structure of Laws Stores; the
environment in which it operated and attitudes
to new technology (Appendix H).
25th	 Buyer: Conducted a structured interview as
above.
29th	 Training Officer: Announcement made by the
Managing Director of Wm Low.
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February 1985 
7th	 Produce Specialist: Comparison of Laws Stores
and Wm Low.
8th	 Store Manager: Visit to Whickham branch to
discuss laser scanning. Further discussion
comparing Laws Stores with Wm Low.
13th	 D.P. Manager: Discussion on the DP Department
and the computer systems.
Throughout March, April and May structured interviews were
conducted with the following members and ex-members of
Laws Stores. The topics covered included the organization
Structure of Laws, the environment in which it operated
and attitudes to new technology (Appendix H).
March 1985 
13th	 Computer Operations Manager
14th
	
Chief Accountant
15th	 Store Manager, Whickham
18th
	
Merchandise Accounting Manager
Training Officer
21st	 Marketing Assistant
25th	 Area Manager
28th	 D.P. Manager
Senior Area Manager
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April 1985 
1st	 Store Manager, Shields Road
18th	 Chairman
22nd	 Finance Director (resigned June 1984)
May 1985 
7th	 Project Leader (resigned July 1983)
8th	 Personnel Director
Although the Finance Director and Project Leader had left
the company some time prior to the interview, both had
been involved in the introduction of new technology. It
was therefore necessary to interview them in order to
build a complete and balanced picture of events.
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APPENDIX B 
MEMORANDA
DATE	 SENDER AND SUBJECT
3.5.82	 Finance Director - Three Year Plan 1982-85
Inclusive
	
2.8.82	 Personnel Director - Laws Stores - Strengths and
Weaknesses.
	
3.8.82	 Chairman - Impressions and Prospects.
3.8.82	 Finance Director - Impressions of the Laws
Stores Business.
20.8.82 Finance Director - Management Information
Systems Review/Electronic Point of Sale
Equipment.
23.9.82	 DP Manager - PLU Systems.
27.9.82 DP Manager - Visit to Milan Retail Centre.
27.9.82 DP Manager - Hursley One Company Course.
14.12.82 Finance Director - Board Report on Management
Information Systems (MIS).
17.1.83	 Finance Director - Board Report on MIS.
8.2.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
8.3.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
25.3.83	 Finance Director - Future DP Developments.
31.3.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
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29.4.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
23.5.83	 Finance Director - System Responsibilities.
27.5.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
28.6.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
22.8.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
24.8.83	 Chairman - Laser Scanning.
9.9.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
9.9.83	 Finance Director - IBM System 38 Storage
Requirements.
	
12.9.83	 Finance Director - Scanning Pilot.
	
14.9.83	 Finance Director - MIS Report.
	
23.9.83	 Chairman - Conversations at EPOS Exhibition.
	
29.9.83	 DP Manager - Warehouse System.
	
4.10.83	 Systems Analyst - IMPROVE - Daily Ordering.
10.10.83 Chairman - Review Meetings with Pairs of
Executives.
14.10.83 DP Manager - DP Changes.
28.10.83 DP Manager - DP Development.
31.10.83 Chairman - Review Meetings with Pairs of
Executives.
1.11.83	 Company Secretary - DP Development Priorities -
Branch Stock Ledger.
15.11.83 Operations Director - Budgen's Scanning.
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22.3.84	 Chairman - Use of IBM PC.
22.3.84 Personnel Director - Capital Expenditure.
2.4.84	 DP Manager - Management Information Systems.
4.4.84	 Chairman - Scanning - Exploitation and
Appraisal.
19.4.84 DP Manager - Scanning Pilot at Morpeth -
Timetable of Events.
24.4.84 Personnel Director - Scanning Tills.
27.4.84 DP Manager - DP Developments.
2.5.84	 DP Manager - Future DP Developments.
3.5.84	 DP Manager - Scanning Pilots.
4.5.84	 DP Manager - Scanning Timings
24.5.84 Personnel Director - Scanning Evaluation.
25.5.84 Operations Director - Scanning Meeting.
25.5.84 DP Manager - DP Developments.
1.6.84	 Operations Director - DP Priorities.
6.6.84	 DP Manager - Scanning Surveys.
22.6.84 DP Manager - DP Developments.
9.8.84	 Personnel Director - Scanning Evaluation.
20.8.84 DP Manager - Contingency Planning for DP
Failure.
21.9.84	 Chairman - Appraisal of Scanning.
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23.10.84 Personnel Director - Scanning Appraisal.
8.11.84 DP Manager - DP Developments.
6.12.84 DP Manager - DP Developments.
18.12.84 DP Manager - Systems Development at Shops.
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APPENDIX C
MINUTES OF MEETINGS 
DATE
11.3.82
7.4.82
6.5.82
26.8.82
26.1.83
MEETING AND THOSE PRESENT 
Executive Meeting - Directors.
Executive Meeting - Directors.
Executive Meeting - Directors
Executive Meeting Directors
IBM Systems Implementation - Directors, Memlioers
of DP Department, Representatives from IBM.
23.3.83 IBM Systems Implementation - Members of DP
Department, Users Representatives.
6.4.83	 IBM Systems Implementation - Members of DP
Department, Users Representatives,
Representatives from IBM.
27.4.83 IBM Systems Implementation - Members of DP
Department, Users Representatives,
Representatives from IBM.
5.5.83	 IBM Systems Implementation - DP Manager,
Representatives from IBM.
8.6.83	 IBM Systems Implementation - Directors, Members
of DP Department, Users Representatives,
Representatives from IBM.
29.6.83
	 Executive Meeting - Directors.
25.8.83
	 Executive Meeting - Directors.
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12.10.83 Executive Meeting - Members of DP Department,
Representatives from IBM.
19.10.83 Meetings on Management and Staff - Directors.
-
6.12.83	 Executive Meeting - Directors.
1.2.84	 Executive Meeting - Directors.
6.4.84	 Executive Meeting - Directors.
r•..
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APPENDIX D
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS 
DATE	 TITLE/DESCRIPTION
17.10.67	 Brochure to Commemorate the 'Official Opening
of New Office Block and Central Packing
Station'.
14.10.82	 1982 Suppliers Conference. Text of
Presentations made by the Chairman and Buying
Director.
March 1983 A Report by OGC on the Conclusion of a
Follow-up Market Research Study.
30.8.83	 Report on a Visit to the USA by the Finance
Director and DP Manager arranged by IBM.
Aug. 1983
	 Portable Data Capture Unit - Application
User's Manual.
9.9.83	 Photocopying Facilities (evaluation and
costings).
9.1.84	 Background Information to Advertising
Agencies for a Presentation for New
Advertising Campaign for Laws.
	
30.4.84	 Visit to Portsea Island Co-op.
	
25.5.84	 Document produced by Work Study Officer
detailing problems with barcodes.
Sept. 1984 A Summary of Scanning at Laws Stores Ltd.
Various
	 Weekly Notes (communication to stores).
Various
	 Marketing Notes (communication to stores).
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Various	 Laws Gazette (company newspaper).
Unknown	 Background Information to Advertising
Agencies for a Presentation on a new
Advertising Campaign for Laws.
Unknown	 Possible Press Release: Laws Stores Limited -
Development of New Supermarket Checkouts.
Unknown	 Potted History of Laws Stores.
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APPENDIX E
SAMPLE INTERVIEW - UNSTRUCTURED
BRANCH MANAGER - 13 JULY 1984 
Q. In retrospect how do you view the preparation and
implementation of laser scanning?
A. The preparation was not as good as it could have been
and the company systems were to blame for this. If
the price changes had come through earlier we would
not have had as much work to do on Sunday. As we're
the first to do this we had no-one else's experience
to go on. We couldn't anticipate how long it would
take and the price changes took a lot longer than we
expected. If we'd had more money it would have been
easier, but we had to do it with normal wage
constraints and everything else.
Q. Were you adequately consulted?
A. Yes, certainly - everything that the Area Manager or
D.P. Manager knew they passed on to me. But they
were very much in the dark too because it's not the
same system as the other store.
Q. Do you anticipate any further difficulties?
A.	 No, I think we've got everying ironed out.
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Q. Are you developing any new systems?
A. If it was my decision, I would use the 'dot sytems'
differently. The majority of grocery items are
barcoded but we are still putting green dots on the
shelf-edge labels. In reality all the barcoded items
which scan O.K. could be left without dots. This
would save time and money.
Q. Do you have any method of identifying problem
barcodes?
A. The girls on the checkouts have a pencil and paper
handy to make a note of anything not in the file or
which repeatedly fails to scan and then they come and
see me with the list. For example, we didn't expect
Baxters to change their barcode for no reason and
without prior notice. Also, barcodes change for
customer offers and flash packs and these may not be
in the file.
Q. Have the staff accepted the changes?
A. Yes, the checkout operation is now more
sophisticated, they have to know the different
departments, be able to scan, weigh produce on the
- scales, use the numeric pad and know the different
fruit and vegetable lines. Previously it would only
take a girl a couple of hours to be proficient in
till operation, now it takes much longer and this has
been seen with a Saturday girl who started since the
introduction of scanning. This is not something
which can be taught but can only be done through
experience which is best gained when the shop is
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quiet. Scanning does not make bad operators into
good ones, or good ones into bad ones. In some cases
it has made good operators better. One advantage is
that it eliminates having to look for a price because
the ticket has fallen off, which used to be a
problem, particularly on frozen foods.
Q. Have the customers accepted the changes?
A. Yes, very well. The new system makes it easier to
check off their receipt and this has been appreciated
by some customers. Acceptance has been helped by
gradual implementation of the changes, and this has
also helped the checkout girls.
Q. How do you view the quality of shelf-edge labelling?
A. Its very poor, it peels off at the top right hand
corner and dries up like a slice of cooked meat.
They get very dirty and often have to be placed over
the rivets. A plastic label is needed, although
something is being done about this now it should have
been thought out before.
Ordering new labels is a large job because the six
digit code has to be written on the order form for
each label. So it's easier to order a whole new
batch. We have ordered three new sets so far and put
about half the tickets on. The cost of plastic
tickets, if they cost three times as much they would
have already paid for themselves as we've replaced
them three times.
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Q. How much time is saved in no longer having to price
the goods?
A. Time is now saved throughout the whole pricing
operation. This is not just time saved in pricing a
case of goods, but also looking for guns, changing
ticket rolls, finding the price book, etc. A measure
of this is that takings have increased by £5,000
because of the usual summer peak, but I have not had
to take on any more staff as I usually would, the
increased work load has just been absorbed. Whereas
before one girl could do two sections, she probably
now does four sections. The price books are no
longer used, therefore they can easily be found and
there are no missing pages.
Q. How long does it take to do price changes?
A. Price changes are probably quicker now. For
increases, the ticketing is done first, and for
decreases, the price in the memory is changed first.
Q. Has the speed of throughput at the checkout canged at
all?
A.
	
	
I don't know because all my till results are sent to
the DP Manager at the end of the week.
Has checkout security improved?
A We'll have to wait for the stock results before I can
answer that. I have believed for a long time that
the amount of money lost through wrong keying in is
greater than the allowance given. Very often the
girls think they know a price and don't look, when,
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in fact, the price may have changed. So I do believe
the stock results will have improved. However, we
have also dismissed a dishonest twilight shift
supervisor, so that could account for some
,
improvement in stock results which I expect.
In addition, previously when the price of an item
increased I had to declare the number of cases in the
backshop, on which I would be charged the increased
rate. Now, however, we still only declare backshop
stock, although the goods on the shelves are also
being bought by the customer at the increased price.
This should also effect stock results favourably.
Q. Have there been any general improvements in
discipline?
A. Yes, there is more discipline because the label tells
you what goes on the shelf and the spacing of the
labels tells you how many facings their should be.
It is also easier to fill the shelves, anyone can do
it.
Q.	 Is the data obtained of any use?
A. Not really because it comes out in the form of a till
receipt and in a random order. The algorithm used to
determine the order is very complicated. The memory
required to be able to produce it in a usable order
is too expensive for this machine. For larger shops
you can attach a 'grand master' which will support a
printer. The present system will only support a
maximum of eight satellites. Another difficulty is
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that the machine cannot be reset (for example, to
record the number of items sold that week) without
printing all of the current memory. Maybe this could
be done if I asked the engineers.
Q. How do you view the introduction of barcoding guns
and scales?
A. Scales are going to be introduced soon and I'm
pleased about that. The checking-out of provisions
is very time consuming as two hands are required to
open the bag out. Guns would only be of benefit if
all the information was used to give a complete
picture. The barcoding guns are ten times more
expensive than normal guns and do not give any direct
benefit.
Q. Do you think a computer link to head office would be
beneficial?
A. A link to head office would be worthwhile as a pilot
test. Things have to be piloted to try them out and
we might as well get ahead now that we've got
scanning here. It would also be of advantage in
doing price changes as the system the company has now
makes it a 'rush job'. If we knew in advance we
could apply a 'batch number' to initiate price
changes at a later date. The buyers must know the
price in advance but they always do the changes on
Friday. The buying department is always being
criticised, for example, we can have up to a hundred
out of stocks in any one week and they may take two
weeks to come in. We have to apply orange dots to
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the shelf-edge labels so that when they do come in
they are brought into the office for price changing
in the file memory.
Q.	 Should laser scanning be extended to other branches?
A. Yes, I believe so. The cost can be justified, for
example, as I've avoided bringing extra staff in over
the summer, my wage costs are now a lower precentage
in relation to sales. Its particularly beneficial
where a twilight shift is in operation. This is
already the most economical way of filling the
shelves but could be improved still further by not
having to price the goods and the associated cost
benefits.
Q. Is there anything you would like to comment on that
we haven't covered?
A. One or two customer reactions have been unexpected,
for example new customers don't realise we have
scanning, they think that because the goods are not
priced the girls have to remember the prices and
therefore don't trust this method.
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APPENDIX F
SAMPLE INTERVIEW - STRUCTURED
The following interview was undertaken with a senior
member of Laws Stores management on 14th March 1985. In
order to preserve confidentiality some answers have been
left blank.
****** *********
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - LAWS STORES 
Interviewer: The aim of the interview is to investigate
how the people who worked for Laws Stores perceived the
company. However, before doing so I have • a few
preliminary questions.
1. Firstly, how long have you been with the company?
A.	 Three years.
2. Which department do you work in?
A.
3. What is your job title?
A.
4. Have you worked in any other departments in the
company?
A.	 No.
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SHOW CARD 1 (diagrammatic)
1. Which of these 4 types of organization most closely
fits your view of Laws Stores.
A. The company was mostly like type B.
Instructions flowed down, but information didn't flow
back up, and we never really got comprehensive
instructions. There wasn't much co-ordination
between departments, any disagreements we had went up
to director level, along and then back down again.
It should have worked more like an organic type of
company, with the task determining what resources
were required and what the priorities were. But in
our case the resources and priorities were given and
we had to make the best of them.
SHOW CARD 2 
2. Which of these 4 categories most closely describes
Laws?
A. Laws most closely resembled type 4, but not in all
cases. For example, with the computer they were
innovative, but in ther areas they were just not
competing, such as bakeries and fruit and vegetables,
they just followed the trend. With computers they
were trying to improve performance, for example
ordering, to give the customer what she required.
They were trying to make the logistics more effective
rather than trying to improve the product. They
could have diversified product lines, in the case of
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•Control
Type B: Instructions flow from
the top downwards. Relatively
little co-ordination between
departments.
CARD I 
High
Type A: Instructions flow Integration Type C:.All employees take part
from the top downwards. Fairly
high degree of co-ordination
between
departmentAs.
0104
41110
in decision making with a fairly
high degree of commitment to the
company.
High Low
Low
Integration
Control
Type D: All employees take part
in decision making. Little
co-operation between departments.
Low commitment to the company.
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CARD 2 
TYPE 1. This type of company has a narrow and specialised
market. Top managers are highly expert in this area of
operation but do not search elsewhere for new
opportunities. As a result of its narrow focus, this type
of company seldom needs to make any major changes in its
technology, structure or methods of operation. Instead,
it devotes most attention to improving the efficiency of
its operation.
TYPE 2. This company almost continually searches for new
market opportunites and regularly experiments with new
ideas. Thus, this type of company is often the creator of
change to which its competitors must respond. However,
because of its strong concern for product and market
innovation it is unlikely to be completely efficient.
TYPE 3. This type of company operates in two types of
market, one relatively stable the other changing. In the
stable market it operates routinely and efficiently
through the use of formal rules and procedures. In the
more changeable area, top managers watch their competitors
closely for new ideas, and then rapidly adopt those which
appear most promising.
TYPE 4. This company is one in which managers frequently
see change occurring in their area but are unable to
respond effectively. Because this company lacks a
consistent strategy, it seldom makes changes of any sort
until forced to do so by outside pressures.
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wines and spirits, they were only forced into it in
recent years because of market pressures, but
otherwise they wouldn't have done it.
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
1. Can you tell me which people - both inside and
outside the company - you deal frequently with in
your work, say once a week?
A. I deal most frequently with accounts staff and
supervisors such as the wages supervisor. I also
deal with the Finance and Administration Director and
other members of the Board quite a lot.
2. Is this mainly verbal or written communication?
A.	 It is mainly verbal communication, especially with
the accounts staff. There is some written
communication with Directors and the Board as a
whole, such as memos on capital expenditure and
monthly reports for Board Meetings.
CONTROL OF THE ORGANIZATION
Interviewer	 I would now like to investigate how
decisions were taken within the company.
1.	 Can you tell me who was involved in decisions about
wage negotiations?
A.	 USDAW influenced the wage rates for staff. In our
case, middle management had a say in wage rates for
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the Finance Department, but only because the Director
was willing to discuss it with us.
2. Who was involved in decisions about recruitment and
promotion of a senior member of staff, say a Branch
Manager or equivalent?
A. The influence Directors had on recruitment and staff
promotions varied depending on the director and the
vacancy. Middle management didn't have much room for
manoeuvre, they had some say in promotion within
their own department, but they had no say in
recruitment generally as it was politically not on.
3. Who was involved in decisions about the setting of
budgets?
A. These were controlled mainly by the Chairman and
Operations Director, with the other Directors having
some say. Middle management, such as the Area
Managers, had very little influence.
4. Who was involved in decisions about capital
expenditure?
A. Again, this was decided by the Chairman and
Operations Director. I don't know how much influence
the other Directors had because I don't know how many
unsuccessful proposals they made. A few people lower
down had some influence, such as the D.P. Manager and
Property Services Manager.
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5. Who was involved in decisions about pricing policy?
A. The Chairman had considerable influence over the
pricing structure, the Marketing Director also had
quite a lot, but the others had very little. The
Buyers obviously had some input because it affected
the budgets they had to work to.
6. Who was involved in the choice of outside
consultants, such as the advertising agency?
A. It was really down to the Chairman to choose the
advertising agency. The Marketing Director had some
influence as he took the Chairman along to the agency
and was able to contribute to the discussions.
7. Who was involved in decisions about computer software
packages?
A. The Finance Director had most say in the purchase of
software packages. That's the way it should be, the
specialist should know the right one and make the
decisions and then it should be either rubber stamped
or vetoed by the others. Middle management initially
had no say, but towards the end as we had more of an
overview and as packages became more integrated, we
would have expected to be consulted.
8. Who decided on the priorities for computerisation?
A. The Finance Director mainly decided priorities and
the Chairman would mostly go along with this.
Priorites could be changed if you could take the
trouble to over-turn them. Myself and the D.P.
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Manager were the only ones who were really
interested.
9. Who was involved in decisions about branch trading,
stock levels, dispensations, etc?
A. The Operations Director would probably have most say
in this area, although suggestions might come from
other Directors. The Area Managers also had some
influence.
10. Who was involved in merchandising and display
decisions?
A. The Chairman and Operations Director had influence
over merchandising to an inordinate degree. They
shouldn't have got bogged down in such detail but
should have •worked on more strategic issues. The
Buyers and Area Managers would also have some say in
merchandising.
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Interviewer : I now wish to look at the organization in
terms of its structure and its relationship with the
outside world.
1. How strong would you say the competition in the area
was?
A.	 Competition is very strong in this area.
2. How susceptible was the company to changes in
competitor activity?
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A. The company was very susceptible to such things as
new store openings, price changes, etc.
3. What was the rate of staff turnover like compared to
other supermarket chains?
A. Its difficult to say what the rate of staff turnover
was like, it was probably less than major chains
because the staff were happier. The large proportion
of part-time staff has pushed up the turnover rate
because such staff tend to be less reliable. The
money they earn isn't very much and therefore it
dosen't matter that much to them if they leave.
4. To what extent did the company observe the outside
environment for any changes that might be taking
place?
A. The company didn't observe the outside enough, this
is my particular 'hobby-horse'. They didn't try to
get any information, except for the most obvious
statistics, on a week by week basis and thereby
wrestle market share from competitors. They just
didn't take enough of a global view.
5. To what extent did it imitate competitor's activity?
A. Imitation of other stores was less than average. We
may have dropped our prices, but not always. We
often did promotions at the same time as others.
6. To what extent did the company adopt original ideas?
A. We adopted some original ideas, such as
computerisation - it has to do with the Chairman
being an academic. As it was technical, it was more
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up his street rather than anything concerned with the
market place. The trouble is that the ancillary
areas were pursued rather than the core of the
business. For example, the advertising strategy was
new, with the idea of the three stages and different
promotions slotted in and also getting the
manufacturers involved in paying for it. However,
most things were not new.
7. How would you rate the planning process for new
projects?
A. Unfortunately, planning was not all it should have
been. It was not at the level of detail required, it
did not concentrate on strategic decisions but became
bogged down in detail. Things should have been
reported to directors on an exception basis, with an
operating board or management committee to take all
the day to day decisions. Instead, what used to
happen was the Board would spend all day every
Tuesday in meetings, they took all day to discuss
operating problems and would spend half an hour at
5pm to discuss strategy.
8. To what extent did the company evaluate projects
after their introduction?
A. They would evaluate projects on an operational or
technical basis, but would evaluate effectiveness,
for example throughput, to a lot lesser degree.
Unfortunately, the culprits were never brought to
bear. The situation was one of the tail wagging the
dog, by that I mean computerisation was pushing the
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company rather than the company defining what it
wanted from computerisation. There was always more
intention to evaluate trading projects but they were
never scientific and no-one was willing to learn from
experience.
9. How much communication was there in the company
between people at the opposite ends of the hierarchy?
A. That depends whether you mean 'conversation' or
'communication'. The Chairman was the patriarch, so
conversation was just a good PR job, but there was no
real communication, very little feedback. Some
people who'd been here a long time would provide him
with some feedback, but it wasn't structured. We
should have had regular meetings for people to
provide feedback. Unfortunately, the Chairman and
directors didn't listen to the shop floor,
communication was all formal.
10. How much communication was there between departments?
A. There was very little communication between
departments, far too little, and even less
co-operation (excluding the D.P. Department). There
was a great deal of departmental friction with
traditional lines of demarcation. Operations were
very distant from Marketing, and Accounts was the
'leper in the corner' trying to catch people out.
However recently, departmental barriers were being
broken down, mainly because of computerisation which
reaches across disciplines. For example, we had
project meetings for all those involved in a
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particular project. People were becoming aware and
more tolerant. They now had a common hate the
computer!
With the branches it was 'us and them' - There was no
two-way communication. The Operations Director felt
strongly that the branches should not be bogged down
in administration. It would have been better if I
could have gone out and explained to Branch Managers
the importances and significance of things they were
doing, the forms they sent us and the printouts and
things we sent them. Unfortunately, the Operations
director wouldn't allow it.
OPEN QUESTIONS 
1. If the outside environment was being observed at all
by the company, which was the main department or
individual doing this?
A. From a marketing point of view, information would be
gained from trade press and from discussions with
suppliers. Directors also visited some of our
competitors, including Wm Low.
2. Which was generally considered the most important
department within the company?
A. Marketing was generally considered the most
important. They set the prices and dictated what
people bought. Marketing was also blamed for
Operations faults, for example they blamed their own
problems on poor pricing and poor buying,	 so
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marketing carried the can. Operations may have been
thought of as more important but they weren't treated
that way, no-one even bothered to visit the stores,
never mind investing money in improving them. Data
Processing went across all departments and the
company placed great emphasis on it, although it was
doing development work at the moment, eventually it
would have become a maintenance function.
3. Did the introduction of new technology over the
period of the last three years cause many differences
of opinion?
A. The question of priorities, for development and
processing time, was the most contentious. Each
department had differing demands and even within
departments there were differences. As I've already
said, the way of resolving these would be to go up to
Director level, across and back down again. The
Finance Director wore two hats, Finance and Data
Processing. On a number of occasions D.P. were found
wanting and Finance remedied it. They thought
appearances had to be kept up for the sake of morale,
but I think the Chairman and his son should have been
shown what was going on, warts and all. For example,
the purchase ledger programme was not suitable, I
don't know what criteria were used to choose it, but
we were never asked our opinion. Decisions were
often delivered to us as a 'fait accompli'. Some
people were empire building and we just had to go
along with it.
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The workload was increased because of the
computerisation and there was a problem of achieving
deadlines. The time-scales were all wrong, the
workload was too great and the timetable too short, I
told the Chairman and Finance Director about it, but
it didn't do any good. The only reason things got
done, and at one point we were within a hair's
breadth of losing it all, was because of individuals'
commitment to it and desire to see that it was
successful. This was just the result of personal
commitment to the project and wanting it to succeed.
I'm thinking here of myself and the D.P. lads. Very
often it was informal relationships and alliances
that got things done. The prime movers got together,
agreed what needed to be done and carried it out.
4. There are some who say that Laws managed to keep
going so long because of the introduction of new
technology, whilst others say it was the investment
in new technology which accelerated the company's
decline, which view do you take?
A. In three years time the systems would have been
perfect and the company working smoothly. On balance
we've probably broken even on computing, it has
enabled us to make better decisions, quicker. In
all, it probably cost us a million pounds.
We could have gone on longer without the computer,
but not stronger. We needed to generate more profit
to invest in stores. Computers were the answer if
you were taking a long term view, but if we were
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already going down the drain they were not the
solution. Finances were depleted and assets were not
secured, these after all were the Chairman's
insurance policy. By July the systems would have
been good.
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W/C 2 SEPTEMBER 1985 AND 21 OCTOBER 1985	 Appendix G
SUMMARY OF VISITS TO WM LOW, DUNDEE. 
The last two visits to Wm Low were made to conduct more
structured interviews (see Appendix H). This enabled
comparisons to be made with Laws Stores and relevant
issues, identified in previous visits, to be probed
further.
Interviews were conducted with the following:
Marketing Manager
Information Systems Controller
Store Manager
Methods Manager
Managing Director
Inventory Controller
Retail Controller
Productivity and Distribution Controller
Head Grocery Buyer
Office Services Manager
Store Manager
Technical Services Manager
Personnel Manager
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APPENDIX H
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - WM LOW
The aim of the interview is to investigate how the people
who work for Wm Low perceive the company. However, before
doing so I have a few preliminary questions.
1. Firstly, how long have you been with the company?
2. Which department do you work in?
3. What is your job title?
4. Have you worked in any other departments in the
company?
Show Card 1 (diagrammatic). 
1. Which of these 4 types of organization most closely
fits your view of Wm Low?
Show Card 2 
2. Which of these 4 categories most closely describes Wm
Low?
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COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
Can you tell me which people, both inside and outside the
organization, you deal frequently with in your work, say
once a week.
Is this mainly verbal, written or both?
NAME
	
TYPE
(V, W, B)
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CONTROL OF THE ORGANIZATION
I should now like to investigate how decisions are taken
within the company.
1. Who is involved in decisions about wage negotiations?
Name	 Comments 
2. Who is involved in decisions about recruitment and
promotion of a senior member of staff, say a Branch
Manager or equivalent?
3. Who is involved in decisions about the settin g of
budgets?
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4. Who is involved in decisions about capital expenditure?
5. Who is involved in decisions about pricing policy?
6. Who is involved in decisions about the choice of
outside consultants, eg advertising agency, computer
consultants?
7. Who is involved in decisions about computer hardware
purchases?
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8. Who decides what are the priorities for
computerisation?
9. Who is involved in decisions about stock range,
de-listing etc?
10. Who is involved in merchandising and display
decisions?
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
I now wish to look at the organization in terms of its
structure and its relationship with the outside world.
1. How strong would you say competition in the area is?
2. How susceptible is the company to changes in
competitors' activity?
3. What is the rate of staff turnover like compared to
other supermarket chains?
4. To what extent does the company observe the outside
environment for any changes which might be taking
place?
5. To what extent does it imitate competitors' activity?
6. To what extent does it adopt original ideas?
7. How would you rate its planning process for new
projects?
8. To what extent does it evaluate such projects after
their introduction?
9. How much communication is there within the company
between people at the opposite ends of the hierarchy?
10. How much communication is their between departments?
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OPEN QUESTIONS 
1. If the outside environment is being observed at all by
the company, which is the main individual or
department doing this?
2. Is there a department or area of the company which is
generally considered the most important?
3. Who would you say initiates changes in the company?
4. Do you consider there to be a large degree of risk in
undertaking technological change?
5. How do you view the future of the food retailing
industry?
6. What part do you think new technology will play in
this?
7. What new technology do you think Wm Low will introduce
over the next two years?
8. Finally, what do you consider to be the strengths and
weaknesses of Wm Low?
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PHASE ONE: THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO LAWS STORES HEAD OFFICE AND WAREHOUSE 
APPENDIX I 
DATE GENERAL HARDWARE/
OPERATING PROGRAMMES FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS PURCHASE LEDGER GENERAL LEDGER PAYRCLL DIDOS WAREHOUSE PURCHASING TEXT PROCESSING PERSONNEL
1982
JANUARY Computer Proposal
submitted.
User Visits to IBM
APRIL Project Manager
appointed.
Decision to purchase
IBM System 38.
MAY Most packages identified.D.P. Manager appointed
AUGUST Laser Scanning Proposal
agreed.
Computer and operating
programmes installed.
Work in first stages.
Tested and demonstrated.
Work begun. Work begun.
SEPTEMBER Re	 ofview 	 Educacation
and Training.
3370 Dis	 de livere d.k Lficulties encountered
 •	 IBM.
Progressing. Shipment due but not arrived. Urgent attention to
Software	 -	 IBM.
OCTOBER
IBM Course for Directors.
VW Training for Executives.
5225 Printer delivered.
Live data input into
Computer.
Arrived.
NOVEMBER Visit to IBM Milan. Sales statistics produced
-	 Trial Balance.
Wages Report produced.
DECEMBER
1983
JANUARY
Visit to Germany. Hardware delivered: CPU boards;VDUs;
	 Controllers; Printer.
Latest operating software
installed.
rograms installed.
1
Mrk progressing.
Accounts produced entirely
from Computer.
Hourly payroll - operational.
Monthly payroll - testing.
Timetable agreed.
Scheduled introduction
March.
Functional fit exercise.
Agreement on Proposed
System.
Program installed.
Test data installed,
Work progressing.
Decision required on
Package.
Printer installed.
Education and Training
for Staff.
Installed.	 Loading of
data to begin.
Test program installed.Report writer developed.
Budgets being input.
All	 'Live' except Pensions. Awaiting Warehouse
developments.
FEBRUARY Education proceeding. Upgrade Processor. ocumentation andducation.
All programs operational. Work progressing.
Integrated with Warehouse.
File creation. Decision made on
Package.
Input progressing.
,
MARCH
Visit to Sweden.
Critical time - last
week bureau.
Live'. Running satisfactorily. Input testing and
amendment.
Parallel run for
2 weeks.
Production of documents. Input almost complete.
APRIL
MIS fully operational
in-house.	 Bureau ceased.
More VDUs required. Live Run.
	 lirst cheque run O.K.
Branch stock ledger
produced.
'Bugs'. Branch charging incorrect. Satisfactory progress.Problems with cables.
'Live'	 for 2 weeks.
Some problems.
Input almost complete.
MAY
Review of System
Responsibilities, Financial
Accounts, Warehouse,
Purchasing - all operational.
More VDUs and Controller
ordered,
rogress O.K. Year-End unbalanced -
written-off,
Some problems. Cable faults reduced. System fault - somedata lost.
JUNE Awaiting VDUs. Problems linking Computer 	 brk on link to DIDOS.
to text printer for	 mendments to Branchtock Ledger.reports.
Clerks and VDUs to be
monitored to establish
workload/staffing.
Invoices issued -
some problems.
Clear run. Warehouse
data input wrong,
Response times slow.
More training.	 Printer
performance investigated,
Back-up procedure
reviewed.
JULY Visit to USA.IBM communication devices
disappointing.
Cancellation of Second
System 38.
AUGUST Chairman recommends deferral
of scanning because of
error in MIS.
Problems - manual	 ionputer cheque runs
preparation of information.
	 *gin*
Checking of data.
Review required.
-
SEPTEMBER Agreed to defer
scanning
Extra Disk required.	 IBM to
review hardware requirements.
i
Errors in charging
documents.
	
! ntroduction of controls.
Wdor review required.
Stocktake satisfactory.
Enhancements required.
Rardmseonies-
required
system'Lh%e
Cbanges	 by
Buyersput on priority list.
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PHASE TWO: THE INTRODUCTION OF IN-STORE SYSTEMS
	
APPENDIX 3'
DATE	 GENERAL	 PDC's	 LASER SCANNING
1982
AUGUST
1
Proposal	 agreed.
1983
HAY Quotes	 for	 PDC's.
Trial	 scheduled
for	 June.
JUNE Report	 by work	 study
officer.
AUGUST Training	 In-Store Chairman	 proposes deferral.
SEPTEMBER Manual	 written.
Successful	 test
transmission.
Proposal	 to defer
scanning agreed.
OCTOBER
1984
FEBRUARY
Problems encountered.
Board authorises
purchase.
MARCH Pilot	 live	 in	 first	 store.
APRIL Chairman's memo on
exploitation &	 evaluation.
DP Manager's	 report.	
.
Plans timetabled	 for
second	 store.	 Personnel
Director	 reports on
checkout	 speeds.
MAY DP Manager's
memo on future
development,
Implementation on
target.
Agreement	 reached on
positive
	 solution	 for
second	 store.	 DP
Manager's memo on
reconciling	 views.	 Memos
by	 Personnel	 Director	 and
Operations	 Director.
JUNE DP	 projects
prioritised.
Finance Director
resigns.
Implementation near
completion.
Second	 store	 'live'.
Problems with	 barcodes.
JULY 2	 new staff
appointed
	 for
DP Dept.
Implementation	 in all
shops.	 Review of
extending capabilities
to include	 frozen and
chilled	 foods.
Outline	 review agreed.
Report	 to	 be	 issued	 at
end	 of August.
	 Barcoding
guns on	 trial	 in	 first
store.
AUGUST Total	 DP	 failure.
Machine	 'down'
for	 almost	 a	 week.
Personnel	 Director's memo
on	 checkout	 productivity.
SEPTEMBER DP Manager's summary and
outline	 of	 options.
Chairman's memo	 requesting
comprehensive	 evaluation.
OCTOBER Personnel	 Director's	 memo.
NOVEMBER DP Manager's memo	 on
evaluation	 of	 'hard'
benefits.	 Two	 stores	 to
be	 proposed	 early	 in	 1985.
DECEMBER Tested	 for	 chilled
foods.
DP Manager's memo on
system development	 in
shops.	 Proposes meeting
early	 in New	 Year.
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APPENDIX K
P.D.C. TRANSMISSION RECORD SHEET W/E 9/6/84 
DAY SHOP NUMBER OF
ATTEMPTS
COMMENTS
MONDAY HN 2 DIDN'T PRESS THEIR ENTER
IN TIME
MONDAY QC 4 ESTAB. LINE ERROR
MONDAY NR 2 NOT CONTACTING
TUESDAY NH 2 NOT CONTACTING
TUESDAY LS 2 NOT CONTACTING
WEDNESDAY NA 4 SYNC TIMING
WEDNESDAY AX 2 NOT CONTACTING
WEDNESDAY NR 2 NOT CONTACTING
THURSDAY HN 2 FAILED
THURSDAY XH 2 FAILED
THURSDAY XD 2 FAILED
THURSDAY NA 2 LINE ERROR
THURSDAY NC 2 SYNC TIMING
THURSDAY XY 2 ERROR IN DATA
THURSDAY ZA 2 NOT CONTACTING
THURSDAY AH 100 EVERYTHING
FRIDAY AS 2
,
FRIDAY QS 3 ERROR IN DATA
FRIDAY AD 2 FIRST TRANSMISSION
FRIDAY
_
HN 3
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